Mayo v. Polk Co.
| Decision Date | 15 June 1936 |
| Citation | 169 So. 41,124 Fla. 534 |
| Parties | MAYO, State Com'r of Agriculture v. POLK CO.[*] |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Suit by the Polk Company against Nathan Mayo, as Commissioner of Agriculture of the State of Florida, wherein a temporary injunction was granted. From orders denying a motion to vacate the injunction and a motion to dismiss the bill of complaint, defendant appeals.
Reversed. Appeal from Circuit Court, Leon County; J. B Johnson, Judge.
Cary D Landis, Atty. Gen., H. E. Carter and James B Watson, Asst. Attys. Gen., Mabry, Reaves, Carlton & White and Zewadski & Pierce, all of Tampa, and E. G. Grimes, of Palmetto, for appellant.
Robert T. Dewell, of Winter Haven, and George C. Bedell and Chester Bedell, both of Jacksonville, for appellee.
The Legislature of 1935 enacted chapter 16860, Laws of Florida, relating to the purchase, sale, and handling of citrus fruits and providing for the licensing and bonding of citrus fruit dealers. Appellee, as complainant, instituted this suit in the circuit court of Leon county, the bill of complaint praying that appellant, who was named as defendant, be restrained from enforcing the provisions of the said act against it. A temporary injunction as prayed for was granted. A motion to vacate and a motion to dismiss the bill of complaint were denied, and from both orders this appeal was prosecuted.
The first question urged is whether or not the licensing and bonding provisions of sections 2 and 3, chapter 16860, Acts of 1935, can be enforced against appellee and others who are engaged exclusively in the business of canning, preserving, and marketing in sealed containers the edible portions of grapefruit grown or purchased outright and not consigned for canning, processing, and sale.
Appellee contends that this question must be answered in the negative because the title to chapter 16860 is not sufficient, under section 16 of article 3 of the State Constitution, to cover those engaged exclusively in the business of canning, preserving, and marketing the edible portions of grapefruit grown or purchased outright, and not consigned for canning, processing, and sale.
The title to chapter 16860, Acts of 1935, is as follows:
'An Act relating to the Purchase, Handling, Sale and Accounting of Sales of Citrus Fruit Grown in the State of Florida; to Prevent Fraud and Deception Therein; to Provide [124 Fla. 537] for the Licensing and Bonding of Citrus Fruit Dealers; to Prescribe Certain Powers and Duties of the Commissioner of Agriculture of the State of Florida in the Administration and Enforcement of this Act; and to Prescribe Penalties for the Violations of the Provisions of this Act.'
The terms 'dealer' and 'citrus fruit dealer' are defined in section 1 of the act and are as follows:
Section 16 of article 3 requires that each law enacted in the Legislature shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in the title. The test by which it may be determined whether the title of an act meets this requirement is met if its verbiage is sufficient to put one on notice and cause him to inquire into and ascertain the contents of the body of the act. If it does this, it is sufficient to correct the vice that section 16 of article 3 was designed to cure. State ex rel. Moodie v. Bryan, 50 Fla. 293, 39 So. 929; Ex parte Pricha, 70 Fla. 265, 70 So. 406.
Measured by this rule and others equally as familiar but unnecessary to burden this opinion with, the title to chapter 16860 was ample. The appellee was not a 'producer, consignor, commission merchant, consignment shipper, cash buyer, broker, or agent,' as contemplated by the term 'citrus fruit dealer,' but it was attempting to make money out of grapefruit by canning, preserving, and marketing the edible portion thereof in sealed containers. It was consequently a 'dealer' as defined by section 1 as here quoted.
But appellee contends that the words 'dealer' and 'citrus fruit dealer,' as referred to and defined in the act, must be applied in their ordinary or current use, and that the Legislature cannot by definition extend their meaning beyond that generally attributed to them. Appellee, in other words, contends that the maxim, 'Expressio unius est exclusio alterius,' is applicable and should control in applying the title to the body of the act under review.
The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another is a sound rule of construction as applied to acts of the Legislature, but it has no application to the title of an act. Goetz v. Smith, 152 Tenn. 451, 278 S.W. 417; Doeppenschmidt v. International & G. N. R. Co., 100 Tex. 532, 101 S.W. 1080. It is quite true that the words 'dealer' or 'citrus fruit dealer' are terms of common usage and well-understood meaning, but it is also true that it is competent for the Legislature to expand or contract the implication of these terms within their permissible meaning. In re Ortiz's Estate, 31 N.M. 427, 246 P. 908; Wright v. Fulton County, 169 Ga. 354, 150 S.E. 262; Lloyd Garretson Co. v. Robinson, 178 Wash. 601, 35 P.2d 504, 505; State ex rel. Olsen v. Board of Control of State Institutions, 85 Minn. 165, 88 N.W. 533. The definition attributed to 'dealers' and 'citrus fruit dealers' by chapter 16860 was well within the rule applied in these cases.
In all cases where the constitutionality of an act turns on the interpretation of the title, the latter should be construed liberally if necessary to uphold the act, but in this case we do not have to resort to that canon of construction. One engaged in the business of canning, preserving, processing, and marketing the edible portion of grapefruit for profit is certainly within the permissible use of the phrase 'citrus fruit dealer' as used and defined by the act brought in question.
The answer thus given to question 1 necessarily answers question 2 contrary to the contention of appellee; the import of question 2 being that the licensing and bonding provisions of sections 2 and 3, chapter 16860, have no application to appellee and others in like situation. This contention is grounded on the further contention that chapter 16860 indicates a purpose to regulate only the business of those dealing in citrus fruit for the account of others and that it neither expresses nor infers a purpose to regulate those engaged in canning, preserving, and marketing the edible portion of grapefruit grown or purchased by the canner or processor and not consigned to him or them for canning, processing, and sale.
We have given due consideration to the argument of appellee on this point, but the test of whether or not one is a dealer, as contemplated by the act, is whether he makes, or attempts to make, money or something of value by dealing in citrus fruits 'in any manner whatsoever.' It seems inescapable that any one processing citrus fruit or purchasing that of another for a like purpose and profit and not embraced within the exceptions made would be a dealer as contemplated by the act, and being so would be required to secure the license and post the required bond with the commissioner of agriculture.
It is next contended that if chapter 16860 is valid, in that it requires appellee to secure the license and post the bond with the commissioner of agriculture, then it is violative of sections 1 and 12, Declaration of Rights, Constitution of Florida, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, in that it unduly limits appellee's power to contract. To support this contention appellee relies on Riley v. Sweat, 110 Fla. 362, 149 So. 48; and State v. Old Tavern Farm, Inc., 133 Me. 468, 180 A. 473, 101 A.L.R. 810.
The majority opinion in the latter case supports appellee's contention. Riley v. Sweat was an habeas corpus proceeding in which it was shown that the petitioner had tried repeatedly but had been unable, to make the required bond. This court held that under such circumstances failure and inability to make the bond required amounted...
To continue reading
Request your trial