170 Cal. 686, S. F. 7134, Western Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury
| Judge | We concur: ANGELLOTTI, C. J.; LAWLOR, J. |
| Parties | WESTERN INDEMNITY CO. v. PILLSBURY et al. |
| Citation | 151 P. 398,170 Cal. 686 |
| Date | 04 August 1915 |
| Court | California Supreme Court |
| Docket Number | S. F. 7134. |
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On Rehearing, Sept. 2, 1915.
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[151 P. 399]
This is an original proceeding in certiorari, to review an award of the Industrial Accident Commission, awarding compensation to one L. Rudder for injuries claimed to have been received by him in the course of his employment by Ocean Shore Railroad Company. Western Indemnity Company, the petitioner for the writ, was a party to the hearing before the commission, and was held liable for the compensation as insurer of the railroad company. On April 12, 1914, the date of the alleged injuries to Rudder, the ‘ Workmen's Compensation, Insurance and Safety Act’ of 1913 (Stats. 1913, p. 279) had, according to its terms, gone into effect. The constitutionality of the act (commonly known as the Boynton Act) is involved here, as it is in a number of other cases under submission. In most of the cases the parties have submitted this issue upon the arguments and briefs presented in Great Western Power Co. v. Pillsbury, 149 P. 35. In that case we found it unnecessary to consider the validity of the main features of the enactment. Now, however, a determination of the questions presented in this behalf becomes necessary and proper.
The Boynton Act superseded the act of 1911 (known as the Roseberry Act [St. 1911, p. 796]), which was the basis of the rights asserted in the Great Western Power Case. The most striking difference between the two laws is that the compensation provisions of the latter statute are compulsory on all employers [151 P. 400] and employé s coming within its terms, while the Roseberry Act gave to both employers and employé s a
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right of election in this regard. A brief summary of the later law must precede any discussion of the points made against its validity.
Sections 1 and 2 provide a short title for the act, and define the terms used in it. Sections 3 to 11 provide for the appointment and organization of a board of three members, to be known as the ‘ Industrial Accident Commission,’ and declare the general powers of the board. Sections 12 to 35 deal with the subject of compensation for industrial accidents. Section 12 follows, with slight changes, the phraseology of section 3 of the Roseberry Act. It declares that:
‘ Liability for the compensation provided by this act, in lieu of any other liability whatsoever, shall, without regard to negligence, exist against an employer for any personal injuries sustained by his employé s by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment and for the death of any such employé if the injury shall proximately cause death, in those cases where the following conditions of compensation concur: (1) Where, at the time of the accident, both the employer and employé are subject to the compensation provisions of this act. (2) Where, at the time of the accident, the employé is performing service growing out of and incidental to his employment and is acting within the course of his employment as such. (3) Where the injury is proximately caused by accident, * * * with or without negligence, and is not so caused by the intoxication or the willful misconduct of the injured employé .’
By the second subdivision ‘ b’ of section 12, the right to compensation under the act, where the required conditions concur, is made the exclusive remedy against the employer, except where certain delinquencies on the part of the employer have caused the injury.
Section 13 defines ‘ employer’ as including, in addition to the different governmental agencies, every person, association or corporation ‘ who has any person in service under any appointment or contract of hire, or apprenticeship, express or implied. * * *’ By section 14, ‘ employé ’ is defined to mean ‘ every person in the service of the employer as defined by section 13 hereof under any appointment or contract of hire, * * * ’ excluding any person whose employment is both casual and not in the usual course of the trade, business, profession,
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or occupation of his employer, and also excluding any employé engaged in farm, dairy, agricultural, viticultural or horticultural labor, in stock or poultry raising, or in household domestic service. Section 15 contains an elaborate schedule for fixing the compensation to the injured employé, or to his dependents where death results; the scale being based in part on the earnings of the injured person. Sections 16 to 20 limit the time within which proceedings for collection may be instituted, provide methods for computing the earnings or loss of wages which are a factor in the allowance to be made, and define the dependents who are to be compensated in case of death. Sections 22 to 33 deal with the procedure to be followed on applications to the commission, and kindred matters; section 25 declaring that:
‘ After final hearing by the commission, it shall, within thirty days, make and file (1) its findings upon all facts involved in the controversy, and (2) its award which shall state its determination as to the rights of the parties.’
Sections 36 to 50 provide for the creation and administration of a ‘ state compensation insurance fund.’ We shall have occasion, at a later point in the discussion, to give a more detailed statement of those provisions. The questions raised in this case make it unnecessary to go into particulars regarding sections 51 to 72, which give the commission power to make and enforce safety rules and regulations, to prescribe safety devices, and to order the reporting of accidents.
Sections 73 to 80 declare the powers of the commission with respect to procedure. Sections 81 to 83 provide for the authority of the board to grant rehearings.
Sections 84 and 85 authorize a review of the orders and awards of the commission by the Supreme Court or by the District Court of Appeal of the appellate district in which the applicant resides. The only method of review is by means of a writ of certiorari, and it is provided that:
The review ‘ shall not be extended further than to determine whether or not: (1) The commission acted without or in excess of its powers. (2) The order, decision or award was procured by fraud. (3) The order, decision, rule or regulation is unreasonable. (4) If findings of fact are made, whether or not such findings of fact support the order, decision or award under review.’
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It is declared, in section 84, that:
‘ The findings and conclusions of the commission on questions of fact shall be conclusive and final and shall not be subject to review; such questions of fact shall include ultimate facts and the findings and conclusions of the commission.’
Section 86 demands a liberal construction of the act, and provides that:
‘ If any section, * * * sentence, clause or phrase of this act is for any reason held to be unconstitutional, such decision shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.’
The concluding sections (87 to 92) have no bearing on the questions we are about to consider.
Attention should also be called to section 21 of article 20 of the Constitution, added by vote of the electors on October 10, 1911, prior to the enactment of the Boynton Law. This section reads:
‘ The Legislature may by appropriate legislation create and enforce a liability on the part of all employers to compensate their employé s for any injury incurred by the said employé s in the course fo their employment irrespective of the fault of either party. The Legislature may provide for the settlement of any disputes arising under the legislation contemplated by this section, by arbitration, or by an industrial or accident board, by the courts, or by either, any or all of these agencies, anything in this Constitution to the contrary notwithstanding.’
[151 P. 401] Both the federal Constitution and the Constitution of this state are invoked in support of the assault made upon the law.
The clauses of the fourteenth amendment guaranteeing ‘ due process of law’ and ‘ the equal protection of the laws' are, it is alleged, violated by the scheme of legislation embodied in the Boynton Act. The enactment substitutes a new system of rights and obligations for the common-law rules governing the liability of employers for injuries to their workmen. The change thus made is radical, not to say revolutionary. In place of the old action, in which the employer was liable only if he, or some one representing him, had been guilty of negligence or misconduct, the new law imposes upon the employer a liability for any accidental injuries to his employé s arising out of the employment— a liability not conditioned upon any negligence of the employer, or any want of negligence on the part of the employé. All that is required is that the injury shall not have been caused by the intoxication
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or the willful misconduct of the injured employé. Stating the change another way, the long-established doctrines of contributory negligence, of assumption of risk, and of negligence of a fellow servant are by this law swept out of existence, and are given no weight in proceedings by employé s against employers on account of injuries received in the employment. It may be noted that, under the particular scheme embodied in this act, the loss resulting from accidental injuries is not imposed upon the employer alone. The scale of compensation fixed by section 15 allows to the employé, in addition to medical and surgical expenses, an indemnity based upon his loss of earnings; but this indemnity covers not the whole, but only a part or a percentage of such loss. The risk of...
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