Riverside Mills v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.

Decision Date14 January 1909
Citation168 F. 987
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia
PartiesRIVERSIDE MILLS v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO.

R. J Southall and Alexander Akerman, for plaintiff.

Joseph Lamar, for defendant.

SPEER District Judge (orally).

So clear are my own convictions about this question, also in view of its immediate importance, that perhaps I should not for the sake of attempting anything like a neat opinion delay a decision of the case by taking it under advisement.

For a very long period of our history, Congress, although authorized by the organic law to regulate commerce between the states, failed to take any very valuable or substantial action relating to that great topic. The marvelous development of our interstate and foreign commerce, the multiplication of great railroads, the combinations of these railroads into vast systems, the enormous power which was thus accumulated by the railroads, and the helplessness of the shipper in his conflict with these systems, resulting from such accession of power, pressed upon the minds of the members of the national Legislature. Looking, then, to the letter of the organic law, they found the authority to enact legislation of this general character. The Interstate Commerce Commission was created. Numerous amendments to the original law were made. These were not, however, regarded as sufficient, and this bill, which because of the name of its distinguished author is called the 'Hepburn Bill' (Act June 29, 1906, c. 3591, 34 Stat. 584 (U.S. Comp. St Supp. 1907, p. 892)), was enacted.

Under this provision the action is brought. It is an action in behalf of the Riverside Mills, a corporation of this city, against the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad. The complaint is that the plaintiff shipped a quantity of its product to points beyond the destination of this railroad, and that the goods were not delivered. No payment has been made for them by the consignee, and redress is sought by recourse to an action based upon the provisions of this clause of the 'Hepburn Bill' (section 7), which is as follows:

'That any common carrier, railroad or transportation company, receiving property for transportation from a point in one state to a point in another state, shall issue a receipt or bill of lading therefor and shall be liable to the lawful holder thereof for any loss, damage, or injury to such property caused by it or by any common carrier, railroad or transportation company to which such property may be delivered or over whose line or lines such property may pass, and no contract, receipt, rule or regulation shall exempt such common carrier, railroad or transportation company from the liability hereby imposed.'

This is, as I understand it, but the converse proposition of what has long been the law in our own state. If a shipment comes to this state over the lines of connecting railways, and a default or loss is occasioned anywhere by the negligence of one of the railway connections of a line within our state, it may result, if I am not incorrect in my recollection, in an action against the railroad whose terminal is here, and which last received the goods as in good order. Instead of making the last railroad responsible, with equal force and justice, Congress has reversed the process, which the Legislature of Georgia long ago fixed, and which has been recognized as the law within this state since that statute was enacted.

Where is the wrong in it? It is said that the initial carrier is...

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