Meehan v. Town of Plymouth

• Decision Date: 28 July 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-2235,97-2235
• Citation: 167 F.3d 85
• Parties: Joseph A. MEEHAN, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. TOWN OF PLYMOUTH, et al., Defendants, Appellees. . Heard
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 85

167 F.3d 85

Joseph A. MEEHAN, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. TOWN OF PLYMOUTH, et al., Defendants, Appellees.

No. 97-2235.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Heard July 28, 1998.

Decided Feb. 3, 1999.

James R. McMahon III on brief, for appellant.

David C. Jenkins, with whom Dwyer & Jenkins was on brief, for appellees.

Before TORRUELLA, Chief Judge, WELLFORD, ^* Senior Circuit Judge, and LYNCH, Circuit Judge.

TORRUELLA, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant Joseph A. Meehan was arrested by Plymouth police officers William E. Curtis, John W. Rogers, Jr., and Robert J. Pomeroy during a drug raid in a local bar. Meehan was convicted in Massachusetts state court of trafficking in cocaine. On appeal, however, his conviction was overturned because the appeals court found that the evidence of Meehan's involvement in the particular joint venture to traffic in cocaine was insufficient as a matter of law. See Commonwealth v. Meehan, 33 Mass.App.Ct. 262, 597 N.E.2d 1384 (Mass.App.Ct.1992). Meehan then filed the present suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts against the Town of Plymouth (the "Town") and the three police officers, alleging, inter alia, federal and state malicious prosecution causes of action.

All of Meehan's causes of action except the state and federal malicious prosecution claims were dismissed on statute of limitations

grounds. Then, in a Memorandum and Order dated August 20, 1997, the district court: (1) granted the Town's motion to dismiss Meehan's remaining claims against it; and (2) granted the individual officer-defendants' motion for summary judgment on the remaining claims against them. See August 20, 1997 Memorandum and Order, at 12, 20. Meehan appeals, and we affirm.

BACKGROUND

In reviewing the entry of summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), we view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party--Meehan in this case. See Iglesias v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 156 F.3d 237, 239 (1st Cir.1998). ¹

Joseph A. Meehan was arrested on the night of July 29, 1988, at Driscoll's Cafe in Plymouth, Massachusetts. Earlier that day, a state judge issued a warrant for the search of Driscoll's Cafe on the basis of defendant Curtis' affidavit. In his affidavit, Curtis stated that the Plymouth police department believed that Meehan and Priscilla Turk, a bartender at Driscoll's Cafe, were selling cocaine at the establishment. This belief was based upon tips from confidential informants and direct surveillance of Meehan over a period of approximately two years.

Prior to the execution of the search warrant, undercover police officer Richard Noone entered the bar and observed Meehan and Turk engage in three short conversations. Noone did not, however, witness any drug transactions. Noone then left the bar and called the police station to report what he had seen. Minutes afterwards, defendants Curtis, Pomeroy, and Rogers conducted the raid on Driscoll's Cafe. After entering the bar, the officers arrested Meehan and Turk and conducted a pat-down search on them. During that search, the officers found a package of cocaine in one of Turk's pockets, but they did not find any drugs in Meehan's possession. The officers found approximately three hundred dollars on Meehan's person. The officers also claim to have found a "cuff list" in Meehan's possession, although Meehan disputes that the "cuff list" was found on him. ² Meehan claims that the "cuff list" did not belong to him and was planted nearby him by Pomeroy. Meehan also claims that Curtis' testimony regarding the "cuff list" was inconsistent, noting that Curtis testified to the grand jury that it was found in Meehan's pocket, but testified at Meehan's criminal trial that he found it in a puddle of beer on the bar, underneath Meehan's hand.

Meehan was taken to the police station, where he was strip-searched. The officers found a wad of approximately four thousand dollars inside the waistband of his pants. Three days later, Pomeroy completed and executed an Application for Criminal Complaint, charging Meehan in Plymouth District Court with trafficking in cocaine, possession of cocaine, and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Pomeroy later filed a Criminal Complaint in Superior Court against Meehan charging the three counts described above. After Meehan was indicted by a Plymouth County grand jury of a single count of trafficking in a controlled substance, the Plymouth District Court action was dismissed.

