Clayton v. Ancell, 2445-7996.

Decision Date27 January 1943
Docket NumberNo. 2445-7996.,2445-7996.
PartiesCLAYTON et al. v. ANCELL et al.
CourtTexas Supreme Court

Suit in trespass to try title by George B. Ancell, Jr., and others against Hattie G. Clayton and others, C. L. Appel and others, and the Consolidated Oil Company, wherein Hattie G. Clayton and others filed a cross-action, and wherein the Consolidated Oil Company filed a disclaimer on which it was discharged, and wherein C. L. Appel and others filed a cross-action. From a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, Hattie G. Clayton and others appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. The Court of Civil Appeals, 159 S.W.2d 962, reversed the trial court's judgment, but failed to render judgment in favor of the appealing defendants and instead remanded the case to the trial court, and such defendants bring error.

Judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed.

Royston & Rayzor, Robt. Eikel, Jr., and Stewart & DeLange, all of Houston, for appellants.

M. G. Poteet and R. B. Anderson, both of Vernon, and Heyser & Hicks, Otis E. Nelson, and Rush H. Record, all of Wichita Falls, for appellees.

HICKMAN, Commissioner.

The parties to this suit are in three groups. One group, the Ancells, plaintiffs in the trial court, consists of the widow, son and daughters of George B. Ancell, Sr., deceased, the daughters being joined by their husbands. Another group, the Claytons, defendants in the trial court, consists of the widow, son and daughter of Dr. R. L. Clayton, deceased, the daughter being joined by her husband. The remaining defendants, referred to in the briefs as Appel et al., who claim under a certain power of attorney under the Claytons, compose the third group. No questions are presented for decision with reference to the action by the Claytons against Appel et al. to cancel such power of attorney and, for the purposes of this opinion, the case may be regarded as one wherein the Ancells were plaintiffs and the Claytons defendants.

The Ancells sued the Claytons for title and possession of 160 acres of land in Wilbarger county, the property in controversy being the mineral rights in and to such land. Their petition was in several counts, the first of which was an action in statutory trespass to try title. Other counts will be noticed more specifically hereinafter. At the close of all of the testimony, the district court instructed a verdict in favor of the Ancells and, upon such instructed verdict, rendered judgment against all other parties. The Claytons filed a motion for instructed verdict, but same was overruled. From the judgment of the trial court in favor of the Ancells the Claytons appealed. Appel et al. did not appeal. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case thereto. 159 S.W.2d 962. The Ancells accepted the judgment and filed no application for writ of error. The case is before us upon the application of the Claytons, their contention being that the Court of Civil Appeals, having reversed the judgment of the trial court, should have rendered judgment in their favor instead of remanding the case to the trial court.

One of the theories upon which the Ancells sought to recover in the trial court was that of an express parol trust. In substance, they alleged that on May 8, 1918, George B. Ancell, Sr., deeded to Dr. R. L. Clayton, an interest in the minerals on and under the property; that thereafter George B. Ancell, Sr., made an agreement with W. H. Peaden to the effect that Peaden would purchase the mineral interest from Dr. Clayton for the use and benefit of him, Ancell, Sr., who agreed to reimburse Peaden for the consideration which he might be required to pay for the property; that in compliance with such agreement Peaden bought the property from Dr. Clayton and received a deed therefor, holding the title thereto in trust for Ancell, Sr.; and that the title claimed by the Claytons was acquired through a quitclaim deed executed to them by Peaden while he was holding the property as trustee only.

It would appear that the trial court concluded that the Ancells established their trust theory as a matter of law, and, upon that ground, instructed a verdict in their favor. The Court of Civil Appeals concluded that the trust theory was not established as a matter of law, but that the evidence raised an issue of fact with respect thereto. We are unable to agree with either conclusion, but are of the opinion that the Ancells wholly failed to establish their trust theory or raise an issue of fact with respect thereto.

