State ex rel. Lashly v. Wurdeman
Decision Date | 07 April 1914 |
Parties | STATE OF MISSOURI ex rel. ARTHUR V. LASHLY, Prosecuting Attorney, Relator, v. GUSTAVUS A. WURDEMAN, Judge, Respondent |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
WRIT MADE PEREMPTORY. CAUSE CERTIFIED TO SUPREME COURT.
Writ made peremptory. Cause certified to Supreme Court.
Arthur V. Lashly, Prosecuting Attorney, George Barnett, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, and E. R. Chappell, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for relator.
Sam D Hodgdon, J. C. Kiskaddon, R. H. Stevens and F. E. Mueller for respondent.
Mandamus. Original Proceeding.
This is a proceeding in mandamus. The alternative writ issued in virtue of the original power of this court in that behalf provided.
The relator is the prosecuting attorney of St. Louis county, duly elected and qualified. The respondent is judge of the circuit court of the same county and presides in division No. 2 of that tribunal. The question for consideration relates to, and the writ is invoked with a view of vindicating, the right of the prosecuting attorney to appear in the circuit court and defend a suit in which the county is interested.
The relevant facts out of which the controversy arises are as follows: It appears that one Hornberg presented to the county court of St. Louis county an application for a dramshop license, in proper time and in due form, and the county court declined to consider or act upon it; that thereafter, on the same day, Hornberg sued out an alternative writ of mandamus against the judges of the county court, John Wiethaupt, William Buermann and Albert Wilmas, commanding them to appear in the circuit court, division No. 2, and show cause, if any they had, why they, as judges of the county court, should not proceed and act upon the petition of Hornberg for a dramshop license. To this mandamus proceeding so instituted in Division No. 2 of the circuit court, over which the respondent here, Judge Wurdemann, presides, the respondents in that proceeding--that is, the judges of the county court, Wiethaupt, Buermann, and Wilmas--made their return in writing through counsel other than relator, the prosecuting attorney of the county. Upon the coming in of the return of the judges of the county court in that case, relator, prosecuting attorney, appeared and moved the circuit court to permit him to assume control of the defense in the matter, on the ground that it was one in which the county was interested, and that, therefore, the statute made it incumbent upon him to do so. This motion and request the court denied, as though it were competent for the county judges to exclude the prosecuting attorney with respect to the matter of the defense of that case and employ other counsel to control and manage it. It is in assertion of his right to control and manage the defense of the mandamus suit pending in the circuit court against the judges of the county court with respect to the subject-matter of the application of Hornberg for a dramshop license that the prosecuting attorney, as relator, sued out the writ of mandamus here involved, and it is insisted the respondent, as judge of the circuit court, denied to him a clear legal right in refusing to permit the prosecuting attorney to assume control and manage the defense of that case.
In disposing of the question in judgment, it is essential to consider the relevant sections of the statute prescribing the duties of the prosecuting attorney, and to consider, too, the interests involved in the mandamus suit pending in the circuit court against the judges of the county court of St. Louis county.
It is to be said, first, that under the statutes both the judges of the county court and the prosecuting attorney are elected by the people of the county and with a view of serving its inhabitants in the discharge of the duties annexed by law to the respective offices of county court and prosecuting attorney. The office of the county court and of the prosecuting attorney are, of course, separate and independent and neither is necessarily subservient to the other. The county court consists of three judges, elected by the people, but its members are not required to be learned in the law, while one of the qualifications prescribed for the prosecuting attorney is that he shall be so learned. By statute, certain judicial duties and certain other ministerial and administrative duties are committed to the county court, while other statutes commit certain duties which appertain to the profession of a lawyer to the prosecuting attorney as the law officer of the county. In respect of the latter, sections 1007 and 1008, R. S. 1909, are to be here considered.
It is to be observed that section 1007, above copied, makes it the duty of the prosecuting attorney to defend all suits against the State or county, and, indeed, it is conceded in the instant case that, if the mandamus proceeding in the circuit court against the three judges of the county court were a suit against the county, no one could deny or gainsay the right of the prosecuting attorney to control and manage the defense therein. Touching this question, it is said in the brief of respondent, We quote this as a concession in the argument here, but it is said it does not apply to the instant case, in which the prosecuting attorney insists upon his right to appear.
In Kansas, the statutes concerning the county commissioners and the county attorney are similar to those which obtain with respect to our county courts and prosecuting attorney. The matter of a suit against the county of Leavenworth being under consideration in that State, the Supreme Court stated the doctrine precisely as we understand it, touching the question of the right of the county commissioners or the prosecuting attorney to control the case in court. Of this the court said, in Clough & Wheat v. Hart, 8 Kan. 487, 494:
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