Woodbridge v. First Nat. Bank of Saratoga Springs

• Decision Date: 12 March 1901
• Parties: WOODBRIDGE v. FIRST NAT. BANK OF SARATOGA SPRINGS.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

166 N.Y. 238

59 N.E. 836

WOODBRIDGE

v.FIRST NAT. BANK OF SARATOGA SPRINGS.

Court of Appeals of New York.

March 12, 1901.

Appeal from supreme court, appellate division, Third department.

Action by Helen F. Woodbridge, trustee, against the First National Bank of Saratoga Springs. From a judgment of the appellate division (61 N. Y. Supp. 258) affirming a judgment dismissing the complaint on the merits, and affirming an order for an extra allowance of costs, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Frank S. Black, for appellant.

John L. Henning, for respondent.

WERNER, J.

This action was brought to compel the defendant to account for all moneys belonging to the estate of Samuel Freeman, deceased, at any time received by the defendant, and for judgment directing the defendant to pay over to the plaintiff all moneys of said estate which may be found due upon such accounting. The facts our of which this action arose are as follows: Said Samuel Freeman died December 19, 1870, leaving a will dated May 17, 1870, which was probated December 24, 1870, and in which Augustus Bockes was named as executor and trustee. This will, after providing for certain specific legacies, gave to said Bockes all the testator's real and personal property in trust during the life of the testator's daughter, the plaintiff in this action, to receive the rents, income, and profits therefrom, and to pay to the plaintiff out of the same a sum not exceeding $3,500 per year. After the death of the latter the estate was to go to her children, if any, and, if none, then to the testator's heirs. At the time of the testator's death plaintiff had two children, a son and a daughter, both of whom are still living. There was no disposition by the will of the income of the trust over and above the $3,500 per year, which was to be paid to the plaintiff, and the sum of $500 per annum, which the trustee was to receive as compensation in lieu of fees. The complaint charges that said Bockes continued to perform the duties of executor and trustee under this will until about June 28, 1872, when, in violation of his duty as such executor and trustee, he delivered into the custody and charge of one John Woodbridge, the husband of the plaintiff, all of the estate and property of said Samuel Freeman, deceased, which was impressed with the trust referred to. It is further alleged that said Bockes executed and delivered to said Woodbridge an instrument in writing, purporting to be a power of attorney, in and by which said Bockes wrongfully and unlawfully attempted to delegate his powers and duties as such executor and trustee. The complaint then continues with allegations designed to show knowledge on the part of the defendant and its officers of the illegal acts of said Bockes and Woodbridge with reference to said estate, and with specific charges that between the 28th day of June, 1872, and April 6, 1876, the defendant knowingly received moneys which were a part of said trust estate, amounting in the aggregate to the sum of $61,102.42, and wrongfully placed the same to the account of Helen Woodbridge, and thereafter wrongfully and negligently permitted the said John Woodbridge to withdraw the said moneys from said bank, and to convert the same, or some part thereof, to his own use. It is also charged that the defendant knowingly and wrongfully permitted the said John Woodbridge to substitute an account in his own name with said bank in the place and stead of one previously maintained in the name of plaintiff, and that thereafter, and between the 6th day of April, 1876, and the 8th day of June, 1894, the defendant knowingly and wrongfully received on deposit, and placed to the credit of said John Woodbridge, moneys which belonged to said estate, and were impressed with said trust, which moneys, amounting in the aggregate to $161,653.12, or some part thereof, the defendant wrongfully and unlawfully permitted said Woodbridge to convert to his own use. The complaint concludes with a prayer for an accounting. The answer, after admitting certain formal facts, denies all of the allegations of the complaint essential to plaintiff's cause of action. Upon the trial at special term witnesses were called for the plaintiff, who were cross-examined at length in behalf of the defendant. At the close of the plaintiff's case the defendant also rested its case, and then defendant's counsel moved that the complaint be dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff had not established a cause of action. The court reserved its decision, which was thereafter embodied and handed down in the following memorandum: ‘The plaintiff has failed to prove that there has been any conversion or misappropriation of any part of the trust estate by the defendant, or the trustee Augustus Bockes, or by John Woodbridge, or by any other person. The plaintiff has failed to prove that defendant had any knowledge of any wrongful use of the said trust property, or of any intent to misappropriate any part thereof on the part of the said trustees Augustus Bockes or John Woodbridge, or any other person. The complaint should be dismissed upon the merits, and judgment is so directed, with costs to the defendant.’ The judgment entered upon the decision of the court at special term was affirmed by the appellate division. It will be observed that the motion made by defendant's counsel at the close of the evidence was in form a motion for a nonsuit, while the decision subsequently rendered by the court disposes of the case upon the merits.

The learned counsel for the appellant argues that the trial court had no power to make this decision upon such a motion. It is true that defendant's motion was made at the close of plaintiff's case, but it was also made at the close of defendant's case, as the record shows. Plaintiff was compelled to call the delinquent trustee and the officers of the defendant bank as witnesses in the effort to establish her cause of action. Upon the cross-examination of these witnesses, the defendant proved its case. When both parties rested, all the matters in issue were before the court for decision. It was therefore competent and proper for the court to decide the case upon the merits. If, however, we assume that defendant's motion was for a nonsuit and nothing more, and that the court could have been compelled to...