International Broth. of Teamsters v. Pena

Decision Date15 March 1994
Docket NumberNo. 92-1413,92-1413
Citation17 F.3d 1478
PartiesINTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, Petitioner, v. Federico F. PENA, Secretary of Transportation, and Rodney Slater, Administrator, Federal Highway Administration, Respondents.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Petition for Review of an Order of the Federal Highway Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation.

Paul H. Lamboley, Washington, DC, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Stephen Presser.

John P. Schnitker, Atty., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, DC, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Michael Jay Singer, Atty., U.S. Dept. of Justice.

Before MIKVA, Chief Judge, WILLIAMS and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS.

STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge:

On November 21, 1991, then-Secretary of Transportation Samuel Skinner, acting on behalf of the United States, entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with his Mexican counterpart. Each country agreed that as of April 1, 1992, it would require commercial drivers licensed pursuant to its authority to pass drivers' tests meeting the standards specified in an annex to the Memorandum of Understanding; in addition, each country would recognize commercial drivers' licenses ("CDLs") that the other country issued in compliance with their agreement. The United States Federal Highway Administration ("FHWA") later promulgated a rule implementing this accord. 57 Fed.Reg. 31,454 (July 16, 1992) (the "Implementing Rule").

Recognition of foreign CDLs had been presaged by FHWA regulations implementing the "single-license requirement" of the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986 (the "Safety Act"), 49 U.S.C. app. Secs. 2701 et seq. Because a truck driver with licenses from many different jurisdictions might be able to maintain the appearance of a good driving record despite many violations, the Safety Act prohibited operators of commercial motor vehicles from having more than one license. Id. Sec. 2701. Under penalty of loss of highway funds, the Safety Act also encouraged each state to issue CDLs only to people domiciled in that state, with one exception: states could issue nonresident licenses to people who were not domiciled in a state that issues CDLs. Id. Sec. 2708(a)(12). Later the FHWA made clear that states could grant these nonresident CDLs to people domiciled in foreign jurisdictions that fail to impose CDL standards "in accordance with, or similar to" the minimum standards imposed by the FHWA on American states. 49 CFR Sec. 383.23(b). The implication of this regulatory scheme is that when a foreign country's CDL standards are "in accordance with, or similar to," the federal standards, CDLs issued by that country will be valid in America. Otherwise, drivers from foreign nations with non-complying standards would be able to secure a state nonresident CDL, while drivers from complying nations would be completely barred from our highways.

In 1988, pursuant to an agreement between Canada and the United States, the FHWA determined that Canadian CDL standards met this test and inserted a footnote to that effect in 49 CFR Sec. 383.23(b). This action went unchallenged. But when the FHWA adopted the Implementing Rule, adding a sentence to the footnote to implement the Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Mexico, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters brought this petition for review. The Teamsters do not challenge the underlying regulatory system, but insist that Mexico's CDL standards are not "similar to" the federally established ones, and that the Implementing Rule violates the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. Secs. 551 et seq.; the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. Secs. 2112, 2191; the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. Secs. 2901-02; and the Safety Act. We reject their arguments.

I. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

Though the parties have not contested our subject-matter jurisdiction, we must independently satisfy ourselves that it exists. Unless a statute provides otherwise, persons seeking review of agency action go first to district court rather than to a court of appeals. See 5 U.S.C. Sec. 703. But Congress has overridden the normal default rule here.

