Kansas City v. St. Louis & Kansas City Land Co.

• Decision Date: 14 July 1914
• Citation: 169 S.W. 62,260 Mo. 395
• Parties: KANSAS CITY v. ST. LOUIS & KANSAS CITY LAND COMPANY, CHICAGO, BURLINGTON & QUINCY RAILROAD COMPANY et al., Appellants
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

169 S.W. 62

260 Mo. 395

KANSAS CITY v. ST. LOUIS & KANSAS CITY LAND COMPANY, CHICAGO, BURLINGTON & QUINCY RAILROAD COMPANY et al., Appellants

Supreme Court of Missouri

July 14, 1914

Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court. -- Hon. Thomas J. Seehorn, Judge.

Affirmed.

White & Lyons, Warner, Dean, McLeod & Langworthy, Sebree, Conrad & Wendorff, Ball & Ryland, Kenneth McC. DeWeese, Watson, Watson & Alford, Cowherd, Ingraham, Durham & Morse and Scarritt Scarritt, Jones & Miller for appellants.

(1) The charter of Kansas City could not confer original civil jurisdiction on the municipal court, and so much of sections 1 and 2 of article 6 and section 10 of article 4 of the charter of 1908 as purports to do so, is violative of sections 1, 22, 34, 36 and 37, article 6, of the Constitution of Missouri, and section 15 of the Schedule of the Constitution, conferring civil jurisdiction exclusively on circuit courts except as otherwise provided and of section 16, article 9, of said Constitution, authorizing Kansas City to frame and adopt a charter, and is inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the State. R. S. 1909, secs. 8578 8663, 6050; State v. Fry, 4 Mo. 190; Abbott on Mun Corp., sec. 584; Spencer v. Sulley Co., 4 Dak. 474; Industrial School v. County, 40 Wis. 326; Dillon on Mun. Corp. (5 Ed.), secs. 744, 745, 632; People v. Howell, 5 Colo. 412; Lafron v. Dufracq, 9 La. Ann. 350; Ottawa v. Carey, 108 U.S. 121. See also dissenting opinion in State ex rel. v. Seehorn, 246 Mo. 541. (2) The judgment in the court below deprived appellants of their property without due process of law, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments to the Constitution of the United States, in that no notice was ever given them of the pendency of said proceedings as required by sections 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7, of article 6, of the charter of Kansas City. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97; Hagar v. Reclamation District, 111 U.S. 701; Bellingham Bay & B. C. Co. v. New Whatcom, 172 U.S. 314; St. Louis v. Rankin, 96 Mo. 497; Lumber Co. v. McCrimmon, 164 F. 759; Railroad v. Wright, 207 U.S. 137; Prichard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124; Londener v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373; Railroad v. Backus, 154 U.S. 421; Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112. (3) The judgment of the trial court denied to these appellants the equal protection of the laws, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, in denying them a hearing on the question of the value of the land taken or damaged under proceedings under Ordinance 3209. (4) The court erred in holding that said proceeding under Ordinance 3209 could be supplemental after it had adjudged said proceedings null and void as to the Union Pacific Railroad Company et al., and the court erred in not sustaining appellant's contention that said judgment was res adjudicata as to all issues involved in said suit, and, that a void proceeding could not be supplemental after such proceedings were declared null and void. Daniel v. Carroll, 19 Ill. 226; Nelson v. Roundtree, 23 Wis. 367; Merritt v. Kewanee, 175 Ill. 552; Cooley on Const. Lim., p. 382. (5) The municipal court was wholly without authority under the terms of the charter to "hear and determine the cause" or to empanel a jury therein by reason of the failure to publish the court order of notice and of the proceedings -- a publication "necessary to the validity thereof." Charter 1908, sec. 2 (p. 255); Shaffner v. St. Louis, 31 Mo. 264; State ex rel. v. Gill, 84 Mo. 248; Kansas City v. Mulkey, 76 Mo. 247; St. Louis v. Brinckwirth, 204 Mo. 305. (6) Section 23, article 6, of the charter, concerning supplemental proceedings to cure "any error, defect or omission" in the original proceedings, has no application to the case at bar. Here there was nothing to supplement. (7) Original Ordinance 3209 is void on its face in that it requires that "the amount allowed for private property taken shall be wholly raised by special assessments made against the property described" in the benefit district, contrary to the provisions of the charter (Sec. 3, art. 6), which expressly directs that there shall first be assessed against the city "the amount of benefit to the city and public generally, inclusive of any benefit to any property of the city," and the balance, if any, against the several tracts of private property in benefit district. No citizen was bound to pay any attention to an ordinance in invitum, containing such a provision as did the one in question.

