Donovan v. City of Milwaukee

Citation17 F.3d 944
Decision Date18 February 1994
Docket NumberNo. 92-4112,92-4112
PartiesTerry DONOVAN, Special Administrator in the Matter of the Estate of Dana E. Reinartz, and Parent of David E. Reinartz, a Minor, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF MILWAUKEE, a Municipal Corporation; Frederick Birts, John C. Bogues, Charles Homa, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Jeff S. Olson (argued), Julian, Olson & Lasker, Kathleen A. Wagner, Wagner Law Offices, Madison, WI, for plaintiff-appellant.

Grant F. Langley, Susan E. Lappen (argued), Office of the City Atty., Milwaukee, WI, for defendants-appellees.

Before WOOD, Jr., FLAUM, and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff below, Terry Donovan ("Donovan"), commenced this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, alleging that the City of Milwaukee (the "City") and several Milwaukee police officers violated Dana Reinartz's ("Reinartz") constitutional rights by engaging Reinartz in a high speed chase that ended in a collision killing Reinartz. The district court granted summary judgment for the individual officers on the basis of qualified immunity and for the City because Donovan had failed to state a claim for relief under Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), and its progeny. On appeal, Donovan asks this court to reverse the district court's decision with respect to her claims against a single individual defendant, Officer William Zirbes ("Zirbes"), and against the City. We decline to do so, and instead affirm the district court in all respects.

I.

The events giving rise to this case transpired within a very brief period of time early on the morning of June 19, 1988. At approximately 4:00 a.m., Milwaukee Police Officers Charles Homa ("Homa") and Jeanne Wiedmeyer ("Wiedmeyer") were standing outside their respective vehicles completing a prior dispatch when Homa heard a loud explosion and saw a flash of light. Wiedmeyer also heard the explosion and immediately entered her vehicle to investigate. Homa observed Reinartz and his passenger, Willie Bright ("Bright"), on a motorcycle in the vicinity and decided to ask them if they had information about the explosion. Homa's efforts to signal the driver to pull over proved unsuccessful, causing both Homa and Wiedmeyer to engage in high speed pursuit of the motorcycle. During the chase, officer Zirbes, along with Officers Frederick Birts ("Birts"), John Bogues ("Bogues"), set up visual deterrents or road blocks to stop the motorcycle. 1 The chase ended when the motorcycle became airborne after colliding with Zirbes' squad car. Both Reinartz and Bright died as a result of injuries sustained in the crash.

In the district court, Donovan, the special administrator of Reinartz's estate and the sole surviving parent of Reinartz's only heir, David E. Reinartz, brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Donovan's complaint charged that the City and various police officers violated Reinartz's Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, Donovan alleged that several officers used excessive force by engaging Reinartz in high speed pursuit and by using visual deterrents (roadblocks) and that Zirbes unreasonably seized Reinartz. Furthermore, Donovan claimed that the City failed to adequately train, supervise, and discipline the officers who participated in the chase. Finally, Donovan also plead pendant state claims based on negligence and respondeat superior. Both sides filed motions for summary judgment, and, on November 20, 1992, the court denied Donovan's motion and granted the various defendants' motions for summary judgment in their entirety. For purposes of its summary judgment ruling, the district court accepted Donovan's version of certain critical and disputed facts, including Donovan's allegation that the collision was precipitated by Zirbes' intentional backing of his squad car into the path of the motorcycle. 2

Donovan raises just two issues on appeal. First, she contends that the district court erred in granting qualified immunity to Officer Zirbes because a reasonable officer would not have believed that he could use his squad car to actively inflict deadly force at the time of the incident and under the circumstances presented therein. Second, she argues that a material issue of fact exists as to whether the police department's policy on high speed chases, road blocks, and the use of squad cars to inflict deadly force constituted a constitutional violation and led to Reinartz's death. We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, drawing all reasonable inferences from the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Cornfield by Lewis v. School Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1320 (7th Cir.1993). The non-moving party cannot rest on the pleadings alone, but must identify specific facts to establish that there is a genuine triable issue. Unless we find evidence sufficient to sustain a jury verdict in favor of the non-moving party, we will affirm the grant of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

II.

Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, "governmental officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); Upton v. Thompson, 930 F.2d 1209, 1211-1212 (7th Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1262, 117 L.Ed.2d 491 (1992). Qualified immunity is a judicially created doctrine that stems from the conclusion that few individuals will enter public service if such service entails the risk of personal liability for one's official decisions. Cleveland-Perdue v. Brutsche, 881 F.2d 427, 430 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 949, 111 S.Ct. 368, 112 L.Ed.2d 331 (1990); see also Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 339, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1095, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1985).

