Bar Ass'n of City of Boston v. Greenhood

Decision Date22 March 1897
Citation168 Mass. 169,46 N.E. 568
PartiesBAR ASSOCIATION OF CITY OF BOSTON v. GREENHOOD.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

The petition, so far as specifications 1, 3, 4, and 5 are concerned, and the findings and judgment of the trial court, are as follows:

Petition.

"Respectfully represents the Bar Association of the City of Boston, a corporation organized under the laws of Massachusetts, and having its location and its usual place of business in Boston, in this county, that at a term of the supreme judicial court begun and holden at Boston within and for this county, on the second Tuesday of September, A.D.1884, to wit on the 20th day of January, A.D.1885, Elisha Greenhood, then as now of Dedham, in the county of Norfolk, in this commonwealth, was by said court admitted as an attorney, and that he thereupon was qualified as such. The petitioner further represents that said Greenhood has ceased to be of good moral character, and has been guilty of deceit malpractice, and other gross misconduct; and in particular the petitioner alleges as follows:

"(1) In or about 1892, one Howard Gill, of said Dedham, died leaving an instrument purporting to be his last will, and purporting to be duly executed. Said will was offered for probate by one Elijah W. Bonnemort, named as executor and principal legatee herein, and was duly admitted to probate by the probate court in and for the county of Norfolk. Certain of the heirs of said Gill appealed from the allowance of said will, and the matter of their appeal came on in due course to be heard in the supreme judicial court at a sitting holden at Dedham, before a jury, upon issues theretofore duly framed. Said issues raised the question of competency and soundness of mind on the part of the testator at the time of the making of the will. Said Greenhood acted as attorney at law, in said appeal, for the appellants. Said Greenhood, shortly before the trial of said appeal, professing to act in behalf of the contestants, or certain of them, made an agreement in writing with one Florence Lowe, of Stoughton, in the county of Norfolk, to the effect that she, said Lowe, should do all that was in her power to aid said appellants in their said appeal, and that, in case they should succeed in defeating the probate of said will, she, said Lowe, should receive the sum of five hundred dollars as her compensation, and that certain relatives of said Lowe should receive certain pecuniary advantage. A copy of said agreement is hereto annexed as an exhibit. At the time of making of said written agreement, it was known and agreed between said Greenhood and said Lowe that she was to be and should be a witness for said appellants; that she should, at the trial of said appeal testify to facts tending to show mental unsoundness and incapacity of said deceased at the time of the making of the said will; and that such proposed testimony on her part was part of the service contemplated by said agreement. Thereupon, and pursuant to the terms of said agreement, said Lowe immediately proceeded to secure witnesses upon said point for said appellants, and procured numerous persons to testify thereupon in favor of said appellants. Thereafter, at the trial of said appeal before said court and a jury, said Lowe was called by said Greenhood as a witness, and was duly sworn, and testified to facts tending to show such unsoundness of mind and testamentary incapacity on the part of said deceased. Said agreement with said Lowe, and her pecuniary interest in the result of the appeal, were concealed by said Greenhood and said Lowe from the court and the jury, and said Greenhood, by so calling her as a witness, and by the concealment of said fraudulent agreement, falsely and fraudulently represented to the court and to the jury that no such agreement had been made, and that she, said Lowe, was an ordinary witness, not biased by pecuniary interest in the result of the controversy; and the fact of said agreement was disclosed to the court and the jury only by means of cross-examination of said Lowe by counsel for the appellee, and by an order of the court for the production of said written agreement. Said agreement was produced only pursuant to the order of the court, and against the protest of said Greenhood. The petitioner shows that said agreement tended to the commission of perjury, and was unlawful, corrupt, and fraudulent; and that the calling of said Lowe as a witness, and the concealment of, and failure by said Greenhood to disclose, the fact of such agreement, was a corrupt and fraudulent practice upon the court and the jury. Said Greenhood had theretofore given especial study to the question of agreements void as against the policy of the law, and in particular to agreements of this character, and had written and published a treatise, in which he had explicitly set forth the law in respect thereof, and had stated that agreements of this character were corrupt and fraudulent."

