State Ex Rel. Lane Drug Stores, Inc. v. Simpson

Decision Date25 February 1936
Citation166 So. 262,122 Fla. 670
PartiesSTATE ex rel. LANE DRUG STORES, Inc. CHAVERS v. SIMPSON, Tax Collector. CHAVERS v. CARSWELL, Tax Collector. STATE ex rel. CHAVERS et al. CHAVERS v. LEE, Comptroller. CHAVERS v. HARRELL, Sheriff. STATE ex rel. ADAMS et al. CHAVERS v. LEE, Comptroller. STATE ex rel. X-CEL STORES, Inc. CHAVERS v. SAME.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

En Banc.

On rehearing.

Original opinions readopted.

For original opinions, see 166 So. 227, 249, 261, 262.

ELLIS P.J., and BROWN, J., dissenting.

COUNSEL

Thomas B. Adams, Henry P. Adair, John McNatt, and Knight, Adair, Cooper & Osborne, all of Jacksonville, H. H Wells and B. K. Roberts, both of Tallahassee, Stanton Walker of Jacksonville, J. Van Wilhite, of Panama City, and William K. Whitfield, of Tallahassee, for petitioner.

Claibourne M. Phipps and Reginald L. Williams, both of Tampa, for relator X-Cel Stores.

Cary D. Landis, Atty. Gen., H. E. Carter, and J. V. Keen, Assistant Attys. Gen., and Henry C. Tillman, of Tampa, for respondent.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

A rehearing having been granted in these several causes by order entered herein under date of January 24, 1936, and each of the above-styled causes and proceedings having been fully and at length reargued before the Supreme Court sitting en banc, all of the justices thereof being present and participating, and the several causes having now been fully reconsidered, and the court now being advised of its opinion and judgment in the premises, it is thereupon considered, ordered, and adjudged by this court that the several opinions heretofore agreed to and adopted by a majority of this court in the cases of State ex rel. Lane Drug Stores v. Simpson, 166 So. 227, decided November 26, 1935; State ex rel. Thomas B. Adams v. Lee, 166 So. 249, decided November 27, 1935, and State ex rel. X-Cel Stores, Inc., v. Lee, 166 So. 568, decided January 14, 1936, be and the same are hereby readopted and agreed to by a majority of the justices now participating in the decision of these several cases on rehearing, and further that all appropriate orders and judgments in conformity to such opmions that have been heretofore entered, be and the same are hereby reinstated and made the several judgments and orders of this court in the premises with like force and effect as originally entered.

Opinions heretofore filed readopted on rehearing, and appropriate judgments entered in conformity therewith.

WHITFIELD, C.J., and TERRELL, BROWN, and DAVIS, JJ., concur.

ELLIS, P.J., and BUFORD, J., dissent.

CONCURRING

ELLIS, P.J. Concurring in denial of petition for rehearing in the X-Cel Store case:

This matter was thoroughly considered. I think that the Legislature did not enact the Bill, but a rehearing on this proposition is unnecessary.

WHITFIELD Chief Justice (concurring).

In State ex rel. v. Dillon, 42 Fla. 95, text 114, et seq., 28 So. 781, 786, it is said:

'Sections 14 and 17, art. 3 Const.1885, read as follows: 'Sec. 14. Any bill may originate in either house of the ligislature, and after being passed in one house, may be amended in the other.' 'Sec. 17. Every bill shall be read by its title on its first reading in either house, unless one-third of the members present desire it read by sections. Every bill shall be read on three several days unless two-thirds of the members present when such bill may be pending shall deem it expedient to dispense with this rule. Every bill shall be read by its sections on its second reading and on its final passage, unless on its second reading two-thirds of the members present in the house where such bill may be pending shall deem it expedient to dispense with this rule. The vote on the final passage of every bill or joint resolution shall be taken by yeas and nays and to be entered on the journal of each house; provided, that any general revision of the entire laws embodied in any bill shall not be required to be read by sections upon its final passage and its reading may be wholly dispensed with by a two-third vote. A majority of the members present in each house shall be necessary to pass every bill or joint resolution; all bills or joint resolutions so passed shall be signed by the presiding officer of the respective houses and by the secretary of the senate and the clerk of the house of representatives.' There are differences of opinion among the courts as to what constitutes the 'final passage' of a bill, within the meaning of constitutional provisions relating to the vote on the final passage of bills being taken by yeas and nays, and entered upon the journals of the legislature. Cases have been cited to us holding that the 'final passage' meant is the vote in each house which adopts the bill as it is afterwards enrolled and presented to the governor for his signature. The provision which we have quoted from our constitution speaks of the first and second reading and final passage of the bill, and it seems to us, from the connection in which they are used, that the words 'final passage' in our constitution can legitimately refer to nothing else than the vote in each house which adopts the bill after it has passed its first and second readings, and after it has been read again for the purpose of being put upon its passage. No doubt, after passing one house, it may be very materially amended in the other, and there passed as amended. The constitution expressly recognizes this fact, and authorizes it to be done; but it does not require such bill as amended to be read three times in the house originating the bill before concurring in the amendments proposed by the other (State ex rel. Turner v. Hocker, 36 Fla. 358, 18 So. 767), nor does it require the vote on the adoption of the amendments to be taken by yeas and nays, and entered on the journal. The clause quoted was framed in view of parliamentary practice, as is evident from the use of terms 'first and second readings' and 'final passage,' and its object was to regulate the number of readings to which the bill should be subjected in each house, and to require the vote to be taken by yeas and nays, and entered upon the journals upon the passage of the bill after such readings. Such has been the legislative construction of the provision in question for many years, and we are satisfied that construction is correct.' See, also, State v. Crowe, 130 Ark. 272, 282, 197 S.W. 4, L.R.A.1918A, 567, Ann.Cas.1918D, 460; 59 C.J. 570; 25 R.C.L. 882; State ex rel. Attorney General v. Buckley, 54 Ala. 599.

