Kohinoor Coal Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Decision Date | 20 December 1948 |
Docket Number | No. 9630.,9630. |
Citation | 171 F.2d 880 |
Parties | KOHINOOR COAL CO. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
James J. Dougherty, of Philadelphia, Pa. (John R. Scholl, of Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for petitioner.
Morton K. Rothschild, of Washington, D. C. (Theron Lamar Caudle, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Sewall Key and A. F. Prescott, Sp. Assts. to Atty. Gen., on the brief), for respondent.
Before MARIS, GOODRICH and KALODNER, Circuit Judges.
This appeal is taken from the decision of the Tax Court.
The question presented is whether the taxpayer is entitled to an allowance for percentage depletion with respect to its operations in the extraction and processing of coal from culm or refuse banks which it leased for that purpose from the owner and operator of a coal mine. The claim for depletion allowance is based upon Section 23(m)1; Section 114(b) (4) (A) and (B) as amended,2 of the Internal Revenue Code; and Section 29.23(m)-1 of Treasury Regulations 111.3
The facts, which are not in dispute, may be summarized as follows:
The taxpayer, a Pennsylvania corporation, entered into an agreement with Turkey Run Fuels, Inc., on February 11, 1941, whereby it leased from Turkey Run, the owner, culm or refuse banks of material which Turkey Run had theretofore thrown aside in the operation of its anthracite mines. The lease was to run for ten years or a shorter period if the marketable coal was earlier exhausted from the refuse piles. The taxpayer was to pay a minimum annual rental of $24,000 and was granted the right to remove all coal from the refuse piles. It also agreed to pay all taxes on improvements and on the coal shipped, but not on the lands.
The taxpayer, in order to extract the coal from the culm or refuse banks, and to wash, size and load it for shipment, erected an anthracite breaker and installed other equipment and machinery at a cost to it of approximately $150,000. It then proceeded with the operations enumerated, during the taxable years.
In its return for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1943, the taxpayer computed depletion on a percentage basis, and claimed a deduction of about $22,000; in its return for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1944, the taxpayer elected to take depletion on a percentage basis, but did not claim the deduction because the question was being contested by the taxpayer for the earlier years. After the Commissioner disallowed the deduction for depletion for the taxable year ended June 30, 1943, and determined a deficiency upon other grounds for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1944, the taxpayer filed a petition for review of the Commissioner's determination with the Tax Court covering both years.
The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner in his determination of deficiencies in excess profits tax of $21,552.99 and $5,230.79 for the fiscal years ended June 30, 1943, and 1944, respectively.
The Commissioner contends (1) a culm bank is not a "mine"; (2) extraction of coal from a culm bank is not "mining"; and (3) there is absent the requisite "economic interest" for depletion allowance.
The taxpayer takes the position (1) whether a culm bank is a "mine" is immaterial; (2) extraction of coal from a culm bank is "mining" since Congress, in amending Section 114(b) (4) by adding paragraph (B), broadened the definition of the word "mining" to include not merely the extraction of ores or minerals from the ground, but also the ordinary treatment processes normally applied by coal mine operators such as cleaning, breaking, sizing and loading for shipment; and (3) it has the requisite "economic interest."
Certain well-established principles are applicable in the determination of the issue. They are:
In order to determine whether a taxpayer is entitled to an allowance for depletion under Section 23(m) we must recur to the fundamental purposes of the statutory allowance. The deduction is permitted as an act of grace. The depletion allowance permitted as a deduction from the gross income in determining the annual taxable income of mines represents the reduction in the mineral content of the reserves from which the product is taken. The reserves are recognized as wasting assets and the depletion allowance is intended as a compensation for the part used up in production. United States v. Ludey, 1927, 274 U.S. 295, 47 S.Ct. 608, 71 L.Ed. 1054; Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., 1938, 303 U.S. 362, 366, 58 S.Ct. 616, 82 L.Ed. 897.
The right to depletion allowance does not depend upon the particular legal form of interest enjoyed by the taxpayer in the mineral content of the land. It is sufficient if one, as lessor or lessee, has an "economic interest" in the mineral deposit "in place" which is depleted by production. The phrase "economic interest" is not to be taken as embracing a mere economic advantage derived from production, through a contractual relation to the owner, by one who does not have a capital investment in the mineral deposit. There must exist some element of "ownership" in the mineral deposit "in place" and a right to share in its production in order to entitle one to depletion allowance. The mineral deposit "in place" must be a reservoir of capital investment of the taxpayer claiming the allowance. Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Company, 1925, 267 U.S. 364, 45 S.Ct. 274, 69 L.Ed. 660; Palmer v. Bender, 1933, 287 U.S. 551, 53 S.Ct. 225, 77 L. Ed. 489; Thomas v. Perkins, 1937, 301 U.S. 655, 57 S.Ct. 911, 81 L.Ed. 1324.
The principles stated were applied in several cases in which the fact situations were strikingly analogous to that here. In Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., supra, the taxpayer entered into contracts with oil producers for the treatment of wet gas by the extraction of gasoline. Natural gas, commonly known as "wet gas", as it flows from the earth is not a salable commodity. It is only through processing — by separation of the gasoline therefrom — rendering it dry, that it may be sold for commercial use. Conversely, it is only through the separation of dry gas from wet gas that the gasoline is salable. The taxpayer's contracts provided, generally, that it should (1) install and maintain the necessary pipe lines and connections from casingheads or traps at the mouth of the well to its plant, through which the producers agreed to deliver the natural gas produced at the well; (2) extract the gasoline from the wet gas; and (3) pay the producers one-third of the total gross proceeds derived from the sale of the gasoline so extracted, or, at the producers' option, to deliver to them one-third of the gasoline itself.
The taxpayer, under its contracts, took no part in the production of the wet gas. It did not conduct drilling operations on the producing premises. It did not pump oil or gas from the wells. It did not have an interest as lessor or lessee in any of the producing wells. It merely attached pipe lines to the wells, carried the gas from those wells to its plant and extracted the gasoline therefrom.
The then Board of Tax Appeals found that the taxpayer had no depletable interest.4 It was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit5 on the ground that the taxpayer, under its contracts, had acquired an "economic interest" in the wet gas "in place" and was thus entitled to depletion allowance. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed. Said the Court, 303 U.S. at page 367, 58 S.Ct. at page 618, 82 L.Ed. 897:
In the companion cases of Chicago Mines Co. v. Commissioner and London Extension Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 10 Cir., 1947, 164 F.2d 785, certiorari denied, 1948, 333 U.S. 881, 68 S.Ct. 913, the facts were as follows:
A former owner of a mine dumped on the surface of the land tailings from the mine which consisted of waste material and low-grade ore. One of the taxpayers, London Company, which also had an ownership interest in the mining property, acquired the working lease to the underground mine and, as an incident to the lease, the right to work the dump. During a portion of the taxable period, it granted to its wholly-owned subsidiary, Chicago Mines Co., a lease entitling it to sort and mill the contents of the dump. Chicago Mines Co. was to pay London Company a royalty on the net smelting returns. During the remaining portion of the taxable period, the London Company itself worked the dump. The Court held that the dump was not a "mine" under Section 23(m); that no deduction for depletion with respect to it could be taken by the London Company, since the dump was not created by it and was not operated as an integral part of its underground mining...
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