Shaffer v. Kugler

Citation17 S.W. 698,107 Mo. 58
PartiesSHAFFER v. KUGLER.
Decision Date09 November 1891
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Missouri

A post-nuptial agreement between husband and wife for the conveyance to him of her general fee-simple estate in land, upon condition that he sell his own land and with the proceeds improve hers, although made upon a sufficient consideration, is not enforceable, either in law or equity, against the wife and her heirs. SHERWOOD, C. J., dissenting. Livingston v. Livingston, 2 Johns. Ch. 537, distinguished.

In banc. Error to circuit court, Clay county; J. M. SANDUSKY, Judge. Affirmed.

Ejectment by Henry B. Shaffer against Frederick Kugler. There was judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

Crittenden & Stiles and Sam'l Hardwicke, for plaintiff in error. L. C. Slavens and H. F. Simrall, for defendant in error.

BRACE, J.

This is an action in ejectment for a tract of land in Clay county. Martha A. Kugler, deceased, who was the wife of the defendant, is the common source of title. She became seised in fee-simple of the 40-acre tract, of which the land in controversy (being about 25 acres) formed a part, in 1864, and died in 1882. The plaintiff, since her death, and before the bringing of this suit, acquired by quitclaim deeds the title of her heirs at law to the land in dispute. The defendant and the said Martha intermarried in 1869. At that time he owned 40 acres of land in Caldwell county, and after the marriage defendant sold his land in Caldwell county. They moved upon the 40-acre tract of the wife in Clay county, improved it, and made it their home until her death, except about 15 acres, which seems to have been disposed of to other parties during the marriage. On the 24th of November, 1879, the said Martha A. appeared before a notary public with a deed, signed with her name and mark, and dated November 15, 1879, purporting for the consideration of $300 to convey the premises in controversy to the defendant, which she acknowledged in the words of the certificate, "to be her act and deed for the purposes therein mentioned." After acknowledging it thus she took it home, and there it seems to have remained until the 27th of May, 1882, three days after the death of Mrs. Kugler, when it was filed for record. The defendant's claim is that said deed was made in pursuance of a parol agreement between him and his wife, entered into after marriage, by which she agreed that, if he would sell his land, move on to her land, and with the proceeds of his land improve hers and make it their home, after death he should have her land absolutely for his own use; that he performed his part of the agreement; and he prays that this contract may be specifically enforced as against the plaintiff by vesting in him the legal title to the premises. In support of this contention and as proof of this agreement the defendant introduced in evidence the deed of his wife and the acknowledgment and declaration made by Mrs. Kugler during the marriage, before and after she made the acknowledgment. The substance of what she said before was "that Mr. Kugler had sold his land, and they had used the money; that he had lived with her on her land, and improved it; and she proposed for him to have it after her death;" that she intended to deed the land to Mr. Kugler if he would furnish money to build the house, and means to live on; and afterwards that "she had deeded it to him;" "that everything was fixed between her and Kugler; that there was but two of them, and it was all Kugler's." The question of the value of the improvements and rents and of the amount of money received by the defendant for that part of the 40 disposed of during the marriage was not gone into on the trial below, the defendant waiving any right he may have for an accounting to determine what, if anything, he should have for money spent or improvements made on the land. In this state of case the court held "that, while a defective deed from a person not under disability will amount in effect to a contract to convey, the defective deed of a married woman cannot have this effect, because of her inability to contract. The deed of Martha A. Kugler to her husband was therefore void, and can afford no basis for equitable relief. Neither can a verbal contract, or improvements made under a verbal contract. Her title can only pass to her legal real estate by deed conforming in all respects to the statute," — and, so holding, found for the plaintiff, and rendered judgment accordingly, from which the defendant appeals.

1. This opinion will be limited to the single question upon which it turned in the circuit court. In order to secure a reversal of the judgment, the defendant must successfully maintain the proposition that a post-nuptial agreement between husband and wife for the conveyance to him of her general fee-simple estate in lands, made upon sufficient consideration, though void at law, will be enforced in a court of equity against the wife and her heirs. This proposition the learned counsel for the defendant undertake to maintain in the face of the doctrine laid down and repeatedly approved in this state, that a feme covert, except as to her separate estate, "is utterly incapable of binding herself by a contract to convey her land, either at law or in equity, except by compliance with the prescribed statutory forms." Shroyer v. Nickell, 55 Mo. 264; Whitely v. Stewart, 63 Mo. 360; Pearl v. Hervey, 70 Mo. 160; Dameron v. Jameson, 71 Mo. 97; Hord v. Taubman, 79 Mo. 101; Walker v. Owen, Id. 563; Gwin v. Smurr, 101 Mo. 551, 14 S. W. Rep. 731; Rush v. Brown, 101 Mo. 586, 14 S. W. Rep. 735. The argument seems to proceed upon the theory that this doctrine is founded upon the oneness of the husband and wife in the marital relation at common law, in consequence of which they could make no binding individual contract with each other, but that it does not obtain in courts of equity in regard to contracts between husband and wife, wherein either has executed his or her part of it, and the other has received a valuable and sufficient consideration for the contract; and we are cited to many cases in which such courts have ignored this common-law idea of absolute unity, and have sustained post-nuptial settlements and contracts of the husband made with or for the benefit of the wife upon sufficient consideration; but these do not reach the case in hand. The incapacity of the wife to contract does not rest alone upon the unity of the husband and wife in the marital relation, but upon the further maxim that the wife is sub potestate viri. Her acts ex contractu during the marital relation are presumed to be the fruits of his power and influence, and not of her own volition. They may bind him, but cannot bind her, only so far as this disability has been removed by statute. The husband rests under no such incapacity. He has power to bind himself, and courts of equity in many instances enforce his contracts for her benefit, founded upon a sufficient consideration. A mode has been provided by statute by which the wife...

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14 cases
  • Heger v. Bunch
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • December 31, 1928
    ......1855; Sec. 681, R. S. 1879, p. 112; Brown v. Dressler, 125 Mo. 589;. O'Reilly v. Kluender, 193 Mo. 576; Hoskinson. v. Adkins, 77 Mo. 537; Shaffer v. Kugler, 107. Mo. 58; Bartlett v. O'Donoghue, 72 Mo. 563;. Shroyer v. Nickell, 55 Mo. 264. (4) A decree in. partition is void as to the interest ......
  • Rivard v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co.
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    ...in law or equity by any contract of hers. Clay v. Mayer, 183 Mo. 157; Brown v. Dressler, 125 Mo. 592; Wannal v. Kern, 51 Mo. 150; Shaffer v. Kugler, 107 Mo. 64; Marshall Anderson, 78 Mo. 85. The acknowledgment of a married woman's deed in the conveyance of her land is as essential as her si......
  • Heger v. Bunch
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • December 31, 1928
    ...Sec. 681, R.S. 1879, p. 112; Brown v. Dressler, 125 Mo. 589; O'Reilly v. Kluender, 193 Mo. 576; Hoskinson v. Adkins, 77 Mo. 537; Shaffer v. Kugler, 107 Mo. 58; Bartlett v. O'Donoghue, 72 Mo. 563; Shroyer v. Nickell, 55 Mo. 264. (4) A decree in partition is void as to the interest of any per......
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