Foster v. Anderson
| Citation | 165 F.Supp.3d 781 |
| Decision Date | 29 February 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. C14–3043–LTS,C14–3043–LTS |
| Parties | Azzel Mickey Lee Foster, Plaintiff, v. Dr. Arnold Anderson and Bradley Kinte, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
Hannah Marie Vellinga, Corbett, Anderson, Corbett, Vellinga & Irvin, LLP, Sioux City, IA, for Plaintiff.
H. Loraine Wallace, Department of Justice, Des Moines, IA, for Defendants.
Plaintiff Azzel Mickey Lee Foster, previously committed to the care and custody of the Iowa Department of Corrections (DOC), commenced this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on July 22, 2014, by filing a pro se motion (Doc. No. 1) for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. After the motion was granted, his pro se complaint (Doc. No. 3) was filed on October 31, 2014.
On the same date, attorney Hannah Vellinga was appointed to represent Foster. She filed an appearance (Doc. No. 4) and an amended complaint (Doc. No. 5) on December 15, 2015. The amended complaint names two defendants, Dr. Arnold Andersen and Bradley Kintigh,1 and asserts that while Foster was in DOC custody, the defendants were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need and provided inadequate medical care. Foster seeks compensatory and punitive damages as well as attorney fees and other relief.
The defendants have moved for summary judgment (Doc. No. 14). Foster has not filed a timely resistance. No party has requested oral argument and, in any event, I find that oral argument is not necessary. See N.D. Ia. L.R. 7(c). The motion is fully submitted and ready for decision.
I find the facts set forth below to be undisputed for purposes of defendants' motion for summary judgment:2
The Parties. During the events that gave rise to this action, Foster was an inmate at the Fort Dodge Correctional Facility (FDCF) in Fort Dodge, Iowa. Foster has since been released and is no longer in the care and custody of the DOC. Dr. Arnold Andersen is a psychiatrist for the DOC. Bradley Kintigh is a correctional officer at the FDCF.
Relevant Events. Foster began serving a two-year sentence on January 23, 2014. During this sentence, Foster spent time at the FDCF from March 4, 2014, until October 22, 2014. On May 30, 2014, Foster was taken to health services on two separate occasions for complaints of dizziness, headaches and blurred vision. The complaint alleges, among other things, that Kintigh “almost banged [Foster's] knee on the entrance of the doorway” while transporting Foster to health services. During both visits, Foster was attended to by nurse staff.
The FDCF maintains written grievance procedures through which inmates may seek the resolution of complaints and issues. On May 30, 2014, Foster submitted a grievance concerning “poor medical treatment and poor assistance to someone in need of emergency.” Grievance Officer Dawn Fulton responded to the grievance in writing. While the grievance procedures include an appeals process, Foster did not appeal the initial response. Thus, he did not exhaust all available administrative procedures. Additionally, the medical care provided to Foster by nurse staff and Dr. Andersen was timely and met all medical standards.
Any party may move for summary judgment regarding all or any part of the claims asserted in a case. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
A material fact is one that “ ‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.’ ” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Thus, “the substantive law will identify which facts are material.” Id . Facts that are “critical” under the substantive law are material, while facts that are “irrelevant or unnecessary” are not. Id .
An issue of material fact is genuine if it has a real basis in the record, Hartnagel v. Norman, 953 F.2d 394, 395 (8th Cir.1992) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ), or when “ ‘a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party on the question,” Woods v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 409 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir.2005) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ). Evidence that only provides “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, or evidence that is “merely colorable” or “not significantly probative,” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, does not make an issue of material fact genuine.
As such, a genuine issue of material fact requires “sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute” so as to “require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248–49, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The party moving for entry of summary judgment bears “the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record which show a lack of a genuine issue.” Hartnagel, 953 F.2d at 395 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ). Once the moving party has met this burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and by depositions, affidavits, or otherwise, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Mosley v. City of Northwoods, 415 F.3d 908, 910 (8th Cir.2005). The nonmovant must show an alleged issue of fact is genuine and material as it relates to the substantive law. If a party fails to make a sufficient showing of an essential element of a claim or defense with respect to which that party has the burden of proof, then the opposing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
In determining if a genuine issue of material fact is present, I must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587–88, 106 S.Ct. 1348. Further, I must give the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the facts. Id. However, “because we view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we do not weigh the evidence or attempt to determine the credibility of the witnesses.” Kammueller v. Loomis, Fargo & Co., 383 F.3d 779, 784 (8th Cir.2004). Instead, “the court's function is to determine whether a dispute about a material fact is genuine.” Quick v. Donaldson Co., Inc., 90 F.3d 1372, 1376–77 (8th Cir.1996).
The amended complaint alleges that defendants denied adequate medical care and were deliberately indifferent to Foster's serious medical need. In moving for summary judgment, defendants argue (a) that they did not violate Foster's Eighth Amendment rights, (b) that his claims are barred by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), (c) that they are entitled to qualified immunity and (d) that the claims against Kintigh are barred by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).
As noted above, Foster failed—despite being represented by counsel—to resist defendants' motion for summary judgment. Nor did Foster request an extension of the resistance deadline or take any other action concerning the motion. Foster's resistance deadline expired over five months ago, meaning Foster had ample opportunity to respond. Ignoring the motion was poor practice.3
Because no response has been filed, defendants' motion may be granted without further notice. See N.D. Ia. L.R. 7(f) (); N.D. Ia. L.R. 56(c) (). Nonetheless, I must consider the merits of the motion to determine whether defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Maxwell v. Linn County Correctional Center, 310 Fed.Appx. 49, 49–50 (8th Cir.2009) (citing Johnson v. Boyd–Richardson Co., 650 F.2d 147, 149 (8th Cir.1981) (); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) (). As such, I will address the merits of defendants' arguments.
Deliberate indifference to an inmate's serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). To prevail on a claim of deliberate indifference, an inmate must show “that (1) the inmate suffered from an objectively serious medical need, and (2) the prison official knew of the need yet deliberately disregarded it.” Schaub v. VonWald, 638 F.3d 905, 914 (8th Cir.2011) (citing Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778, 784 (8th Cir.1997) ). Under the first requirement, an objectively serious medical need is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.”...
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