Gmyr-Maez v. Albuquerque Police Collin Schneider
| Citation | 169 F.Supp.3d 1172 |
| Decision Date | 11 February 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV 15-0617 RB/SCY,CIV 15-0617 RB/SCY |
| Parties | Sarah Gmyr-Maez, Plaintiff, v. Albuquerque Police Officer Collin Schneider, individually and in his official capacity, Albuquerque Police Officer Christine Apodaca, individually and in her official capacity, John/Jane Doe Supervisor, individually and in his/her official capacity, and City of Albuquerque, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
Frances Crockett Carpenter, Law Office of Frances Crockett, Hans Peter Erickson, Frances Crockett, LLC, Albuquerque, NM, Plaintiff.
Kristin J. Dalton, Assistant City Attorney, Albuquerque, NM, for Defendant.
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Amended Motion for Summary Judgment filed on September 3, 2015 (Doc. 30), and an affidavit from Plaintiff's counsel, which the Court construes as a motion for relief from the stay and for limited discovery (Doc. 39). Jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Having considered the submissions of counsel and relevant law, the Court will GRANT IN PART Defendants' Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, and GRANT IN PART Plaintiff's motion for relief from the stay and for limited discovery.
Plaintiff was arrested on March 4, 2014 based on allegations of misdemeanor domestic violence. (Doc. 24, First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 7–8; see also Doc. 40 at 2, ¶ 1.) Defendants Schneider and Apodaca drove Plaintiff and several male detainees to the Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC), where Plaintiff alleges that Defendants left her in the transport van, handcuffed and eventually panicked, in freezing temperatures, for up to two hours. (First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 12–16, 19–27.)
Plaintiff filed her complaint in state court alleging (1) cruel and unusual punishment in violation of her Eighth Amendment rights; (2) excessive force in violation of her Fourth Amendment rights; (3) deprivation of her rights to be free from severe discomfort and from the risk of serious bodily harm in violation of her due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment; (4) negligent operation of motor vehicles under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act; (5) negligent operation of equipment and machinery under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act; and (6) negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act. (Id. at ¶¶ 35–71.) Defendants removed the case to this Court on July 15, 2015, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(b) and 1446(a). (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on August 26, 2015 to correct the name of one Defendant. (First. Am. Compl.)
Defendants filed their original motion for summary judgment (later amended) and a Motion for Stay of Discovery and Request for Entry of Protective Order (Doc. 28) on September 1, 2015, asking the Court to stay discovery until their motion for summary judgment, which is largely based on qualified immunity grounds, is decided. Defendants, who were scheduled for depositions on September 3, 8, and 29, also filed a Notice of Nonappearance and Motion for Protective Order on September 2, 2015. (Doc. 29) Plaintiff responded to the motion to stay on September 15, 2015. (Doc. 38.) Accompanying her response is an affidavit from Plaintiff's counsel pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(d), which this Court construes as a motion for relief from the stay and for limited discovery. (See Docs. 38-B; 39; 40 at 2–3.) Plaintiff seeks certain discovery in order to better answer Defendants' amended summary judgment motion. (See Doc. 39.) Defendants filed replies to their motions for protective order and stay on October 9, 2015. (Docs. 43, 44.)
Defendants filed their Amended Motion for Summary Judgment on September 3, 2015 (Doc. 30), Plaintiff filed her response on September 15, 2015 (Doc. 40), and Defendants filed their reply on October 9, 2015 (Doc. 47). Judge Yarbrough granted Defendants' motions for stay and for protective order, reserving the issue of Plaintiff's request for relief from the stay for consideration with Defendants' Amended Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 51.) Remaining before the Court are Defendants' Amended Motion for Summary Judgment (on all issues except for any claims brought pursuant to a procedural or substantive due process standard)1 and the affidavit from Plaintiff's counsel, which the Court construes as a motion for relief from stay and for limited discovery. (Docs. 30, 39.)
