Bylinski v. City of Allen Park

• Citation: 169 F.3d 1001
• Decision Date: 25 January 1999
• Docket Number: No. 98-1725,98-1725
• Parties: Gloria BYLINSKI, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE CITY OF ALLEN PARK, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)

Page 1001

169 F.3d 1001

Gloria BYLINSKI, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE CITY OF ALLEN PARK, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 98-1725.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued Dec. 11, 1998.

Decided Jan. 25, 1999. ^*

Peter W. Macuga, II (argued and briefed), Macuga, Swartz & Little, Detroit, MI, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Charles N. Raimi (briefed), R. Craig Hupp (argued and briefed), Bodman, Longley & Dahling, LLP, Detroit, MI; Kenneth D. Kruse, Allen Park, MI, for Defendant-Appellee The City of Allen Park.

R. Craig Hupp (argued and briefed), Bodman, Longley & Dahling LLP, Detroit, MI; Victor T. Mitea, Taylor, MI, for Defendant-Appellee City of Ecorse.

Edward M. Zelenak (briefed), Lincoln Park, MI; Charles N. Raimi (briefed), R. Craig Hupp (argued and briefed), Bodman Charles N. Raimi (briefed), R. Craig Hupp (argued and briefed), Bodman, Longley & Dahling LLP, Detroit, MI; David A. Bower, River Rouge, MI, for Defendant-Appellee City of River Rouge.

Longley & Dahling LLP, Detroit, MI, for Defendant-Appellee City of Lincoln Park.

Charles N. Raimi (briefed), R. Craig Hupp (argued and briefed), Bodman, Longley & Dahling LLP, Detroit, MI; John F. Gilhool, Southgate, MI, for Defendant-Appellee City of Southgate.

Carl B. Downing, Sommers, Schwartz, Silver & Schwartz, Southfield, MI; Charles N. Raimi (briefed), R. Craig Hupp (argued and briefed), Bodman, Longley & Dahling LLP, Detroit, MI, for Defendant-Appellee City of Taylor, Michigan.

Before: NELSON, SILER, and DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judges.

DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judge.

This class action suit was brought originally in state court by a group of disgruntled taxpayers seeking a refund of taxes paid and an injunction against further taxation by the defendant municipalities, based on the plaintiffs' claim that the defendants lacked authority to levy taxes without the referendum required by a recent amendment to the Michigan state constitution. The defendants removed the action to federal court, on the ground that the taxes in question had been levied pursuant to a federal consent decree entered four years earlier. Because the district court found that it had continuing jurisdiction under the consent decree, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion to remand to state court and granted summary judgment to the defendants on the merits. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 1994, the district court entered a consent decree in an action brought by the State of Michigan and the United States Environmental Protection Agency under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq., to remedy illegal discharges of raw sewage and other pollutants into Michigan waterways. Pursuant to that decree, Wayne County and certain down-river communities were directed to make cash contributions to a fund to update wastewater treatment facilities. The decree also effectively provided that communities unable to make the mandated payments would be required to increase taxes in order to meet their assessments. When a number of the municipalities were forced to levy taxes to ensure compliance with the court order, the citizen plaintiffs initiated this suit in Michigan state court for a refund of their increased tax payments and to enjoin further tax collections. The suit, however, was not filed until four years after entry of the consent decree in the federal action and three years after implementation of the actual tax levies. By that time, the renovation projects were 85 percent completed or contracted, and approximately $220 million in bonds had already been sold.

The defendant communities successfully removed the suit to federal court, alleging that the subject matter of the state court action was inextricably intertwined with the viability of the district court's 1994 consent decree. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the taxpayers' claims that the tax levies violated provisions of the Michigan constitution, finding (1) that the challenge to the constitutionality of the tax levies was barred by laches, (2) that the court had inherent power to enforce its judgments, and (3) that the Michigan state constitutional provision invoked by the plaintiffs was not applicable to the tax levies in question, because they were authorized under state statutes that predated the amendment to the state constitution.

ANALYSIS

Before this court, the plaintiffs contend that the district court erred both in denying their motion for remand and in ordering the municipalities to raise taxes without a vote of the citizenry, allegedly in violation of a "tax revolt" provision of the state constitution.

A. Jurisdiction

The district court correctly noted that implementation and enforcement of compliance with the 1994 consent decree gave it continued jurisdiction over the financing agreements that constituted an integral part of the order, citing Vanguards of Cleveland We also agree that the district court correctly invoked 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), the All Writs Act, which gives federal courts the "authority to remove an otherwise unremovable state court case in order to effectuate and prevent the frustration of orders it has previously issued in its exercise of jurisdiction otherwise obtained." In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 1431 (2d Cir.1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). It follows...