The legislative journals show that Senate Bill No. 724 (Laws 1935, c. 16848) was introduced in the Senate and after being amended in the Senate was duly passed by a yea and nay vote of the Senate; that the same bill, with proposed amendments thereto duly made by the House, was passed by a yea and nay vote by the House; that the Senate concurred in some of the amendments proposed by the House and refused to concur in other amendments proposed by the House; that a conference committee composed of duly appointed members of each House considered the bill with proposed amendments, and their report on Senate Bill No. 724 was adopted by each House, as were also germane amendments to Senate Bill No. 724 stated in the conference report. It is contended that under the Constitution the bill as reported by the conference committee with proposed amendments should have been adopted by a yea and nay vote in each House duly entered on the journals to make the bill validly enacted. The action taken on the conference report was not a final passage of Senate Bill No. 724. The final passage of the bill was on third reading in each House several days before the reference to the conference committee. The Constitution requires the yea and nay vote to be taken and entered on the journals 'on the final passage of every bill,' not on the adoption of amendments proposed by a conference committee of the Senate and House.

Under section 12 of article 3 of the Constitution, 'the yeas and nays of the members of either House on any question shall, at the desire of any five members present, be entered on the Journal.'

Section 6, article 3, of the Constitution provides that 'each house shall * * * determine the rules of its proceedings,' and the proceedings taken by each House in adopting amendments to Senate Bill No. 724 as reported by the conference committee, do not violate the provisions of section 17, article 3, of the Constitution, which provides that 'the vote on the final passage of every bill * * * shall be taken by yeas and nays, to be entered on the journal of each House'; the adoption of such amendments not being 'the final passage of' the bill. State ex rel. Dillon, supra; Wilson v. Young County Hardware & Furniture Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 262 S.W. 873.

The command of section 12, article 3 of the Constitution, that 'each House shall keep a journal of its own proceedings' does not require a journal entry to be made of every action taken on proposed amendments to bills pending in the Legislature. See West v. State, 50 Fla. 154, 39 So. 412.

If under the Dillon Case after a bill has been duly passed by the Senate it may be passed in the House with proposed amendments thereto, and the amendments proposed by the House can be concurred in by the Senate without a yea and nay vote, the same rule should apply in each House where amendments to the Senate Bill are presented by a duly appointed conference committee and such amendments are adopted by each house.

Senate Bill No. 724 having been duly passed by the Senate by a recorded yea and nay vote and also duly passed by the House with proposed amendments, by a recorded yea and nay vote some of which House amendments are concurred in by the Senate,...

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6 cases
  • Carlton v. Grimes
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • 29 Julio 1946
    ... ... cities and towns of the state in the ratio of their ... respective populations ... State ... ex rel. Lane Drug Stores v. Simpson, 122 [237 Iowa 922] ... ...
  • Driver v. Van Cott
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • 15 Diciembre 1971
    ... ... Talbot M. VAN COTT, Appellee ... STATE of Florida, Appellant, ... Matthew SMITH, ... 737, 30 So.2d 102 (1947) ... 2 State ex rel. Lee v. Buchanan, 191 So.2d 33 (Fla.1966); United ... Lane Drugstores v. Simpson, 122 Fla. 582, 166 So. 227 ... 15, 81 L.Ed. 399; Conner v. Joe Hatton, Inc., 216 So.2d 209 (Fla.1968); Small v. Sun Oil Co., ... ...
  • State ex rel. Schwartz v. Bledsoe
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • 8 Julio 1947
    ... ... Davis, 124 ... Fla. 592, 169 So. 199; State ex rel. Lane Drug Stores v ... Simpson, 122 Fla. 670, 671, 166 So. ; State ex ... rel. X-Cel Stores, Inc. v. Lee, 122 Fla. 685, 166 So ... 568; State ex rel ... ...
  • State Ex Rel. Cole v. Keller
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • 18 Septiembre 1937
    ... ... 1054 and the following Florida cases: State ex rel. Lane ... Drug Stores v. Simpson, 122 Fla. 582, 166 So. 227; ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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