Banks v. Cnty. of Westchester

• Decision Date: 09 March 2016
• Docket Number: No. 13-CV-5254 (KMK),13-CV-5254 (KMK)
• Parties: Davon Howard Banks, Plaintiff, v. The County of Westchester, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

168 F.Supp.3d 682

Davon Howard Banks, Plaintiff,

v.The County of Westchester, et al., Defendants.

No. 13-CV-5254 (KMK)

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed March 09, 2016

Davon Howard Banks, White Plains, NY, Pro Se Plaintiff.

Syma B. Funt, Esq., Westchester County Attorney's Office, White Plains, NY, Counsel for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

KENNETH M. KARAS

, District Judge

Pro se Plaintiff Davon Howard Banks (“Plaintiff”), a former inmate of Westchester Department of Corrections, filed the instant Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against the County of Westchester (“County”), Corrections Officer Vega (“Vega”), Corrections Officer Ficorotta (“Ficorotta”), Sergeant Middleton (“Middleton”), Captain Harris (“Harris”), Sergeant Andrews (“Andrews”), and Corrections Officer Gibson (“Gibson”) (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging that Defendants engaged in conduct that violated Plaintiff's rights under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (Compl. § V (Dkt. No. 2).) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants were negligent, engaged in libel, fraud, hate crimes, and discrimination, and violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (See id. ) Before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (“Motion”). (Mot. to Dismiss (“Mot.”) (Dkt. No. 40).) For the following reasons, Defendants' Motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

The following facts are drawn from Plaintiff's Complaint and are taken as true for the purpose of resolving the instant Motion.

On March 19, 2013, during “the 11 p.m. [to] 7 a.m. shift” at the Westchester County Department of Corrections, Defendant Gibson “smashed [Plaintiff's] hand against [an] iron steel cell door.” (Compl. § II.) On March 20, 2013, “on the 7 a.m. [to] 3 p.m. shift,” Defendant Vega “smashed [Plaintiff's] face on the floor and kicked disinfectant in [his] eyes.” (Id. ) During the “3 p.m. [to] 11 p.m.” shift on May 7, 2013, Defendant Ficorotta “spit in [Plaintiff's] face and called [him] a nigger,” and Defendant Middleton “harass [ed,] ... attacked ...[,] and taunted [Plaintiff].” (Id. ) On June 15, 2013, during that same shift, Defendant Harris put Plaintiff in the Special Housing Unit (“SHU”) because he “ask[ed] for [his] medication,” and Defendant Andrews “stole [Plaintiff's] personal property[,] harass[ed] [him,] stalked [him,] falsified criminal documents[,] and a[ssa]ssinated [Plaintiff's] character maliciously.” (Id. )

As a result of these alleged incidents, Plaintiff suffered “a fractured pinky, soft tissue damage, shattered nerves, ... arthritis

[,] [and] los[s] of vision.” (Id. § III.) Plaintiff also alleges that he “had to get [his] eyes flushed” and to get “stitches above [his] eye,” in addition to “need[ing] surgery on [his] right hand.” (Id. )

Plaintiff filed a grievance against Defendant Harris for “[a]buse of [p]ower,” after which Harris “put [Plaintiff] in solitary confinement.” (Id. § IV.) Plaintiff appealed the decision. (Id. ) Plaintiff also alleges that “the other [grievances he filed] were thr[own] away by other [sergeants] and captains.” (Id. ) Plaintiff informed Defendant Andrews, Sergeant Moore, Defendant Middleton, and Captain Smiley of his claims, but “[t]hey took them and threw them away.” (Id. )

B. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint on July 26, 2013, along with a request to proceed in forma pauperis. (Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis was granted on August 21, 2013. (Dkt. No. 3.) Defendants filed their Motion To Dismiss and supporting papers on May 14, 2014. (Dkt. Nos. 40–42.) On January 29, 2015, the Court denied without prejudice Defendants' Motion for failure to comply with the Court's individual rules of practice. (Dkt. No. 64.) In the meantime, on March 31, 2015, Plaintiff filed his opposition papers in the form of a letter to the Court. (Dkt. No. 68.) Defendants re-filed their Motion to Dismiss and filed their reply on May 15, 2015. (Dkt. Nos. 71–72.)

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his [or her] entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (alterations, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, a complaint's “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level ....” Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Although “once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint,” id. at 563, 127 S.Ct. 1955, and a plaintiff must allege “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, if a plaintiff has not “nudged [his or her] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, the[ ] complaint must be dismissed,” id. ; see also

Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not 'show[n]'—'that the pleader is entitled to relief.”' (second alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)

)); id. at 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (“Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.”).

“[W]hen ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007)

. Further, “[f]or the purpose of resolving [a] motion to dismiss, the [c]ourt ... draw[s] all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Daniel v. T&M Prot. Res., Inc. , 992 F.Supp.2d 302, 305 n. 1 (S.D.N.Y.2014) (citing Koch v. Christie's Int'l PLC , 699 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir.2012) ). Additionally, “[i]n adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court must confine its consideration to facts stated on the face of the complaint, in documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, and to matters of which judicial notice may be taken.” Leonard F. v. Israel Disc. Bank of N.Y. , 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also

Hendrix v. City of N.Y. , No. 12–CV–5011, 2013 WL 6835168, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2013) (same).

Where, as here, a plaintiff proceeds pro se, the court must “construe[ ] [his or her] [complaint] liberally and interpret[ ] [it] to raise the strongest arguments that [it] suggest[s].” Sykes v. Bank of Am. , 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir.2013)

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also

Farzan v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. , No. 12–CV–1217, 2013 WL 6231615, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2013) (same). However, “the liberal treatment afforded to pro se litigants does not exempt a pro se party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Bell v. Jendell , 980 F.Supp.2d 555, 559 (S.D.N.Y.2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also

Caidor v. Onondaga Cty. , 517 F.3d 601, 605 (2d Cir.2008) (“[P]ro se litigants generally are required to inform themselves regarding procedural rules and to comply with them.” (italics and internal quotation marks removed)).

B. Analysis

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint on several grounds. Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, to allege any constitutional violation by Defendants, and to allege the existence of any policy or practice that caused the alleged harms under Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York , 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)

. (See generally Defs.' Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. To Dismiss (“Defs.' Mem.”) (Dkt No. 41).)¹

1. Eighth Amendment Claims

The Eight Amendment guarantees freedom from “cruel and unusual punishments.”

U.S. Const., amend. VIII

; cf.

Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment places restraints on prison officials, who may not, for example, use excessive physical force against prisoners.”); Zimmerman v. Seyfert , No. 03–CV–1389, 2007 WL 2080517, at *23 (N.D.N.Y. July 19, 2007) (“Under the Eighth Amendment, an inmate has the right to be free from conditions of confinement that impose an excessive risk to the inmates health or safety.”).² Analysis of cruel and unusual punishment claims requires both objective examination of the conduct's effect and a subjective inquiry into the defendant's motive for the conduct. See

Wright v. Goord , 554 F.3d 255, 268 (2d Cir.2009) (citing McMillian , 503 U.S. at 7–8, 112 S.Ct. 995 ); see also

Sims v. Artuz , 230 F.3d 14, 22 (2d Cir.2000) (“[A] prisoner who alleges facts from which it could be inferred that prison officials subjected him to excessive force, and did so maliciously and sadistically, states an Eighth Amendment claim on which he is entitled to present evidence.”).

The objective element...