Vital v. Interfaith Medical Center

• Decision Date: 19 February 1999
• Docket Number: Docket No. 98-7730
• Citation: 168 F.3d 615
• Parties: 80 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 281 Coleman VITAL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. INTERFAITH MEDICAL CENTER and Local 1199, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Page 615

168 F.3d 615

80 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 281

Coleman VITAL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. INTERFAITH MEDICAL CENTER and Local 1199, Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 98-7730.

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.

Argued Dec. 11, 1998.

Decided Feb. 19, 1999.

Coleman Vital, Brooklyn, NY, pro se.

Peter D. Stergios, Epstein, Becker & Green, New York, NY (Sean T. Granahan, Epstein, Becker & Green, New York, NY, of counsel), for Defendant-Appellee Interfaith Medical Center.

Pamela Jeffrey, Levy, Ratner & Behroozi, P.C., New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellee Local 1199.

Before: KEARSE, STRAUB, and SACK, Circuit Judges.

STRAUB, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff Coleman Vital, pro se, appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Frederic Block, Judge ), dismissing in toto his action for employment discrimination brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Specifically, the District Court (1) dismissed Mr. Vital's claim against Defendant-Appellee Local 1199, National Health and Human Service Employees Union ("Local 1199") on the pleadings ¹ and (2) dismissed Mr. Vital's claim against Defendant-Appellee Interfaith Medical Center ("IMC") on summary judgment. We approve the District Court's dismissal of Mr. Vital's claim against Local 1199 on the ground that the union was not named in the charge that Mr. Vital filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") or in the right to sue letter that Mr. Vital received from the EEOC. However, we hold that the District Court erred in granting IMC summary judgment on two grounds: first, because there is no indication in the record that Mr. Vital had been informed or was otherwise aware of the nature and consequences of a summary judgment motion and, second, because the District Court inappropriately resolved an issue of material fact.

We therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

BACKGROUND

Mr. Vital began working for IMC on May 1, 1987. He did part-time work until 1990, when he moved into a full-time position in IMC's housekeeping department. IMC terminated Mr. Vital in December 1991, but reinstated him in January 1992 pursuant to a "last chance" agreement. IMC contends that despite the agreement, Mr. Vital failed to appear for work at his regularly scheduled time and consequently was terminated effective March 20, 1992. Mr. Vital maintains that his termination was instead due to discrimination based on his national origin.

Throughout his employment at IMC, Mr. Vital was a member of a collective bargaining unit represented by Local 1199. The terms of Mr. Vital's employment were governed by a Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") entered into by Local 1199 and the League of Voluntary Hospitals and Homes of New York. The CBA prohibits discrimination on the basis of national origin. It also designates procedures for filing grievances and permits either IMC or Local 1199 to refer an unresolved grievance to binding arbitration.

In response to Mr. Vital's second termination, Mr. Vital and Local 1199 filed a grievance pursuant to the CBA. Through Local 1199's counsel, Mr. Vital subsequently filed a formal demand for arbitration of the grievance. However, no arbitration hearing was held. IMC maintains that instead, Mr. Vital and Local 1199 negotiated a settlement agreement with IMC, which Mr. Vital signed on February 25, 1993 ("Settlement Agreement"). Under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, Mr. Vital was to receive the gross sum of $641.22, less deductions, representing one and a half weeks' salary. The agreement further provides:

Local 1199 and Coleman Vital withdraw the demand for arbitration with prejudice[, and] Coleman Vital's discharge will be converted to a resignation for personal reasons effective March 20, 1992, his letter of discharge will be expunged from the file, and [IMC]'s records will be adjusted to reflect the resignation.

IMC contends that it issued Mr. Vital a check in the appropriate amount on February 25, 1993, and that Mr. Vital endorsed and cashed the check. Mr. Vital claims that the signature on the Settlement Agreement is not his, denies receiving the check, and professes not to understand why his grievance never went to arbitration.

In April 1992, after Mr. Vital filed his grievance but before the Settlement Agreement was allegedly reached, Mr. Vital filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC and the New York State Division of Human Rights. In his charge, Mr. Vital alleges that IMC discriminated against him based on his national origin, which he describes as "American," when it terminated him in March 1992. On December 8, 1995, the EEOC issued Mr. Vital a "right to sue" letter. Neither Mr. Vital's charge nor the right to sue letter mentions Local 1199.

