Hill v. Walker

• Decision Date: 01 February 1909
• Docket Number: 2,766.
• Citation: 167 F. 241
• Parties: HILL et al. v. WALKER.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

167 F. 241

HILL et al. v. WALKER.

No. 2,766.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

February 1, 1909

Syllabus by the Court

Jurisdictional allegations in the complaint in federal courts are not made as a basis for proof at the trial, but to found the court's jurisdiction of the action at its commencement.

A proper allegation of jurisdictional facts in the complaint in federal courts creates a prima facie case in favor of jurisdiction.

The prima facie case in favor of jurisdiction, made by a proper allegation of jurisdictional facts in the complaint continues until it is overcome by evidence which convinces the mind to a legal certainty that the court in fact has not jurisdiction of the action.

State codes of procedure are intended for courts of general jurisdiction. Their provision that objections to the jurisdiction of the court shall be taken by answer is not applicable to federal courts, because they are courts of limited jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction as affected by state laws, see note to Barling v. Bank of British North America, 1 C.C.A. 513.)

Neither the general denial under state codes nor the general issue at common law is a proper method of challenging the jurisdiction of federal courts.

Act March 3, 1875, c. 137, Sec. 5, 18 Stat. 472 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 511), covers the entire field of dismissals for defects of jurisdiction arising upon the evidence, and not only declares the duty of federal courts upon that subject but also prescribes the showing necessary to the exercise of the power which it grants.

When the complaint contains proper jurisdictional allegations, in order to justify the court in dismissing an action for want of jurisdiction, under Act March 3, 1875, c. 137, Sec. 1, 18 Stat. 470 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 508), evidence must be produced which convinces the mind to a legal certainty 'that such suit does not really and substantially involve a controversy properly within the jurisdiction of said circuit court.'

Roberts v. Lewis, 144 U.S. 653, 12 Sup.Ct. 781, 36 L.Ed. 579 examined and distinguished.

When an action at law is tried to the court without a jury, and there is a general finding in favor of plaintiff, and no objection is made to the jurisdiction at the trial, an appellate court cannot look into the evidence contained in a bill of exceptions to ascertain whether jurisdiction was properly proven at the trial.

Evidence in this case examined, and held to show plaintiff's citizenship as alleged in the complaint, though the direct testimony only established his residence.

George B. Webster (Harry E. Sprague and Robert Funkhouser, on the brief), for plaintiffs in error.

Henry B. Davis and John A. Harrison, for defendant in error.

Before SANBORN and HOOK, Circuit Judges, and AMIDON, District Judge.

AMIDON District Judge.

This action was brought by George W. Walker, doing business as the Walker Stave Company, against the defendants (the plaintiffs in error), to recover a balance claimed to be due on a contract entered into between the parties on the 23d day of June, 1904, by the terms of which the plaintiff agreed to sell, and the defendants to purchase, 2,000,000 staves of different grades, delivery to be made in about equal quantities in each month down to November 1st of that year. It is not necessary in this place to state the issues more fully. The action was tried before the court without a jury, pursuant to stipulation. A general finding in favor of the plaintiff was made, and judgment entered accordingly. The judgment is chiefly attacked in this court upon the ground that there was no adequate proof of jurisdiction. The complaint properly states that the plaintiff is a citizen of the state of Illinois, and the defendant a corporation organized under the laws of Missouri. The answer is voluminous, raising many issues as to the merits of the controversy, and also contains a general denial which it is claimed puts in issue the citizenship of the plaintiff. On the trial Mr. Walker, while testifying as a witness was asked, 'Where do you reside?' and answered, 'I live in Vandalia, Ill.' It is now assigned as a cause for impeaching the judgment that this testimony constitutes the only evidence as to plaintiff's citizenship. The inaccuracy of the proof was in no way challenged in the trial court, but is now presented here for the first time.

