Barrilleaux v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ.
| Decision Date | 24 April 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 2014 CA 1173.,2014 CA 1173. |
| Citation | 170 So.3d 1015 |
| Parties | Jefferson R. BARRILLEAUX v. The BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY and Agricultural and Mechanical College as Owner and Operator of LSU Health Sciences Center—Houma d/b/a Leonard J. Chabert Medical Center, Jonathan Allen, MD, Dayton Daberkow, MD, and Michael Charlet, MD. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
Eric E. Helm, Benjamin P. Mouton, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and Michael L. Barras, New Iberia, Louisiana, for Plaintiff/Appellant, Carly Rose Thomas.
Matthew Block, Thibodaux, Louisiana, for Defendant/Appellee LSU Health Sciences Center—Houma d/b/a Leonard J. Chabert Medical Center.
John D. Schooneberg, Barry J. Boudreaux, Houma, Louisiana, for Defendant/Appellee, Dr. Sharon Bass, MD.
Before GUIDRY, THERIOT, and DRAKE, JJ.
Plaintiff appeals a final judgment of the district court which dismissed the defendant, Dr. Sharon Bass, with prejudice. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
This case involves a medical malpractice claim arising from injuries sustained by the plaintiff/appellant, Jefferson R. Barrilleaux, following treatment he received in March and April 2009 at Leonard J. Chabert Medical Center. Mr. Barrilleaux filed a medical malpractice claim with the Commissioner of Administration in accordance with the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act, La. R.S. 40:1299.41 et seq., naming The Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College as owner and operator of LSU Health Sciences Center–Houma d/b/a Leonard J. Chabert Medical Center (“Chabert Medical Center”), Dr. Jonathan Allen, Dr. Dayton Daberkow, and Dr. Michael Charlet as defendants. A medical review panel was convened and concluded that there was a deviation from the standard of care by Chabert Medical Center and its employees.
On March 15, 2012, Mr. Barrilleaux filed a second medical malpractice claim, naming Dr. Sharon Bass as a defendant and asserting claims of malpractice arising out of treatment he received by Dr. Bass on April 13, 2009, after his treatment at Chabert Medical Center. On June 6, 2013, a medical review panel unanimously concluded that there was no deviation from the standard of care by Dr. Bass.
On March 23, 2012, Mr. Barrilleaux filed a suit for damages, naming as defendants Chabert Medical Center, Dr. Allen, Dr. Daberkow, and Dr. Charlet, making the same allegations against them as presented before the medical review
panel.1 Following a motion for a partial dismissal filed by Mr. Barrilleaux, the district court dismissed Dr. Allen, Dr. Daberkow, and Dr. Charlet, with Mr. Barrilleaux reserving his right to proceed against Chabert Medical Center.
On October 8, 2013, Mr. Barrilleaux filed his first supplemental and amending petition for damages, adding Dr. Bass as a defendant. In response, on February 28, 2014, Dr. Bass filed a motion for summary judgment to which she attached a statement of undisputed material facts, a memorandum in support, and three exhibits: a copy of the medical malpractice complaint filed against her; the opinion of the medical review panel; and Mr. Barrilleaux's response to her requests for admission, in which Mr. Barrilleaux admitted that he had no expert to establish that Dr. Bass deviated from the standard of care in her treatment of him. Dr. Bass requested that the district court grant summary judgment in her favor and dismissal from the suit with prejudice, because Mr. Barrilleaux lacked the necessary expert medical testimony to support his malpractice claim against her.
In his memorandum in response to the motion or summary judgment filed by Dr. Bass, Mr. Barrilleaux indicated that he had no opposition to Dr. Bass's motion for summary judgment. He requested that the district court include a provision which mirrored the language of La. C.C.P. art. 966(G) in its judgment dismissing Dr. Bass, in order to exclude any future allocation of her fault or evidence of her fault at a trial on the merits.
