Boswell v. Mayer

• Decision Date: 14 April 1999
• Docket Number: No. 97-1710,97-1710
• Parties: Stanley L. BOSWELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert MAYER and Melinda Cieslinski, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 384

169 F.3d 384

Stanley L. BOSWELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert MAYER and Melinda Cieslinski, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 97-1710.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Submitted Feb. 3, 1999.

Decided March 2, 1999.

Rehearing Denied April 14, 1999.

Linda M. Olivieri (briefed), Office of the Attorney General, Corrections Division, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellees.

Stanley L. Boswell (briefed), Baraga, Michigan, pro se.

Before: MARTIN, Chief Judge; NELSON and BOGGS, Circuit Judges.

BOGGS, Circuit Judge.

Stanley L. Boswell, proceeding pro se, brought a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In this lawsuit against a prison warden and a prison employee, Boswell alleged that the defendants violated his constitutional rights by opening a piece of his mail, sent from the Michigan Attorney General's office, in Boswell's absence. Boswell appeals from the district court's dismissal of the case. Because the defendants violated neither Boswell's right of access to the courts nor his right to receive mail, we affirm.

I

In September 1994, this court decided Muhammad v. Pitcher, 35 F.3d 1081 (6th Cir.1994). In the opinion, Judge Jones, writing for the court and joined by Judge Lively, ruled unconstitutional a policy of the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC). The court held that "the conduct ... of treating mail sent from the state attorney general as ordinary mail rather than legal mail ... burdens Plaintiff's First Amendment rights." Id. at 1085. The MDOC policy for legal mail permitted a prisoner to submit a written request regarding mail "clearly designated as being from the prisoner's designated attorney, the courts, or from the Legislative Correctional Ombudsman." Id. at 1082. If the prisoner so requested, prison authorities had to open the legal mail in the prisoner's presence. The court found no reasonable relation between conservation of resources (the only valid penological interest propounded by MDOC) and MDOC's policy treating mail from the Attorney General as nonlegal mail. See id. at 1086.

On November 2, 1994, Marjorie Van Octhen, Administrator of the MDOC Office of Policy and Hearings, prepared a memorandum addressed to "All Wardens." This memo (the "Van Octhen memo") responded to the decision in Muhammad and promulgated a new mail policy. The policy, which governed mail sent from the Michigan Attorney General's Office and from prosecuting attorneys, required prison mailrooms to open the mail in the inmate's presence if three conditions were satisfied: (1) the prisoner had requested that the mailroom open legal mail only in his presence; (2) the return address on the envelope contained the full name of a licensed attorney; and (3) the envelope "is clearly marked 'Privileged' or 'Confidential', or specifically states that it is to be opened only in the prisoner's presence." Van Octhen believed that:

Since most of the mail affected by this ruling will be from the Corrections Division of the Michigan Department of Attorney General, which represents the Department in all litigation, it is anticipated that most AG mail will not require special handling, as there is no reason for it to be marked "confidential" or "privileged".

The memo asked wardens to inform their mailroom staff of the new policy.

Plaintiff Stanley L. Boswell is an inmate at Baraga Maximum Correctional Facility in Michigan. Until Frank J. Kelley retired on December 31, 1998, after 37 years in office, Kelley served as Michigan's Attorney General. See Charlie Cain, Few Regrets for Kelley, State's "Eternal General," DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 14, 1998, at A1. Kelley had a staff of 293 attorneys. See ibid. In a handwritten affidavit dated October 5, 1995, Boswell declared that, "I requested that any and all incoming legal mail coming from Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General to be open [sic] in my presence." In his handwritten complaint, Boswell wrote that, "On June 9, 1995 Plaintiff requested the Defendant Cieslinski [a mailroom employee] and mailroom staff not to open outside his presence any mail from Frank J. Kelley Attorney General's Office." Boswell alleged that, at some point (perhaps on June 9, 1995), he received a letter bearing Kelley's return address, and that mailroom staff opened the letter outside of Boswell's presence. In his affidavit, he alleged that the Warden and Melinda Cieslinski, a mailroom employee, "refused to treat mail coming from Frank J. Kelley as legal mail," but he did not give specific examples or dates. Boswell did not allege that the opened letter contained a warning such as "Confidential" or "Privileged" or "Open only in inmate's presence."

