Haefling v. United Parcel Service, Inc.

Decision Date04 March 1999
Docket NumberNo. 97-1658,97-1658
Citation169 F.3d 494
Parties137 Lab.Cas. P 33,825, 5 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 193 Jack M. HAEFLING, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Kevin W. Betz (argued), Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Daniel C. Emerson (argued), Andrew M. McNeil (on the brief), Bose, McKinney & Evans, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and KANNE, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge.

United Parcel Service ("UPS") terminated Jack Haefling's employment for poor attendance. Haefling filed suit against UPS alleging that his termination violated the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA" or "Act"), and UPS moved for summary judgment. The district court granted this motion based on the court's conclusion that the undisputed facts failed to establish that Haefling "suffered from a serious medical condition" or that his condition rendered him "unable to perform the functions of his position" with UPS, as required by the FMLA. Because we agree with the district court's conclusion, we affirm.

I. HISTORY

UPS is engaged in the small package pickup and delivery business throughout most of the world. UPS employees pick up packages from customers and transport these packages to UPS distribution centers. Once these packages have been delivered to the distribution centers, the packages are sorted and loaded onto UPS feeder trucks for delivery to distribution hubs where the packages are again sorted, reloaded, and transported to the UPS centers nearest to the package's ultimate destination.

Jack Haefling began his employment with UPS in 1972 at the Terre Haute, Indiana, UPS facility. Haefling was hired initially as a part-time reloader. One year later, he accepted a position as a full-time feeder driver and was transferred to the Indianapolis, Indiana, facility. In this capacity, Haefling hauled packages from one UPS site to another (principally between Indianapolis and Chicago). Haefling occupied this position from 1973 until his termination in 1995.

On April 18, 1994, a loaded dump truck struck the rear of an automobile driven by Haefling, aggravating a preexisting neck injury. Despite the accident and the aggravation of his neck injury, Haefling reported to work at UPS that evening and completed his shift. The following day Haefling drove to the hospital where hospital personnel took x-rays of his neck. These x-rays ruled out any fractures in his neck and confirmed the presence of scar tissue from the previous injury. Haefling was treated and released with instructions to "take it easy." Haefling also received a prescription for hydrocodone to be taken for pain as needed.

Soon thereafter, Haefling retained the services of an attorney to represent him in a personal injury suit he filed against the other driver involved in the April 18, 1994, accident. As part of that litigation, the attorney arranged for Haefling to see a doctor for consultation. Haefling visited the doctor approximately ten times during the nine to ten month period following the accident. Haefling characterized his visits with the doctor as general checkups, lasting about twenty minutes apiece. During the course of these visits, Haefling described the pain in his neck and indicated that he had suffered from nauseous headaches on three occasions. Haefling continued to take hydrocodone for pain approximately twelve times throughout 1994.

The doctor referred Haefling to the Rehabilitation Hospital of Indiana for physical therapy. From May 1994 until March 1995, Haefling attended twenty to thirty physical therapy sessions, during which physical therapists rubbed his neck, conducted muscle exercises, and applied heat and ultrasound therapy. Haefling also continued to take a muscle relaxant on the seven or eight occasions when, according to his description, his neck "locked up." Haefling was never admitted to any hospital or other health care facility for his neck injury, and there was no indication that the injury limited his daily activities. However, Haefling described his ability to perform the functions as a feeder driver for UPS as "spasmodic." Between the date of the accident and the termination of his employment with UPS, Haefling attributed nine absences from work as resulting from his neck injury.

UPS relies upon an informal employee attendance policy, pursuant to which employees are expected to maintain an absence rate below four percent of their scheduled workdays in any rolling 200 workday period. In enforcing its policy, UPS considers both the total number of days that an employee is absent, as well as the total number of "occurrences" resulting from an employee's absences. An "occurrence" is defined by UPS as consecutive days of absence uninterrupted by a day worked. UPS generally considers individuals with more "occurrences" to have worse attendance records than individuals who have been absent the same number of days, but with fewer "occurrences." Employees who violate UPS's absenteeism policy are subject to progressive discipline ranging from verbal reprimands to termination.

UPS eventually terminated Haefling's employment as a result of his excessive absenteeism and his failure to abide by UPS's attendance policy. During the period leading up to the termination of Haefling's employment, the attendance records for Haefling maintained by UPS indicate that he was absent from work at least thirty-two of the 257 days he was scheduled to work (an absence rate of approximately twelve percent). The district court relied on Haefling's personal diary to establish Haefling's attendance rate for this same period. This diary, which purportedly contained Haefling's notes on his own attendance, off-set some of the absences contained in UPS's attendance records. However, the diary still indicated that Haefling missed twenty-five scheduled work days, which, in part, constituted seventeen occurrences. In examining the two hundred day period immediately preceding the termination of Haefling's employment, the district court found that Haefling missed eighteen days on eleven occurrences for reasons ranging from heat exhaustion, to a suspended license, to the flu. Of those eighteen absences, only seven days and five occurrences are attributed to Haefling's neck injury according to the district court's reading of Haefling's diary.

UPS matched Haefling's escalating number of absences with escalating levels of disciplinary measures. The disciplinary measures initially were limited to oral reprimands and warning letters. Despite repeated reprimands and warnings, Haefling's attendance failed to improve. UPS eventually issued Haefling a suspension on September 26, 1994, and a final warning on November 10, 1994. On December 27, 1994, UPS terminated Haefling for excessive absenteeism and for violating the November 10, 1994, final warning.

In response to his termination, Haefling filed a grievance pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement and continued to work for UPS during the resolution of this grievance. Following a hearing before the grievance board on this matter, the termination was reduced to yet another final warning and Haefling was offered a second "last chance" to improve his attendance. Haefling missed work from February 15, 1995, to February 17, 1995, claiming he was suffering from the flu. On February 20, 1995, UPS again terminated him. Haefling filed a second grievance asserting, in part, that this termination violated the FMLA. This grievance was ultimately denied, and Haefling's discharge was upheld.

Haefling filed suit against UPS in district court alleging that the termination of his employment violated the FMLA. Specifically, Haefling claimed that UPS terminated his employment because of absences directly related to a "serious health condition" as this phrase is defined by the FMLA and, therefore, the termination of his employment was improper. UPS moved for summary judgment. The district court granted UPS's motion based on the court's conclusion that Haefling failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding his entitlement to protection under the FMLA. Specifically, the court determined that Haefling failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that he suffered from a "serious health condition" that rendered him "unable to perform the functions of [his] position" as the FMLA required. Haefling now appeals.

II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review

We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, drawing our own conclusions of law and fact from the record before us. See Thiele v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 68 F.3d 179, 181 (7th Cir.1995). Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, courts must construe all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable and justifiable inferences in favor of that party. See Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 562 (7th Cir.1996). "A genuine issue for trial exists only when a reasonable jury could find for the party opposing the motion based on the record as a whole." Roger v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 21 F.3d 146, 149 (7th Cir.1994).

B. The FMLA Claim

Under the FMLA, eligible employees may take twelve work weeks of leave within a twelve month period in the event that the employee suffers from a "serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform...

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