United States v. Brooks, 5758
Citation | 169 F.2d 840 |
Decision Date | 26 August 1948 |
Docket Number | 5759.,No. 5758,5758 |
Parties | UNITED STATES v. BROOKS (two cases). |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit) |
Paul A. Sweeney, Atty., Dept. of Justice, of Washington, D. C. (Newell A. Clapp, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., David E. Henderson, U. S. Atty., of Charlotte N. C., and Morton Hollander, Atty., Dept. of Justice, of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for appellant.
Whiteford S. Blakeney, of Charlotte, N C. (Guthrie, Pierce & Blakeney, of Charlotte, N. C., on the brief), for appellees.
Before PARKER and DOBIE, Circuit Judges, and WATKINS, District Judge.
Welker Brooks and James Brooks, as Administrator of the Estate of Arthur Brooks, deceased, filed civil actions in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 921 et seq. The District Judge, sitting without a jury, entered judgments against the United States in favor of Welker Brooks and James Brooks, Administrator of the Estate of Arthur Brooks. The case is before us on the appeal of the United States from these judgments.
About 8 p. m. on February 17, 1945, Welker Brooks and Arthur Brooks, both enlisted men in the United States Army, were driving with their father, a civilian, in their private automobile on a public highway near Fayetteville, North Carolina. Both soldiers were on leave or furlough, engaged in their private concerns and not on any business connected with their military service. The Brooks automobile collided with an Army truck, operated by a civilian employee of the War Department, which was transporting the members of a Fort Bragg band to Fayetteville. Arthur Brooks was killed and Welker Brooks was seriously injured as a result of the collision, which the District Judge held to be due to the negligence of the driver of the Army truck.
The only question we are called upon to decide is whether Welker Brooks and James Brooks, as Administrator of the Estate of Arthur Brooks, deceased, have claims against the United States under the provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act. We think the District Judge erred by answering this question in the affirmative.
This problem of statutory interpretation is close and difficult, due primarily to the inept draftsmanship on the part of Congress in failing to make clear and express provision as to soldiers in the United States Army.
It seems crystal clear that the claims here in suit fall literally within the comprehensive words "any claim against the United States, for money only" used in § 410(a) of the Act, without any specific limitation as to the classes of persons who have valid claims under the Act. This fact, however, is not in itself determinative of our problem. The proper approach, we think, was admirably stated by District Judge Chesnut, in Jefferson v. United States, D.C., 77 F.Supp. 706, 711, 712:
Manifestly, the purpose of any important enactment of Congress is entitled to very great weight in determining the scope of the enactment. Stonite Products Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561, 62 S.Ct. 780, 86 L.Ed. 1026. The purpose of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 812, of which the Federal Tort Claims Act is Title IV, is said to be: "To provide for increased efficiency in the legislative branch of the Government." Congress, for many years, had been plagued with a veritable flood of private bills authorizing the payment of money for personal injuries or property damage caused by the tortious conduct of employees of the United States. These bills consumed an appreciable portion of Congressional time and energy. And Congress, by its size and organization, was ill fitted to pass fairly upon these bills. § 131 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 specifically forbids the introduction of such private bills for claims falling within the ambit of the Act.
While private bills for the relief of civilians were indeed legion, exceedingly rare and very far between were such bills for the relief of men in the armed services. In this connection, we may note the following explanatory statement at page 31, Report No. 1400, on S. 2177 (79th Cong., 2d sess.), which became the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946: "With the expansion of governmental activities in recent years, it becomes especially important to grant to private individuals the right to sue the Government in respect to such torts as negligence in the operation of vehicles." (Italics ours.)
The soldier, upon enlistment, acquires a special and unique military status, quite different from any relation between the Federal Government and civilians. United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 332 U.S. 301, 305, 67 S.Ct. 1604, 91 L.Ed. 2067; In re Morrissey, 137 U.S. 157, 159, 11 S.Ct. 57, 34 L.Ed. 644; In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 11 S.Ct. 54, 34 L.Ed. 636. The soldier is subject to military discipline even while at play, and his desertion is a serious crime, punishable at times by death. Rarely, if ever, is a soldier referred to by Congress as a "private individual."
Congress has established a complete and comprehensive administrative system of compensation to take care of the death of, or injuries to, servicemen. Monthly pension payments for disabling injuries, pensions to the widow, children or dependent parents for the death of a serviceman, full pay during periods of incapacity, medical attention and hospitalization, life insurance at rates far below the rates of commercial companies, employment preferences, education — all these and many other benefits are distinctly given to servicemen. Nor have the States been niggardly to veterans. Certainly there is force in the suggestion that Congress thought this system of benefits took adequate care of soldiers and intended thereby to exclude soldiers from the right to sue the United States for personal injuries received in the service.
In various statutes by which Congress has established this complete and comprehensive administrative system of compensation for damages resulting from the injury or death of a soldier, it has made no distinction between injuries received while a soldier was on furlough or leave, and injuries received while a soldier was on active duty. If the injury or disease is incurred during the period of his military service, it is service-connected, and is compensable, even though not service-caused. The fact that payments were made by the United States on account of the death of Arthur L. Brooks, and the injuries of his brother Welker, shows the practice where the soldier is on leave.
In cognate Congressional statutes, wherein the United States has waived its traditional immunity from suit for tort claims, these statutes have been judicially interpreted as inapplicable to members of the armed services. Thus, the Public Vessels Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 781 et seq., authorized: "a libel in personam * * * against the United States * * * for damages caused by a public vessel of the United States * * *." Yet it was held that there was no claim against the United States for the death of naval officers. Speaking for a unanimous Court, Circuit Judge Swan, in Dobson v. United States, 2 Cir., 27 F.2d 807, 808, 809, certiorari denied 278 U.S. 653, 49 S.Ct. 179, 73 L.Ed. 563, used this trenchant language:
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