On January 17, 1996, Mr. Vital filed the instant Title VII complaint pro se. ² In his complaint, Mr. Vital alleges that he was discriminated against by coworkers and supervisors based on his national origin, which he designates "Black/Native American." According to Mr. Vital, ninety-five percent of IMC's housekeeping staff are from "third world" countries and were hired because of nepotism. Mr. Vital further alleges that his co-workers nicknamed him "Yankee boy" because he is an American from the South. In his complaint, Mr. Vital demands a jury trial.

After answering the complaint, IMC moved for summary judgment on the ground that Mr. Vital is barred from bringing this suit because he knowingly initiated an arbitration of his national origin discrimination claim against IMC and subsequently withdrew his claim with prejudice. At the same time, Local 1199 filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. By Memorandum-Decision and Order dated January 7, 1997, the District Court (John R. Bartels, Judge ) granted Local 1199's motion, but reserved judgment on IMC's motion for summary judgment. The District Court ordered an evidentiary hearing The Magistrate Judge subsequently conducted a hearing, at which various witnesses testified. After the hearing, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation, in which he "conclude[d] that the testimony of [IMC's witnesses was] credible, and that plaintiff's contentions are unworthy of belief" and therefore "recommend[ed] that the Court find that plaintiff signed the Stipulation of Settlement." The Magistrate Judge further concluded that "the stipulation resolves plaintiff's claim of wrongful termination" and recommended that judgment be entered in favor of IMC. On April 21, 1998, the District Court (Frederic Block, Judge ) issued a Memorandum and Order adopting in its entirety the Magistrate Judge's recommendation. On May 7, 1998, judgment was entered dismissing Mr. Vital's action in toto.

before Magistrate Judge Steven M. Gold to determine whether Mr. Vital "signed a stipulation of settlement dismissing his claims with prejudice."

On May 13, 1998, Mr. Vital filed a notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

I. Local 1199's Motion to Dismiss

The District Court dismissed Mr. Vital's claim against Local 1199 because the union was not named in the charge that Mr. Vital filed with the EEOC or in the right to sue letter that the EEOC issued to Mr. Vital.

We review the district court's dismissal de novo, accepting the material allegations in the complaint as true. See Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 701 (2d Cir.1998) (citations omitted). Dismissal is only appropriate where "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957), quoted in Chance, 143 F.3d at 701. "This rule applies with particular force where the plaintiff alleges civil rights violations or where the complaint is submitted pro se." Chance, 143 F.3d at 701.

Despite this stringent standard, the District Court properly dismissed the claim against Local 1199. A complainant must file a charge against a party with the EEOC or an authorized state agency before the complainant can sue that party in federal court under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (limiting aggrieved party's right to sue to "the respondent named in the charge"). "[T]he charge serves to notify the charged party of the alleged violation and also brings the party before the EEOC, making possible effectuation of the Act's primary goal of securing voluntary compliance with its mandates." Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local Union No. 130, 657 F.2d 890, 905 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017, 102 S.Ct. 1710, 72 L.Ed.2d 134 (1982). "Because these charges generally are filed by parties not versed in the vagaries of Title VII and its jurisdictional and pleading requirements," we recognized an "identity of interest" exception to this rule in Johnson v. Palma, 931 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir.1991). That exception "permits a Title VII action to proceed against an unnamed party where there is a clear identity of interest between the unnamed defendant and the party named in the administrative charge." Id. Following the Third Circuit's lead, we consider four factors in determining whether an identity of interest exists:

1) whether the role of the unnamed party could through reasonable effort by the complainant be ascertained at the time of the filing of the EEOC complaint; 2) whether, under the circumstances, the interests of a named [party] are so similar as the unnamed party's that for the purpose of obtaining voluntary conciliation and compliance it would be unnecessary to include the unnamed party in the EEOC proceedings; 3) whether its absence from the EEOC proceedings resulted in actual prejudice to the interests of the unnamed party; 4) whether the unnamed party has in some way represented to the complainant that its relationship with the complainant is to be through the named party.

Id. at 209-10 (quoting Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co., 562...