On June 21, 1995, Robert J. Mayer, Baraga's Warden, sent a memo to Boswell. The memo read: "Mail addressed to you from the Attorney General is not considered legal mail unless it is post stamped as confidential legal mail from that office. If the Attorney General wishes your mail to be handled as privileged correspondence, he will state that in his correspondence to us and to you." Boswell filed grievances and invoked a prison administrative rule that he claimed governed mail sent from "public officials" such as Frank J. Kelley. Boswell did not list the substance of the directive. ¹

On August 4, 1995, Boswell filed a pro se § 1983 complaint in state court. He named as defendants in their official and individual capacities Baraga Warden Robert J. Mayer and mailroom employee Melinda Cieslinski. Boswell alleged that, by opening the letter outside his presence, the defendants violated the administrative rule and Boswell's "constitutional right to access to the court." Boswell sought declaratory and injunctive relief and $10,000 in compensatory and punitive damages.

On September 18, 1995, the defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan. Boswell submitted a motion for partial summary judgment, in which he asked for a ruling that the defendants violated the First Amendment by opening the mail. In March 1996, Magistrate Judge Greeley found controlling this court's decision in Muhammad, and he recommended that the district court grant Boswell's motion for partial summary judgment. In July, Judge Quist rejected the Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation. Judge Quist ruled that the Van Ochten policy revision complied with the rule of Muhammad and Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974).

Defendants moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. In June 1997, Judge Quist dismissed the case, holding that the Van Octhen policy comported with the Constitution and that its alleged procedural flaws do not give rise to a claim under § 1983. Boswell filed a timely appeal.

II

Boswell's complaint and motion for partial of summary judgment reflect a belief that his claim stems from a denial of his "constitutional right to access to the court" or his "First Amendment rights of access to the court." Boswell appears to lack standing to bring such a claim. In light of the decision in Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996), Boswell must show that he suffered prejudice to his right of access to the court. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351, 116 S.Ct. 2174. This court has adopted the standing requirement elaborated in the Lewis opinion. See Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir.1996) ("In order to state a claim for denial of meaningful access to the courts, however, plaintiffs must plead and prove prejudice stemming from the asserted violation."); Kensu v. Haigh, 87 F.3d 172, 175 (6th Cir.1996).

Boswell's complaint does not satisfy this requirement. Apart from his conclusory statement that the defendants impaired his right of access, Boswell does not explain how he suffered harm. He does not allege that the incoming letter pertained to ongoing or anticipated litigation challenging either his sentence or the conditions of his confinement, see Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355, 116 S.Ct. 2174; also, he never mentions the contents of the letter. He does not allege that, by opening the letter in his absence, the defendants affected his access to the courts. Cf. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) ("[E]ven if one were to accept the argument that inspection of incoming mail from an attorney placed an obstacle to access to the court, it is far from clear that this burden is a substantial one."). On appeal, he asserts for the first time that the Van Octhen policy "inflicts a chilling effect on prisoners seeking to correspond with the Attorney General's office." This conclusory assertion comes very late and still does not allege actual injury; rather, if proven, it constitutes the sort of "theoretical" injury found insufficient in Lewis. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351, 116 S.Ct. 2174.

Boswell's status as pro se litigant affords relief from the standing problem, however. Pro se plaintiffs enjoy the benefit of a liberal construction of their pleadings and filings. Such an approach suggests that Boswell stated a claim on which he has standing to sue. Cf. Franklin v. Rose, 765 F.2d 82, 85 (6th Cir.1985) ("The appropriate liberal construction requires active interpretation in some cases...."). The right of access to the courts, if it has constitutional grounding probably stems from the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 367-68, 116 S.Ct. 2174 (Thomas, J., concurring); Wolff, 418 U.S. at 576, 94 S.Ct. 2963; cf. Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1284 (6th Cir.1997) (commenting that "the constitutional source of the right of access to the courts is somewhat nebulous"). A liberal reading of Boswell's complaint uncovers another claim, however--that of a First Amendment violation of the sort prohibited by this court's Muhammad opinion. See Muhammad, 35 F.3d at 1085 ("[T]he conduct that is challenged in the present case ... burdens Plaintiff's First Amendment rights.");...