167 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1948), 9496, United States ex rel. Parker v. Ragen

Docket Nº:9496.
Citation:167 F.2d 792
Case Date:May 07, 1948
Court:United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Page 792

167 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1948)




No. 9496.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

May 7, 1948

George F. Barrett, Atty. Gen., of State of Ill., and William C. Wines, Asst. Atty. Gen., of State of Ill. (Raymond S. Sarnow and James C. Murray, Asst. Attys. Gen., of Ill., of counsel), for appellant.

Elbridge Bancroft Pierce, of Chicago, Ill., for appellee.

Before KERNER and MINTON, Circuit Judges, and LINDLEY, District Judge.

MINTON, Circuit Judge.

We have for answer first the question of whether a writ of habeas corpus shall issue to try and determine the validity of one sentence of life imprisonment for armed robbery while the petitioner is serving at the same time another sentence of one year to life imprisonment for a like offense, which sentence is admittedly valid. Secondly, if the writ may issue, has the petitioner been denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment in the trial and conviction for the second offense?

Petitioner was convicted February 14, 1919, of armed robbery in the Criminal Court of Cook County, Illinois, and sentenced to the penitentiary for the term of one year to life. He was paroled on June 5, 1933. July 23, 1933, he was arrested and held on a charge of armed robbery. On July 27, 1933, the Parole Board of Illinois found that the petitioner was a parole violator and entered an order for his arrest and return to custody. Petitioner was indicted August 4, 1933, for the second offense. According to a brief filed by petitioner in support of a writ of error to the Criminal Court of Cook County, Illinois, exhibited herein, the petitioner stated that he had appeared in court on August 11, 18, and 22, 1933, with counsel of his own choosing. It does not appear who that counsel was, but on August 22 the trial court stated that the record showed the public defender appeared for the petitioner and two others jointly indicted with him for armed robbery, and on that date, a firm of lawyers came into court and claimed to represent the petitioner. They asked that the case be continued as they were engaged in the trial of a murder case and could not be present. The court, after much discussion back and forth, refused to continue the case, and the firm withdrew. As counsel for the petitioner the court thereupon appointed the public defender, a very able, reputable lawyer who was already...

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