McDonald v. Metro. St. Ry. Co.

• Citation: 60 N.E. 282,167 N.Y. 66
• Parties: McDONALD v. METROPOLITAN ST. RY. CO.
• Decision Date: 30 April 1901
• Court: New York Court of Appeals

167 N.Y. 66

60 N.E. 282

McDONALD

v.METROPOLITAN ST. RY. CO.

Court of Appeals of New York.

April 30, 1901.

Appeal from supreme court, appellate division, First department.

Action by Grace McDonald, administratrix of John F. McDonald, against the Metropolitan Street-Railway Company. From a judgment of the appellate division (61 N. Y. Supp. 817) affirming a judgment in favor of defendant, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

TRIAL-DIRECTING VERDICT.

Though, even where the evidence is sufficient to sustain it, a verdict may be properly set aside, and a new trial granted, yet the court in such a case cannot, whenever it sees fit, direct a verdict, if the evidence presents an actual issue of fact.

Edmund L. Mooney and M. P. O'Connor, for appellant.

Charles F. Brown and Henry A. Robinson, for respondent.

MARTIN, J.

This action was for personal injuries resulting in the death of the plaintiff's intestate, and was based upon the alleged negligence of the defendant. An appeal was allowed to this court upon the peal was allowed to this court upon the ground of an existing conflict in the decisions of different departments of the appellate division as to when a verdict may be directed where there is an issue of fact, and because in this case an erroneous principle was asserted, which, if allowed to pass uncorrected, would be likely ‘to introduce confusion into the body of the law.’ Sciolina v. Preserving Co., 151 N. Y. 50, 45 N. E. 371. The court having directed a verdict, the appellant is entitled to the most favorable inferences deducible from the evidence, and all disputed facts are to be treated as established in her favor. Ladd v. Insurance Co., 147 N. Y. 478, 482,42 N. E. 197;Higgins v. Eagleton, 155 N. Y. 466, 50 N. E. 287;Ten Eyck v. Whitbeck, 156 N. Y. 341, 349,50 N. E. 963;Bank v. Weston, 159 N. Y. 201, 208,54 N. E. 40. If believed, the testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses was sufficient to justify the jury in finding the defendant negligent, and the plaintiff's intestate free from contributory negligence. The evidence of the defendant was in many respects in direct conflict, and, if credited, would have sustained a verdict in its favor. Whether the defendant was negligent, the plaintiff's intestate free from contributory negligence, and the amount of damages, were submitted to the jury. It, however, having agreed upon a general verdict, and failed to answer the questions submitted, the trial judge withdrew them, and directed a verdict for the defendant. Upon the verdict so directed, a judgment was entered. Subsequently an appeal was taken to the appellate division, where it was affirmed, and the plaintiff has now appealed to this court.

Although there was a direct and somewhat severe conflict in the evidence, the questions of negligence and contributory negligence were clearly of fact, and were for the jury, and not for the court, unless the right of trial by jury has been partially, if not wholly, abolished. It was assumed below that the plaintiff's evidence established a case which, undisputed, was sufficient to warrant a verdict in her favor. But the court said that at the close of the defendant's evidence the plaintiff's case had been so far overcome that a verdict in her favor would have been set aside as against the weight of evidence. Upon that alleged condition of the proof it held that the trial court might have properly submitted the case to the jury if it saw fit, but that it was not required to, as the verdict might have been thus set aside. The practical result of that decision, if sustained, is in every close case to vest in the trial court authority to determine questions of fact, although the parties have a right to a jury trial, if it thinks that the weight of evidence is in favor of one, and it directs a verdict in his favor. There have been statements by courts which seem to lend some justification to that theory, but we think no such broad principle has been intended, and that no such rule can be maintained either upon principle or authority. The rule that a verdict may be directed whenever the proof is such that a decision to the contrary might be set aside as against the weight of evidence would be both uncertain and delusive. There is no standard by which to determine when a verdict may be thus set aside. It depends upon the discretion of the court. The result of setting aside a verdict and the result of directing one are widely...