A. F. Evans, Jay M. Lee and J. C. Petherbridge for respondent.

(1) The legality of the municipal court of Kansas City has been established and its jurisdiction to try condemnation proceedings, including this supplemental proceeding, has been upheld by this court. State ex rel. v. Seehorn, 246 Mo. 541, which is supported by the following cases and citations: Baldwin v. Philadelphia, 99 Pa. St. 164; McCormick v. Fayette Co., 150 Pa. St. 190; Swift v. Tyson, 16 Peters (U.S.), 18; Fennell v. Common Council, 36 Mich. 185; Shattuck v. Kincaid, 49 P. 758; Industrial School v. Supervisors, 40 Wis 328; In re Cloherty, 2 Wash. 137; People ex rel. v. Curley, 5 Colo. 412; Lafron v. Dufrocq, 9 La. Ann. 350; Ottawa v. Carey, 108 U.S. 110; Meagher v. Storey County, 5 Colo. 196; Hagerstown v. Dechart, 32 Md. 369; Edenton v. Wood, 65 N.C. 379; Ex parte Fagg, 44 S.W. 294; Blessing v. Galveston, 42 Tex. 641; Sec. 1, art. 6, Constitution; Sec. 10, art. 4, Charter of Kansas City; Sec. 16, art. 9, Constitution; R. S. 1899, sec. 6360; Sec. 22, art. 6, Constitution; State ex rel. v. Field, 99 Mo. 355; Kansas City ex rel. v. Scarritt, 127 Mo. 650; Kansas City v. Ward, 134 Mo. 186; Kansas City v. Oil Co., 140 Mo. 466; Kansas City v. Bacon, 147 Mo. 259; Brunn v. Kansas City, 216 Mo. 116; Kansas City v. Smart, 128 Mo. 289; Leonard v. Sparks, 117 Mo. 108; Ex parte Kilburg, 10 Mo.App. 446; 1 Dillon Mun. Corp. (5 Ed.), secs. 237, 238; Secs. 6, 8, 12, art. 5, Constitution 1820; Sec. 1, art. 5, Constitution of 1820, as amended in 1822; Laws 1851, p. 88; Laws 1852, p. 244; Secs. 1, 13, 21, 23, art. 6, Constitution 1865; Laws 1867, p. 18; Laws 1870, p. 327; Laws 1872, p. 397; Laws 1875, p. 196; Secs. 1, 22, art. 6, Constitution of 1875; Sec. 1, art. 7, of the Charter of 1889; Sec. 1, art. 6, of the Charter of 1908; Worthington v. London, etc., Co., 164 N.Y. 81; State ex inf. v. Lund, 167 Mo. 241; Barber Co. v. French, 158 Mo. 547; Corrigan v. Kansas City, 211 Mo. 627; State ex rel. v. Field, 99 Mo. 352; Kansas City v. Bacon, 147 Mo. 270; Meier v. St. Louis, 180 Mo. 409; Morrow v. Kansas City, 186 Mo. 684; Brunn v. Kansas City, 216 Mo. 108; 2 Dillon on Mun. Corp. (5 Ed.), pp. 1115, 1117; 1 Dillon on Mun. Corp. (5 Ed.), pp. 110, 111, 112. Dillon cites the following Missouri cases: Kansas City v. Oil Co., 140 Mo. 458; State ex rel. v. Tel. Co., 189 Mo. 83; Morrow v. Kansas City, 186 Mo. 675; Westport v. Kansas City, 103 Mo. 141; Kansas City v. Stegmiller, 151 Mo. 189; St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 149 U.S. 465. Note 3 Dillon (5 Ed.), p. 1621, citing: State v. Ramsey County Dist. Ct., 87 Minn. 146; State ex rel. v. Field, 99 Mo. 352; Kansas City v. Oil Co., 140 Mo. 458; Kansas City v. Bacon, 147 Mo. 259. (2) The appellants in the original proceedings were not necessary parties in so far as such proceedings related to the amount of the award as damages for property taken or damaged, and were not entitled to notice thereof. The city and the property-owners whose property was taken or damaged, were the only necessary parties to the original proceedings relating to the amount of the award allowed for property taken or damaged. State ex rel. v. Seehorn, Judge, 246 Mo. 583; Kansas City v. Smart, 128 Mo. 272; Kansas City v. Ward, 134 Mo. 179; St. Louis v. Brinckwirth, 204 Mo. 280; St. Louis v. Ranken, 96 Mo. 497; St. Louis v. Calhoun, 222 Mo. 44; St. Louis v. Buss, 159 Mo. 12; Pleadwell v. Glass Co., 151 Mo.App. 51; 1 Page & Jones on "Taxation by Assessment," 213; Goodrich v. Detroit, 184 U.S. 432; Voight v. Detroit, 184 U.S. 115; Adams v. Roanoke, 102 Va. 53; Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373; Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U.S. 345; Garnett v. St. Louis, 25 Mo. 505; Newby v. Platte Co., 25 Mo. 258; Uhrig v. St. Louis, 44 Mo. 458. (3) The supplemental proceedings and the assessment of benefits thereunder were authorized by the Kansas City charter and were in accordance with the law of this State, and not in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, nor in violation of appellants' rights. Sec. 23, art. 6, Kansas City Charter; State ex rel. v. Seehorn, 246 Mo. 568; St. Louis v. Buss, 159 Mo. 12; Drainage Dist. v. Richardson, 237 Mo. 71. And all cases cited under Point 2. (4) The decree of the circuit court in Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Kansas City did not nullify the amount of damages made in the original proceeding for the property taken. It only nullified the benefit assessment against its property under that proceeding. (5) The charter provisions of St. Louis and Kansas City on condemnation proceedings are not materially different, and the opinion and decision of the court in State exrel. v. Seehorn, 246 Mo. 568, were right and should be followed. St. Louis v. Brinckwirth, 204 Mo. 280; St. Louis v. Ranken, 96 Mo. 497; St. Louis v. Calhoun, 222 Mo. 44; St. Louis v. Buss, 159 Mo. 9. (6) The original ordinance is not void or in conflict with the charter of Kansas City. Sec. 2, art. 6, Kansas City Charter; Lamar v. Wiedman, 57 Mo.App. 507, 514; St. Louis v. Lanigan, 97 Mo. 180; Kansas City v. Smart, 128 Mo. 293; Kansas City v. Block, 175 Mo. 444. (7) The supplemental ordinance is not void or uncertain. Sec. 23, art. 6, Kansas City Charter; Lyman v. Farris, 5 N.W. 523; People v. Railroad, 247 Ill. 340; 2 Black on Judgments (2 Ed.),...