Though qualified immunity is categorized as a defense, it functions as "an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) (emphasis in original). Immunity, whether absolute or qualified, "spare[s] a defendant not only unwarranted liability, but unwarranted demands upon those defending a long drawn out lawsuit." Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231-32, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 1793, 114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1991). In clarifying the analytical structure under which a claim of qualified immunity should be addressed, the Siegert Court noted that

A necessary concomitant to the determination of whether the constitutional right asserted by the plaintiff is "clearly established" at the time the defendant acted is the determination of whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitutional right at all.

Id. Thus, once a defendant has pleaded a defense of qualified immunity, courts may logically approach a summary judgment motion using a two-step analysis such as that delineated by this court in Wade v. Hegner, 804 F.2d 67, 70 (7th Cir.1986): (1) Does the alleged conduct set out a constitutional violation? and (2) Were the constitutional standards clearly established at the time in question? See Siegert, 500 U.S. at 231-32, 111 S.Ct. at 1793; Elliott v. Thomas, 937 F.2d 338, 341-342 (7th Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 973, 117 L.Ed.2d 138 (1992); Auriemma v. Rice, 910 F.2d 1449, 1452 (7th Cir.1990) (en banc) ("Summary judgment is the proper manner to resolve a qualified immunity issue as soon as possible because it protects 'government officials from the costs of trial and burdens of discovery whenever possible....' "), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2796, 115 L.Ed.2d 970 (1991). This approach "permits courts expeditiously to weed out suits which fail the test without requiring the defendant who rightly claims qualified immunity to engage in expensive and time consuming preparation to defend the suit on the merits" because a negative answer to the first question ends the inquiry there. Siegert, 500 U.S. at 231-32, 111 S.Ct. at 1793.

A.

We first consider Donovan's claim that Officer Zirbes' conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.

Following from this language, to determine whether Donovan states a Fourth Amendment cause of action we must determine (1) if Zirbes' conduct constituted a "seizure" and (2) whether the seizure, if one occurred, was "unreasonable".

1.

In Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989), the Supreme Court considered the parameters of a seizure in the context of a high speed chase that ended when the fleeing suspect fatally crashed into what was alleged to be a "deadman roadblock" 3 set by county police officers. The petitioner's complaint alleged that the respondent police officers placed an 18-wheel truck completely across the highway in the path of the fleeing vehicle, behind a curve, and with a police cruiser's headlights aimed in such a fashion as to blind the driver as he approached. The Court concluded that a roadblock of the kind alleged constitutes a seizure because it "is not just a significant show of authority designed to induce a voluntary stop, but is designed to produce a stop by physical impact if voluntary compliance does not occur." Brower, 489 U.S. at 598, 109 S.Ct. at 1382. More generally, the Brower Court...

To continue reading

Request your trial
345 cases
  • Jiron v. Roth
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 10th Circuit. District of New Mexico
    • 16 Febrero 2021
    ...citations omitted). "[T]he defense of qualified immunity gives public officials the benefit of legal doubts." Donovan v. City of Milwaukee , 17 F.3d 944, 951 (7th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, qualified immunity provides "ample room for mistaken judgments" and protect......
  • Ryan v. Ill. Dept. of Children & Family Services, 92-3079.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. Central District of Illinois
    • 7 Mayo 1997
    ...of qualified immunity, "courts may logically approach a summary judgment motion using a two-step analysis ..." Donovan v. City of Milwaukee, 17 F.3d 944, 947 (7th Cir.1994). The court must ask: "(1) Does the alleged conduct set out a constitutional violation? and (2) Were the constitutional......
  • Roberts v. Samardvich, 3:93cv0760 AS.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. United States District Court of Northern District of Indiana
    • 21 Noviembre 1995
    ...the burden of proof on a particular issue at trial cannot resist the motion by merely resting on its pleadings. Donovan v. City of Milwaukee, 17 F.3d 944, 947 (7th Cir.1994). Rather, as Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) makes clear, "The adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in ......
  • Kernats v. O'Sullivan, 93-3086
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
    • 16 Septiembre 1994
    ...the time in question? See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231-232, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 1793, 114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1991); Donovan v. City of Milwaukee, 17 F.3d 944, 947 (7th Cir.1994). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the existence of a clearly established constitutional right. Rakovi......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • PRISON MEDICAL DEATHS AND QUALIFIED IMMUNITY.
    • United States
    • Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Vol. 112 No. 1, January 2022
    • 1 Enero 2022
    ...557; Wood, 420 U.S. at 31214 (describing a school board member decision to expel students). (97) See, e.g., Donovan v. City of Milwaukee, 17 F.3d 944, 946, 951 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting the qualified immunity doctrine "gives public officials the benefit of legal doubts" and applying it to a p......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT