Ray v. City of Chicago
| Decision Date | 18 May 1960 |
| Docket Number | No. 35664,35664 |
| Citation | 169 N.E.2d 73,19 Ill.2d 593 |
| Parties | Edward M. RAY et al., Appellants, v. CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Sonnenschein, Lautmann, Levinson, Rieser, Carlin & Nath, Chicago (John J. Faissler, and Wayne R. Hannah, Jr., Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.
John C. Melaniphy, Corp. Counsel, and Kirkland, Ellis, Hodson, Chaffetz & Masters, Chicago (Sydney R. Drebin, Assistant Corp. Counsel, and Andrew C. Hamilton, and Edward G. Proctor, Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.
The owners of certain nearby real estate brought a declaratory judgment action in the circuit court of Cook County to declare invalid a Chicago ordinance vacating the one-block portion of Surf Street between Lake Shore Drive and Commonwealth Avenue and an alley in the block to the north. The action was brought against the city of Chicago, its mayor and its street commissioner; and by leave of court the St. Joseph Hospital, which owns the property abutting the vacated street and alley, was later added as a defendant. The complaint also prayed that defendants be restrained from vacating the street and alley and from obstructing them. After answers were filed defendants moved for summary judgment. The court granted the motion, and plaintiffs appeal directly to this court, the trial judge having certified that the validity of a municipal ordinance is involved and that in his opinion the public interest requires such direct appeal.
The record discloses that St. Joseph Hospital, a private not-for-profit corporation, owns the entire block north of Surf Street to Oakdale Avenue, and about the northerly two-thirds of the block to the south of Surf Street. It thus owns all of the property abutting the street and alley in question; and upon vacation of the street and alley title previously vested in the city would vest in St. Joseph Hospital. The corporation plans to construct a new hospital across the land in question, and the initial suggestion that the street be vacated was made on its behalf. The vacating ordinance which was adopted May 28, 1958, contained a proviso requiring payment of $100 as compensation for benefits accruing to the abutting owner.
The complaint alleges that the plaintiffs are taxpayers and own improved properties in the immediate vicinity of the vacated street and alley; that the street has been used without interruption as an important thoroughfare for over 100 years, serving the public generally and the residents of the area in particular; that vehicular and pedestrian traffic has become increasingly heavy from year to year, so much so that Surf Street and Oakdale Avenue, the next street north, have both been designated as one-way streets; that there is a critical parking situation in the area which will be aggravated if Surf Street is vacated; that the city has no power to vacate streets or alleys unless a public use or interest is subserved; that the ordinance was passed without any consideration for the public interest; and that the sole purpose and result of the vacation is to create benefits upon a privately owned corporation, without any benefits whatever accruing to the public. It is further alleged that the land included in the vacated street and alley has a fair cash market value in excess of $200,000; and that the sum of $100, which the ordinance provides as compensation, is grossly inadequate and bears no relation to the benefits accruing to St. Joseph Hospital by reason of the vacation.
The defendants filed answers denying the material allegations of the complaint and alleging (a) that in enabling St. Joseph Hospital to establish a private charitable hospital in the area, the ordinance benefits all the people of Chicago by increasing and improving the hospital facilities available to them; (b) that the removal of the intersection between Surf Street and Lake Shore Drive will greatly reduce through traffic on Surf Street and will enhance the value of residential properties abutting Surf Street by protecting them from the hazards, noise and congestion of through traffic; and (c) that the city will be relieved of the burden and responsibility of maintaining the portion of the street and alley in question. In their reply the plaintiffs denied all affirmative allegations in the answers, except that they admitted the removal of the intersection would greatly reduce through traffic on Surf Street.
From the pleadings, exhibits and affidavits it appears that the hospital's property and the street and alley in question are located in a neighborhood characterized by numerous multi-story apartment buildings; that a large number of people reside in the area; that the part of Surf Street described in the vacating ordinance is 66 feet wide, 242 feet long on its northerly side and 250 feet long on the southerly side; that the east-west alley described in the ordinance is an 18-foot alley extending from North Lake Shore Drive to Commonwealth Avenue, a distance of 228 feet; that the area is zoned R-7, which permits hospital use; that the architect engaged by the defendant corporation prepared plans for a new hospital to be located across Surf Street, that he participated in the filing of an application with the city for the closing of the street, that the suggestion to vacate it, to begin with, was that of his firm; and that public hearings were held prior to passage of the ordinance.
Minutes of the proceedings in the city council, filed with defendants' motion for summary judgment, show that numerous persons spoke in opposition to the ordinance, giving as reasons that closing the street and constructing a hospital would create parking and traffic problems, that sewers would be overloaded, that access to recreational facilities would be impeded, and that rental and land values would be seriously affected. The minutes also show that a builder spoke in favor of the proposal and that the city planning commissioner recommended closing the street and alley because it would, according to the advisory committee on traffic and parking, eliminate an undesirable interference with Lake Shore Drive traffic flow.
To reverse the decree plaintiffs contend that a material issue of fact exists as to whether a public interest was subserved by the vacation ordinance, and that the court therefore erred in entering summary judgment. The law is well settled that the city council may, without any judicial determination, order the vacation of a street or alley by proceeding in accordance with the applicable statute, and that the courts may...
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