On March 4, 2014, Plaintiff and her husband had a heated argument. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 7; see also Doc. 40 at 2, ¶ 1.) Bernalillo County Sheriff's Office deputies responded and arrested Plaintiff based on allegations of misdemeanor domestic violence. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff alleges that the deputies handcuffed her with her hands behind her back around 7:10 p.m. and transported her to the City of Albuquerque Prisoner Transport Center, where she was transferred to the custody of officers with the Albuquerque Police Department (APD) around 8:41 p.m. (Id. at ¶¶ 10–11, 43.) Between the time of her arrest around 7:10 p.m. and her entrance into the MDC later that evening, Plaintiff alleges that the only time she was free of handcuffs was during the brief transfer of custody from the Bernalillo County Sheriff's deputies to the APD officers when they switched handcuffs. (Doc. 40 at 8, ¶¶ A–B.)
Defendants Schneider and Apodaca placed Plaintiff and eight male detainees in a police transport van. .) The officers separated Plaintiff, handcuffed and belted into her seat, into a small compartment within the van, where Plaintiff alleges she could not stand up, see Defendants, the other detainees, or outside of the van. (Id. at ¶ 14; Doc. 40 at 8, ¶ D–E; Doc. 40-1, Gmyr-Maez Aff. ¶¶ 6, 8.) The drive from the Prisoner Transport Center to the MDC is seventeen miles, and it is possible to travel the distance in approximately thirty minutes. (Docs. 30 at 6, ¶ 10; 40 at 5, ¶ 10.)
Plaintiff alleges that when they arrived at the MDC, Defendants removed the male detainees from the van but left Plaintiff in the van alone. This fact is controverted by Defendant Schneider, who testified that it is his “habit, custom and practice to park the transport unit in a secure location and unload the prisoners to await booking.” (Doc. 30-B, Schneider Aff. ¶ 8.) It is also Defendant Schneider's “habit, custom and practice to take the prisoners inside the MDC and remove their handcuffs so that they can wait to be called for their medical screening.” (Id. )
At some point, Plaintiff could hear people talking outside the van in normal voices, but no one responded to her when she called out for help. (Doc. 40 at 8, ¶ G; Gmyr-Maez Aff. ¶ 10.) It was Plaintiff's perception that there was no ventilation in the van. (Gmyr-Maez Aff. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff submitted evidence that the outside temperature was somewhere between thirty and fifty-six degrees Fahrenheit on March 4, 2014. (Doc. 40-3.) Plaintiff, who asserts that she was only wearing a light sweater over her street clothes, became increasingly anxious, distressed, panicked, and cold in the van. (Docs. 40 at 9, ¶¶ I–K; 40-2; Gmyr-Maez Aff. ¶¶ 12–14.) Plaintiff alleges that when Defendant Schneider eventually retrieved her from the van, she was crying and hyperventilating. (Gmyr-Maez Aff. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Schneider asked her to calm down and apologized for leaving her in the van. (Id. ) Plaintiff alleges that she was left in the van alone anywhere between 45 minutes and two hours. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 27.)
Plaintiff asserts that the “extended period” of time she was in handcuffs caused her to suffer “significant pain in her wrists and shoulders, most especially during the period when she was abandoned in the transport van.” (Doc. 40 at 8, ¶ B.) The pain in her wrists and shoulders lasted for several days. (Id. at 8, ¶ C.) Plaintiff asserts that she complained to the medical screener at the MDC about the incident. (Gmyr-Maez Aff. ¶ 15.)
Summary judgment is appropriate when the Court, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, determines “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 ; see also Garrison v. Gambro, Inc. , 428 F.3d 933, 935 (10th Cir.2005). A fact is “material” if it could influence the determination of the suit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute over a material fact is “genuine” if a reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict for either party. Id. In cases where the moving party will not bear the burden of persuasion at trial, the movant bears the initial responsibility of identifying “an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
Once the moving party meets this burden, Rule 56(e) “requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Celotex , 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) ). The party opposing a motion for summary judgment “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial as to those dispositive matters for which it carries the burden of proof.” Applied Genetics Int'l, Inc. v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc. , 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir.1990) (citing Celotex , 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ). The nonmoving party may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) ; see also Celotex , 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Additionally, “a party cannot rest on ignorance of facts, on speculation, or on...
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