Pearson v. Quinn

Citation166 S.W. 746,113 Ark. 24
Decision Date27 April 1914
Docket Number293
PartiesPEARSON v. QUINN
CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas

Appeal from Miller Circuit Court; Jacob M. Carter, Judge; appeal dismissed.

STATEMENT BY THE COURT.

This litigation involved a petition for the revocation of an order made by the county court of Miller County, which prohibited the sale of intoxicating liquors within three miles of the main public school building situated on block 34 of the city of Texarkana, Arkansas, as per the original plat of said city. The prayer of this petition was granted by the county court, and upon an appeal to the circuit court, where the case was heard de novo, numerous findings of fact were requested, but the court made findings, the effect of which was to declare that the petition for the repeal of the original prohibitory order contained a majority of the adult inhabitants residing within three miles of the said schoolhouse, and an order was entered annulling the prohibitory order; the judgment of the court below being rendered on the 21st day of December, 1912. Time was asked and given for the preparation of a bill of exceptions, and on the 18th day of March, 1913, the judge approved the bill of exceptions prepared in this case. The motion for a new trial alleged various errors as grounds for granting a new trial and these have been discussed in the briefs which have been filed.

The effect of the judgment of the court below was to make it lawful and permissible for the county judge of that county to grant license to sell intoxicating liquors if he saw proper to do so. But on February 7, 1913, the General Assembly, by an act approved on that date, and which is found at page 116 of the Acts of 1913, enacted a law which prohibited the sale or giving away of any intoxicating liquor within ten miles of the said public school building.

Appeal dismissed.

John A Cook, for appellant.

James D. Head, for appellee.

OPINION

SMITH, J., (after stating the facts).

The decision of this court can not give any relief to the original petitioners, who are the appellees in this cause insofar as authorizing the sale of liquors is concerned. Neither will appellants secure any relief, if the judgment of the court below should be reversed, except that they would thereby escape the payment of costs, and as no result can follow the decision of this cause, except the determination of the question of liability for the costs of the litigation we will decline to entertain this appeal.

In the case of Wilson v. Thompson, 56 Ark. 110, 19 S.W. 321, in an opinion by Chief Justice COCKRILL, it was said: "The circuit court erred in its judgment. The order for prohibition was made in January, 1890, and has expired by limitation of law. The appeal is therefore fruitless. For that reason the practice would have justified a dismissal, without going into the question presented by the record. The costs only are now involved, but it was not for that reason that we have felt called upon to determine the cause, for costs are only an incident of litigation, and can not be made the object of appeal any more than of the litigation. But the cause was of practical importance, and the appellants prosecuted the appeal without delay. Having gone into the subject of the litigation, and found that the judgment was erroneous, the appellants are entitled to their costs in both courts." It appears that notwithstanding the appellants were there adjudged to be entitled to their costs, the appeal was not entertained for the purpose of determining that question; but upon the contrary, it was expressly stated that the appeal would not be entertained and the question there involved was decided because of the public interest of the question involved. Here there is no question of public interest, because the action of the Legislature in passing the special act makes any action which the court may take unimportant to any litigant, except to determine liability for costs.

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18 cases
  • Rutherford v. Rutherford
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Maryland
    • August 5, 1983
    ...liability for costs. See, e.g., Wingert v. First National Bank, 223 U.S. 670, 672, 32 S.Ct. 391, 56 L.Ed. 605 (1912); Pearson v. Quinn, 113 Ark. 24, 166 S.W. 746 (1914); Meyer v. Marshall, 62 Ill.2d 435, 441, 343 N.E.2d 479 (1976); Dunn v. State, 163 Ind. 317, 320-321, 71 N.E. 890 (1904); F......
  • Letaw v. Smith
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Arkansas
    • May 10, 1954
    ...of facts having intervened rendering their decision of no practical application to the controversy between the litigants. Pearson v. Quinn, 113 Ark. 24, 166 S.W. 746; Tabor v. Hipp, 136 Ga. 123, 70 S.E. 886, Ann.Cas. 1912C In Kays v. Boyd, 145 Ark. 303, 224 S.W. 617, we said: 'It is the dut......
  • Brown v. Anderson
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Arkansas
    • December 23, 1946
    ...the case at bar, therefore the question of who was entitled to the Democratic nomination has become of no importance. In Pearson v. Quinn, 113 Ark. 24, 166 S.W. 746, 747, we quoted this sentence from a North Carolina "The court will not go through the record merely to decide who would have ......
  • Brown v. Anderson
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Arkansas
    • December 23, 1946
    ...... case at bar, therefore, the question of who was entitled to. the Democratic nomination has become of no importance. In. Pearson v. Quinn, 113 Ark. 24, 166 S.W. 746, we quoted this sentence from a North Carolina case:. . .          "The. court will not go through ......
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