After trial in the Superior Court, a jury found Meehan guilty on the trafficking charge, and he was sentenced to five years in state prison. In September 1992, however, the Appeals Court of Massachusetts reversed his conviction with instructions to the trial court to enter a verdict of not guilty. See Meehan, 597 N.E.2d at 1387. The court found that although there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that Meehan was involved in drug transactions in general, the evidence was not sufficient to permit a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Meehan was involved in a joint venture with Turk to sell the particular cocaine that was found on her person on July 29, 1988. See id.

After his conviction was reversed, Meehan filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts against the individual officers who carried out his arrest, as well as against the Town of Plymouth. The complaint raised a variety of state and federal claims, including malicious prosecution in violation of both Massachusetts law, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 10(b), and the Civil Rights Act of 1870, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. All of Meehan's claims were dismissed on statute of limitations grounds, except Meehan's federal and state malicious prosecution causes of action.

The Town moved to dismiss Meehan's malicious prosecution claims against it, and the individual officer-defendants moved for summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claims against them. The district court granted both motions in its August 20, 1997 Memorandum and Order. The court dismissed the claims against the Town of Plymouth because it found that Meehan asserted no theory that sufficiently stated a claim for malicious prosecution against the Town. See August 20, 1997 Memorandum and Order, at 12. The court entered summary judgment in favor of the individual officer-defendants following its determination that Meehan could not establish one of the essential elements of the claim for malicious prosecution--the absence of probable cause--because Meehan's jury conviction conclusively demonstrated that the officers had probable cause for Meehan's arrest. See id. at 20. Meehan appeals, and we affirm.

DISCUSSION

We affirm the entry of summary judgment substantially for the reasons expressed by the district court in its Memorandum and Order. We pause to add only the following.

I. Malicious Prosecution

Meehan raised malicious prosecution claims under Massachusetts and federal law. In order to succeed on his malicious prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Meehan must prove: (1) state action; and (2) a deprivation of constitutional rights. See Roche v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 249, 253-54 (1st Cir.1996).

A. Constitutional Basis For Meehan's Federal Malicious Prosecution Action

We note as an initial matter that Meehan's § 1983 malicious prosecution claim is not properly based on either a procedural or substantive due process violation. A § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution as a deprivation of procedural due process is barred where, as here, the state's tort law recognizes a malicious prosecution cause of action. See Roche, 81 F.3d at 256; Perez-Ruiz v. Crespo-Guillen, 25 F.3d 40, 42-43 (1st Cir.1994). Further, "[t]here is no substantive due process right under the Fourteenth Amendment to be free from malicious prosecution." Roche, 81 F.3d at 256 (citing Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994) (plurality opinion)); see also Perez-Ruiz, 25 F.3d at 42 ("Albright would appear virtually to foreclose reliance on substantive due process as the basis for a viable malicious prosecution claim under section 1983....").

However, there is a possibility that Meehan's § 1983 malicious prosecution claim may be actionable under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Albright, 510 U.S. at 271, 114 S.Ct. 807 (plurality opinion) ("We hold that it is the Fourth Amendment, and not substantive due process, under which petitioner Albright's claim [under § 1983 that he was prosecuted without probable cause] must be judged."); Roche, 81 F.3d at 256 n. 5 ("[T]he Supreme Court left open the possibility that a malicious prosecution claim might lie under § 1983 on the basis of the Fourth Amendment...."); Calero-Colon v. Betancourt-Lebron, 68 F.3d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir.1995). In fact, the district court proceeded under the assumption that Meehan's § 1983 malicious prosecution claim pleaded a deprivation of Fourth Amendment rights. See August 20, 1997 Memorandum and Order, at 15. As Meehan has provided no further argument on this question, this Court will treat his § 1983 claim similarly.

B. "Absence of Probable Cause" Element

In order to state a cause of action for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must

allege that "criminal proceedings were initiated against him without probable cause and for an improper purpose and were terminated in his favor." Landrigan v. City of Warwick, 628 F.2d 736, 745 n. 6 (1st Cir.1980) (citation omitted). Thus, a § 1983 malicious prosecution action based upon a deprivation of Fourth Amendment rights requires a showing of the absence of probable cause to initiate proceedings, see Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 124 (3d Cir.1998), as does the parallel state tort claim of malicious prosecution, see, e.g., Lincoln v. Shea, 361 Mass. 1, 277 N.E.2d 699, 702 (Mass.1972).

1. The Appropriate Probable Cause Inquiry

Before we proceed any further, we feel compelled to delineate...