George B. Ancell, Sr., is the common source of title. On May 8, 1918, he executed and delivered to Dr. R. L. Clayton a mineral deed to the following:

"All of my right, title, and interest in and to the oil, gas and mineral rights, in and under the following described premises, situated in the County of Wilbarger, Texas, to-wit:

"Being the Northwest quarter of Section 3, H. & T. C. R. R. Company Survey, Block 7, containing 160 acres and being located in Wilbarger County, Texas.

"It being my intention to convey unto the said R. L. Clayton, all of my rights, title and interest in and to the above described premises, viz: A one-eighth (1/8) royalty, including rentals and bonuses that may be paid on above described land, except rentals and bonuses on lease now in force."

At this point we break our statement of the case to consider a question presented in the application, viz: What estate was conveyed by the above instrument? The language of the grant next preceding the description of the land clearly indicates that the intention of the grantor was to convey all of his mineral estate in the land. It appears equally certain that, by the use of the language immediately following the description, the grantor did not undertake to limit the estate granted above further than to provide that rentals and bonuses which might thereafter accrue under a mineral lease then in force should be paid to him. Assuming that the lease then outstanding is no longer in force, it is our view that the entire mineral estate in the land is vested in the successors in title to Dr. Clayton, whoever they may hereafter be decreed to be. While not directly in point on the facts, we cite the case of Bruni v. Vidaurri, Tex.Sup., 166 S.W.2d 81, points 25-27, for a discussion of the governing principles of construction.

Resuming our statement of the case, it appears that Dr. Clayton promoted the drilling of a test well on a block of land in the vicinity of the Ancell ranch, and that the consideration for the mineral deed from Ancell, Sr., to him was the drilling of such test well. The well was drilled on lands belonging to Peaden, but was not a producer. After it was drilled Ancell, Sr., requested Peaden to secure the interest which he had conveyed to Dr. Clayton, above described, and it is upon the alleged express agreement between them with reference thereto that the Ancells base their parol trust theory. After that...

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19 cases
  • Lail v. Hankla, 3147
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 25 Febrero 1955
    ...presumption that a deed conveys the property described to the grantee named in a deed and that he is the owner thereof. Clayton v. Ancell, 140 Tex. 441, 168 S.W.2d 230; 42 Tex.Jur. 687, 688. The statements in the 1936 wills did not indicate an intention to then create a trust. If a trust th......
  • Omohundro v. Matthews
    • United States
    • Texas Supreme Court
    • 5 Octubre 1960
    ...written, does not very the rule that there must be a binding agreement made in advance of the acquisition of title. Clayton v. Ancell, 140 Tex. 441, 168 S.W.2d 230, 233. The contract must be an enforceable one. Whittenburg v. Miller, 139 Tex. 586, 164 S.W.2d 497, 502. In this latter case, t......
  • Rowe v. Palmer
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 24 Marzo 1955
    ...Tex. 362, 107 S.W. 528; Klein v. Sibley, Tex.Civ.App., 203 S.W.2d 239; Faville v. Robinson, 111 Tex. 48, 227 S.W. 938; Clayton v. Ancell, 140 Tex. 441, 168 S.W.2d 230; Lockhart v. Williams, 144 Tex. 553, 192 S.W.2d In the Fitz-Gerald v. Hull case, supra, the agreement was for defendant to p......
  • Loeffler v. King, 15100
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 10 Febrero 1950
    ...to Loeffler and Rankin.) King v. First National Bank of Wichita Falls, 144 Tex. 583, 192 S.W.2d 260, 163 A.L.R. 1128; Clayton v. Ancell, 140 Tex. 441, 168 S.W.2d 230; Newman v. Kerlyn Oil Co., Tex.Civ.App., 189 S.W.2d 701; Porter v. Shaw, Tex.Civ.App., 12 S.W.2d 595; Olvey v. Jones, Tex.Civ......
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