In passing upon this question, it is necessary to distinguish clearly between failure to plead jurisdictional facts in the complaint and a deficiency of proof on that subject in the evidence. The jurisdiction of federal courts, being limited, is aided by no presumption. Until the facts requisite to that jurisdiction are brought upon the record, there is no foundation for the exercise of any judicial power in the cause. It has therefore been uniformly held that these facts must appear with certainty and precision either in the complaint alone, or in the complaint when supplemented by other documents constituting a part of the record proper. Their absence cannot be waived, because they pertain to jurisdiction of the subject-matter and not of the person. By far the greater number of cases in which judgments have been set aside for jurisdictional reasons fall under this head. The facts essential to jurisdiction were not brought upon the record. The only other class is where want of jurisdiction has been disclosed by the evidence. In all such cases, with possibly one or two exceptions, the defect has appeared not from a failure to prove the allegations of the complaint, but by direct and positive evidence showing that the suit was not within the cognizance of federal courts. The present case falls under neither of these classes. Here the jurisdictional facts are alleged with certainty and precision, and the evidence does not show that jurisdiction is wanting.

The jurisdictional averments of the complaint in federal courts are not made as a basis for proof at the trial, but to found jurisdiction of the suit. They are not held in suspense until supported by proof, like allegations respecting the merits; but immediately, upon the filing of the complaint, they accomplish their purpose. Thereupon, by virtue of such allegations, plenary jurisdiction of the court over the cause arises. That jurisdiction is not suspended by a denial in the answer or defeated by such a denial combined with an inaccuracy or insufficiency of proof on the subject, but continues unimpaired until evidence is produced showing clearly that jurisdiction in fact does not exist. What, then, is the force and effect of a proper pleading of jurisdictional facts? (1) It makes a prima facie case in favor of jurisdiction. (2) Such jurisdiction continues until evidence is produced which convinces the mind to a 'legal certainty' that the court in fact is without lawful cognizance of the suit.

Before examining the authorities which we believe support these propositions, it will be advantageous to consider the conformity act of June 1, 1872 (17 Stat. 196, c. 255), and the act of March 3, 1875, c. 137, Sec. 1, 18 Stat. 470 (U.S Comp. St. 1901, p. 508), section 5 of which defines the duty of federal courts as to the dismissal of suits for defects of jurisdiction arising upon the evidence. Before the passage of these statutes the jurisdiction of these courts could only be challenged by a separate plea which presented the question clearly as a subject for actual litigation. There is nothing in either of the acts which necessitates a change in this practice, and there are substantial reasons for the continuance either of that method, or of something no less direct and clear. Most of the state codes embodying the reformed procedure require all pleas and defenses to be set up in the answer. These codes, however, are intended to regulate the practice in courts of general jurisdiction. Under them the objection that a cause is not properly within the jurisdiction of the court very seldom arises; and when it does arise it is shown upon the face of the pleading by the nature of the cause of action, and therefore requires no investigation of matters of fact. The jurisdiction of our national courts, on the contrary, being limited, every cause brought before them presents a question of jurisdiction, and the subject often involves a serious controversy upon the facts. This fundamental difference between the courts of the states and of the nation justifies a difference in practice. The existence of jurisdiction being a part of every suit in the federal courts, and arising in much the greater number of cases out of facts wholly independent of the cause of action, the issue upon that subject ought not to be commingled in the answer with issues upon the merits. Such a practice tends to obscure this question of primary importance and thus cause it to be overlooked through inadvertence. It also leads to confusion in the trial of the cause, as was early pointed out by Judge Hammond in Refining Co. v. Wyman (C.C.) 38 F. 574. But the greatest objection is that it is idle and oppressive to require litigants to come before the court with their witnesses, prepared to try a cause upon the merits, when the jurisdiction of the court to hear the merits is in controversy. It is a noteworthy fact that, since the passage of the acts above referred to, the same as before, whenever it is proposed to really controvert the question of jurisdiction, the issue is raised by a separate plea. That has at all times been recognized at the circuit as the better practice. The general denial is now a part of nearly every answer in a code state, and, as a rule, is interposed simply as a catch-all to cover any matter that may have been omitted through inadvertence. To allow such fundamental subjects as jurisdiction to be...