A hearing was held on Dr. Bass's motion for summary judgment on April 25, 2014, after which the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Bass and dismissed her with prejudice. Despite Mr. Barrilleaux's request, and agreement by counsel for Dr. Bass, the district court struck through the La. C.C.P. article 966(G) provision in the judgment, which was signed on April 25, 2014.
The plaintiff now appeals the district court's striking through the provision of the final judgment tracking the language of La. C.C.P. art. 966(G).
The summary judgment procedure is designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action, except those disallowed by La. C.C.P. art. 969 ; the procedure is favored and shall be construed to accomplish these ends. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(2). Summary judgment shall be rendered in favor of the mover if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions, together with the affidavits, if any, admitted for purposes of the motion, show there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(B)(2). On a motion for summary judgment, the burden of proof is on the mover. If, however, the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the matter that is before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the mover's burden on the motion does not require that all essential elements of the adverse party's claim, action, or defense be negated. Instead, the mover must point out to the court that there is an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim, action, or defense. Thereafter, the adverse party must produce factual evidence sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at trial. If the adverse party fails to meet this burden, there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the mover is entitled to summary judgment. La. C.C.P. art. 966(C)(2).
The motion for summary judgment at issue here arose in the context of a suit for medical malpractice. To establish a claim for medical malpractice, a plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) the standard of care applicable to the defendant; (2) that the defendant breached that standard of care; and (3) that there was a causal connection between the breach and the resulting injury. La. R.S. 9:2794 ; Samaha v. Rau, 07–1726 (La.2/26/08), 977 So.2d 880, 883–84.
Expert testimony is required to establish the applicable standard of care and whether or not that standard was breached, except where the negligence is so obvious that a lay person can infer negligence without the guidance of expert testimony. See Pfiffner v. Correa, 94–0924, 94–0963, 94–0992 (La.10/17/94), 643 So.2d 1228, 1233–34. Where the defendant practices in a particular specialty and the alleged acts of medical negligence raise issues peculiar to the particular medical specialty involved, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the degree of care ordinarily practiced by physicians within that specialty. Vanner v. Lakewood Quarters Retirement Community, 12–1828 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/7/13), 120 So.3d 752, 755–56. Thus, to prevail at trial, the plaintiffs would be required to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the first essential element of their malpractice claim: the standard of care applicable to Dr. Bass.
An appellate court reviews a trial court's decision to grant a motion for summary judgment de novo, using the same criteria that govern the trial court's consideration of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Gamestop, Inc. v. St. Mary Parish Sales & Use Tax Dept., 14–0878 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/19/15), 166 So.3d 1090, 1094 (unpublished opinion).
In the present case, there are no material issues of fact that are disputed. The sole issue before this court is whether the district court erred in striking through a portion of the final judgment that mirrored the language of La. C.C.P. art. 966(G). The interpretation of a statute is a question of law. Louisiana Workers' Comp. Corp. v. Landry, 11–1973 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/2/12), 92 So.3d 1018, 1021, writ denied, 12–1179 (La.9/14/12), 99 So.3d 34. As the reviewing court, because we address only a legal issue, we give no special weight to the findings of the district court. We will conduct a de novo review of questions of law and render judgment on the record. Campbell v. Markel American. Ins. Co., 00–1448 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/21/01), 822 So.2d 617, 620, writ denied, 01–2813 (La.1/4/02), 805 So.2d 204.
This matter turns on the interpretation of La. C.C.P. art. 966(G), which provides2 :
Section (G), formerly designated as Section (F), was added to Article 966 by legislative amendment in 2012. See 2012 La. Acts, No. 257, § 1, effective August 1, 2012. The issue to be resolved is whether the district court legally erred in omitting a portion of the final judgment, which...
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...is the language of the statute itself. Barrilleaux v. Board of Sup'rs of Louisiana State University, 2014-1173 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/24/15), 170 So.3d 1015, 1020, writ denied sub nom. Barrilleaux v. Board of Sup'rs of Louisiana State University and Mechanical College, 2015-1019 (La. 9/11/15), 1......