Snider v. Peters Home Bldg. Co.
| Citation | 139 Minn. 413,167 N.W. 108 |
| Decision Date | 22 March 1918 |
| Docket Number | No. 20653.,20653. |
| Parties | SNIDER et al. v. PETERS HOME BLDG. CO. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Minnesota (US) |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from District Court, Hennepin County; William C. Leary, Judge.
Action by George D. Snider and others against the Peters Home Building Company. Judgment for plaintiffs, and from an order denying its motion for a new trial, defendant appeals. Reversed.
The evidence in an action by the owners against the contractor for the breach of a contract to build a house was such as to sustain though not to require a finding that the defendant substantially performed and that such defects as there were could be readily remedied by a reasonable expenditure so that the plaintiffs would then have the house for which they contracted.
In such a case the measure of damages is the reasonable cost of remedying such defects and not the difference in value between the house as it was and as it should have been; and it was error to exclude from the jury the cost of remedying defects. James C. Melville, of Minneapolis, for appellant.
Daniel F. Foley, of Minneapolis, for respondents.
The plaintiffs had a verdict for $450 in an action to recover damages for the failure of the defendant to construct a house in accordance with a contract between them. The defendant appeals from the order denying its motion for a new trial.
The defendant contracted to construct the house for $2,600 in accordance with plans agreed upon. It constructed one in assumed compliance with the contract and the plaintiffs took possession. They claim that it was not constructed in accordance with the plans and that it was defective in respect of workmanship and materials. The court instructed the jury that the measure of the plaintiffs' damages, if they were entitled to recover at all, was the difference in value between the house as it was and as it would have been if constructed according to contract. Nothing was said about the effect of a performance so substantial that such defects as there were could be readily remedied by a reasonable expenditure so that the plaintiffs would then have the house for which they contracted, though there was some evidence that the cost of remedying defects would be slight.
The questions necessary to discuss are these:
(1) Whether the evidence was such as to sustain a finding that there was a substantial performance of the character indicated and therefore to require the submission of the question to the jury.
(2) If so, and if the jury found such substantial performance, whether the measure of damages was the cost of remedying defects or the difference in the value of the house as it was and its value if as it should have been.
[1] 1. The evidence for the plaintiffs and that for the defendant was directly opposed. That for the plaintiffs was to the effect that there were defects in material and workmanship so vital and which so permeated the structure that a reasonable outlay would not remedy them and give the house which the defendant contracted to build. The defendant's evidence is to the effect that there was at the least a substantial performance, that such defects as there were could be remedied by an expenditure of $25 or $30, and that the plaintiffs would then have the house for which they contracted. Whether there is substantial performance is usually a question of fact. Brown v. Hall, 121 Minn. 61, 140 N. W. 128;Elliott v. Caldwell, 43 Minn. 357, 45 N. W. 845,9 L. R. A. 52. We cannot say that it conclusively appears there was not a substantial performance, though the evidence that the construction, both in respect of workmanship and material, was shabby and inherently bad is quite sufficient to sustain a finding that the performance was not substantial. The question was for the jury.
We have not overlooked the plaintiffs' claim, urgently pressed, that one bedroom was smaller than that for which the plans called, and that because of this alone there was not a substantial performance. The facts are these: The plans did not call for a soil pipe. The ordinance required one and it is conceded that there should be one. The defendant put one in the partition between the bedroom and the bathroom, and it is conceded that this was a proper place for it. To accommodate it it was necessary to make a jog...
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