When the Department of Transportation was created in 1966, Congress transferred authority to it from a variety of different agencies. Pub.L. No. 89-670, Sec. 6, 80 Stat. 937-41 (Oct. 15, 1966), codified at 49 U.S.C. app. Sec. 1655. The Department's exercise of these transferred "functions, powers, and duties" is subject to judicial review "to the same extent and in the same manner" as if the functions in question were still being exercised by the agency from which they were transferred in 1966. See 49 U.S.C. app. Sec. 1653(c). One of the authorities that the FHWA purported to exercise here--the authority to "prescribe requirements for qualifications ... of employees of, and safety of operation ... of" motor carriers and motor private carriers, see 49 U.S.C. Sec. 3102(b); see also the Implementing Rule, 57 Fed.Reg. at 31,457/3 (invoking 49 U.S.C. Sec. 3102(b))--was among the authorities transferred from the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1966. See 49 U.S.C. Sec. 304(a)(1)-(3) (1964) (ICC's old authority); Pub.L. No. 89-670, Sec. 6(e)(6)(C) (transferring this authority). The courts of appeals have exclusive jurisdiction to hear challenges to ICC rules. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2342(5). Accordingly, when the Secretary exercises the Sec. 3102(b) authority (or when the FHWA does so on the Secretary's behalf, see 49 U.S.C. Sec. 104(c)(2); 49 CFR Sec. 1.48(f)), review lies in the courts of appeals. Center for Auto Safety v. Skinner, 936 F.2d 1315 (D.C.Cir.1991).

Here, however, the FHWA relied not only on the Secretary's powers under Sec. 3102(b), but also on the Secretary's powers under the Safety Act. See 49 U.S.C. Sec. 104(c)(3); 49 CFR Sec. 1.48(v). Conceivably the court of appeals--the proper forum to review rules issued exclusively under the former authority--is not the proper forum to review rules issued exclusively under the latter authority; the ICC never exercised Safety Act powers for the simple reason that they were not created until 20 years after the 1966 transfer, at which point they were vested in the Secretary. Cf. Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Ass'n v. Pena, 996 F.2d 338, 340-41 (D.C.Cir.1993) (holding that courts of appeals lack original jurisdiction to review the FHWA's exercise of grant-making authority derived from statutes passed in 1991 and 1983). But regardless of whether jurisdiction to review regulations issued exclusively under the Safety Act would lie in the district court, 1 the FHWA's explicit reliance on both the Safety Act and Sec. 3102 gives us jurisdiction over this petition.

There are at least four possible treatments of these dual authority cases: no review anywhere, review only in the district court, review only in the court of appeals, or review in either at the challenger's option. The first seems clearly ruled out by common sense and the presumption in favor of reviewability. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410, 91 S.Ct. 814, 820, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971). Moreover, the second possibility collapses into the first: if we lack jurisdiction over this petition because the district court has exclusive original jurisdiction to review rules issued under the Safety Act, then the district court would also lack jurisdiction over this petition because we have exclusive original jurisdiction to review rules issued under Sec. 3102. In other words, the only logic that could lead to the second possibility actually ends up leading to total nonreviewability--a possibility that we have already discarded. On the other hand, even if district court jurisdiction was precluded by our exclusive original jurisdiction over actions taken under Sec. 3102, the converse wouldn't necessarily follow: as we have clear appellate jurisdiction even where the district court has exclusive original jurisdiction, the interests of assuring a forum capable of treating the case coherently might justify the comparatively modest displacement of the district court. In any event, as petitioners sought review here, we need not decide whether our jurisdiction is concurrent or exclusive. Cf. Suburban O'Hare Comm'n v. Dole, 787 F.2d 186, 192-93 (7th Cir.1986) (where a single decision encompasses four "orders", three issued under authority leading to exclusive jurisdiction in the court of appeals, and the fourth leading to review initially in the district court, entire proceeding is to be reviewed in court of appeals); Media Access Project v. FCC, 883 F.2d 1063, 1066-69 (D.C.Cir.1989).

II. Standing

The fact that we have jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case does not necessarily mean that the petitioner, a labor organization that represents many commercial truck drivers in America, has standing to invoke it. To have standing under Article III of the Constitution, the petitioner must point to some "injury in fact" that the Implementing Rule inflicts on its members. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (describing "the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing"); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 2441, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977) (setting out requirements for associations to have standing). The petitioner seeks to satisfy this requirement by arguing that the FHWA's action unleashes Mexican drivers on American roads even though they would not qualify for American CDLs. The Teamsters assert that they will suffer both from the extra competition and from a possible increase in the number of truck accidents; in their view, the Implementing Rule threatens both their pocketbooks and...

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