"(3) Shortly prior to May, 1894, one William Dunn, of Hyde Park in the county of Norfolk, died intestate. His will was duly admitted to probate in said county, and one Henry A. Rich, of Hyde Park, in said county, was duly appointed and qualified as sole executor thereof. In the probate court, in the proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of said Dunn, said Greenhood acted as attorney for three legatees under said will, namely, Arthur Dunn, John Dunn, and Mary Thomas, formerly Mary Muxworthy, and after the decease of said Mary Thomas, pending said proceedings, for Julius H. Tuttle, as executor of her will. Among the assets in the hands of said Rich as such executor were thirty-six shares of the capital stock of a corporation named the American Tool Company. Said shares were set forth in said executor's inventory, and were duly appraised at four thousand six hundred and eighty dollars in all; that is to say, at one hundred and thirty dollars per share. Thereafter it became and was necessary and proper, and it was desired by all the beneficiaries of the estate, that said Rich, as such executor, should sell all said stock for the settlement of the estate, and said Rich thereupon determined to sell the same. Said principals of said Greenhood were, under said will, entitled to share, in certain proportions, in the proceeds of said stock. Said Greenhood thereupon, fraudulently devising and contriving to cause said Rich, as such executor, to be charged, in said probate proceedings, in case of a sale of such stock, for more than the amount of his, said Rich's, proper liability in respect thereof, and for a sum greater than said Rich should, in the exercise of due diligence and fidelity, receive for said stock, and believing that said Rich would not be able to obtain for said stock more than one hundred and seventy-five dollars per share, fraudulently conspired with one John W. Chase, of said Dedham, that said Chase should send to said Rich, as such executor, a written offer for the purchase by said Chase from said Rich, as such executor, of all said stock at the price of two hundred dollars per share; that said Chase should thereafter ever refuse to carry out said offer, and that thereafter, in case of the sale of said stock by said Rich at a price less than two hundred dollars per share, they, said Greenhood and Chase, should falsely and fraudulently pretend and assert to said Rich and to said probate court that said Chase had made said offer in good faith, and had ever been willing and ready and able and had ever offered to carry out the same, and that said Rich had fraudulently refused to accept the same, and in selling such stock for less than two hundred dollars per share had acted fraudulently, and had fraudulently diverted from the estate the difference between such sum as he should actually have received and the amount of said Chase's said offer. Said Chase was not then of pecuniary ability to carry out such offer, and this he and said Greenhood then well knew. Pursuant to said false and fraudulent conspiracy, said Chase, at the request of said Greenhood, and with his knowledge, thereupon sent to said Rich, as such executor, a written offer, signed by him, said Chase, to the effect that he, said Chase, would purchase of said Rich, as such executor, all said stock at the price of two hundred dollars per share, or at a higher price, if a higher price should be necessary to the securing of such stock by said Chase. Said Chase and said Greenhood both then intended that said offer should not be carried out by said Chase. Said Rich, as such executor, received said written offer, and forthwith offered to sell to said Chase all said stock at two hundred dollars per share, but said Chase refused to comply with said offer, or to buy said stock. Said Rich, as such executor, thereupon received an offer of one hundred and seventy-five dollars per share for all said stock from a person of pecuniary ability. In said Rich's judgment it was advisable to accept said offer, and due diligence and regard for the interests of the estate required that he should accept it. Before accepting the same, he notified said Chase thereof, and again offered to him said stock for two hundred dollars per share, and he then notified said Greenhood, as attorney for said Arthur Dunn, John Dunn, and Julius H. Tuttle, as executor, of said offer of one hundred and seventy-five dollars per share, and his inability to find a purchaser at a higher price, and of his intention to accept said offer unless a higher price than one hundred and seventy-five dollars per share could be obtained by said Greenhood or by other beneficiaries of said estate. Neither said Greenhood nor any of the persons so represented by him objected to the acceptance of said offer, or...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT