City of Pleasant Ridge v. Romney, s. 19--21
| Decision Date | 04 August 1969 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 19--21,s. 19--21 |
| Citation | 169 N.W.2d 625,382 Mich. 225 |
| Parties | CITY OF PLEASANT RIDGE, a Municipal corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. George ROMNEY, Governor, and State Highway Commission, Defendants-Appellees. Alfred Di MATTEO et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The MICHIGAN STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION et al., Defendants-Appellees. CITY OF LATHRUP VILLAGE, a Michigan Municipal corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF STATE HIGHWAYS, State Highway Commission, Charles H. Hewitt, Wallace D. Nunn, Ardale W. Ferguson, Richard F. Vander Veen, Highway Location Arbitration Board, William C. Bleimeister, Boaz Siegel and John A. Dodds, Defendants-Appellees. * |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
John S. Slavens, City Atty., City of Pleasant Ridge, Royal Oak, for plaintiffs-appellants, John E. S. Scott, and Dickinson, Wright, McKean & Cudlip, Detroit, of counsel.
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, John M. Roche, Asst. Attys. Gen., Lansing, for defendants-appellees.
Before the Entire Bench, except KELLY, J.
BLACK and T. M. KAVANAGH, Justices.
Alleging unconstitutionality of public act 12, Extra Session of 1967, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin construction through the municipalities of Pleasant Ridge and Lathrup Village of planned interstate highway I--696. The circuit court dismissed all 3 complaints with prejudice. Previous delays in carrying out the declaration of policy appearing in the Federal-aid highways act of 1958 (23 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.) having been considered, we granted by-pass of the Court of Appeals February 6, 1969 pursuant to GCR 1963, 852. All 3 causes were consolidated and submitted March 4, 1969. Our judgment of affirmance, reciting that 'An opinion or opinions will follow as soon as same have been considered and signed.', was entered May 5, 1969.
The generally projected purpose of interstate highway I--696 has been and now is that of joining present interstate highways I--94 and I--75, from east to west, across parts of Macomb and Oakland counties. The route through the mentioned municipalities having been approved under Act 12 by the highway location arbitration board, the sole issue brought up for review is whether that approval and the statutory proceedings leading up to same are valid as against plaintiffs' constitutional attack. A second question, raised by the Court during oral submission (See Dation v. Ford Motor Co., 314 Mich. 152, 159--161, 22 N.W.2d 252) and subsequently briefed by the parties appellant and appellee, will be treated in the second division of this opinion.
The foregoing statement of question brought up for review purposely excludes from current consideration any issue that might arise should condemnatory action be taken by the department of State highways under section 7 of Act 12; the reason being that the department has not as yet, in its own claimed right, undertaken to acquire property, in either of the two municipalities, by condemnation deemed by it 'necessary to provide for the completion and successful operation of the interstate highway and appurtenant facilities.' Section 7, of which more presently, reads as follows:
First: The Constitutional Validity of Act 12
Act 12 is entitled 'An act to provide for arbitration of disputes involving the determination of routes for interstate highways through municipalities and to authorize the acquisition of property therefor.' By significant references and express definition the act is keyed to and made an effective adjuvant of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958 (Title 23, U.S.Code § 101 et seq.), in particular section 128(a) of Title 23. 1
Section 1(d) of Act 12 defines an 'Interstate highway' as meaning 'a highway route on the interstate system as defined in and designated pursuant to Title 23 of the United States Code, prior to the effective date of this act.' Other specific definitions, appearing in section 1, demonstrate an unmistakable legislative intent to resolve, by administrative action of a newly created interstate highway location board, all differences arising with respect to the 'route location' of an interstate highway when it is sought to extend such a highway to or through an 'affected municipality.' The thrust of the act is manifest. It is that of implementing by reference to the cited Federal statute the purposes of and financing afforded only by the latter.
Sections 2 through 6 of the act provide that, after the State highway commission has reviewed proposed interstate highway routes and has deemed it necessary 'to resolve disputes concerning the routes through 1 or more municipalities,' the commission shall institute proceedings designed to provide notice to and the public hearing of representatives of the department, of the affected municipalities and of 'such other persons as are parties in interest,' all for the purpose of arriving at a final administrative determination 'of the route' with provision that such determination when made shall constitute an 'approval' that is 'final and binding upon the department and the affected municipalities.' At this juncture compare the purpose of sections 2 through 6 with the Congressional purpose of quoted § 128(a) of Title 23. It is in this setting, of what is popularly known as a 'reference statute,' that we undertake to decide the important constitutional questions which the respective plaintiffs have raised in the circuit court. See discussion of reference statutes, post at 630.
Section 7 of the act, not thus far called into play so far as concerns this I--696 project and any litigation before us, provides per quotation Ante for acquisition of property deemed requisite to the completion and operation of the proposed interstate highway and the facilities thereof. The validity of that section, which we regard as severable within C.L.1948, § 8.5, is not at present before the Court. No proceedings except those leading up to section 6 approval have thus far been instituted. For elaboration, see the second division of this opinion.
For the purposes of review of the constitutional questions posed below and argued here, we accept the statement thereof which the appellant City of Pleasant Ridge has presented. That statement is fairly representative of all questions considered in the original briefs of the parties appellant and has been accepted by the attorney general pursuant to Rule 814.1.
'I. Does Public Act 12, 1967 (Extra Session) (MCLA §§ 252.151--158, MSA §§ 9.1095(51)--(58)) violate Sections 29 and 31 of Article VII of the Michigan Constitution in that its effect is to:
(a) Deprive appellant and other local units of government of the reasonable control of their highways, streets, alleys and public places.
(b) Vacate or alter roads, streets, alleys and public places under the jurisdiction of appellant and other local units of government.
(c) Violate the provisions of MSA 9.1094(2) and 8.171(i)?
'II. Is Public Act 12, 1967 (Extra Session), which provides for compulsory binding arbitration of disputes over the location of Interstate Highways, unconstitutional as:
(a) An illegal and improper delegation of power, or
(b) An improper delegation of power without setting up adequate standards or guidelines for the exercise of the power granted?
In view of our determination that Act 12 is but ancillary to the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958, 2 it appears definitely--and we therefore find--that the only posed questions of moment appear in Stated Questions I, II and III. We refine them to these:
1. Does Act 12 deprive the appellant municipalities of the reasonable control of their highways, streets, alleys and public places in violation of section 29 of Article VII?
2. Does Act 12 vacate or alter any road, street, alley, or public place under the jurisdiction of the appellant municipalities in violation of section 31 of the same article?
3. Is Act 12 unconstitutional in that it undertakes to delegate legislative power to an administrative commission without having included therein requisite standards for the exercise of power granted thereby?
4. Is Act 12 unconstitutional in that it fails to provide a right of judicial review of action taken thereunder by the highway location arbitration board?
Our answer to restated questions 1 and 2 is foretold by that which appears above. No proceedings designed to condemn public ways or public property in either of the two municipalities have been commenced by the department of State highways. Whether the department may with constitutional sanction condemn such ways or property is a serious question, sections 29 an...
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