Stone v. Boston & A.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 01 July 1898
• Citation: 51 N.E. 1,171 Mass. 536
• Parties: STONE v. BOSTON & A.R. CO.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

171 Mass. 536

51 N.E. 1

STONE v. BOSTON & A.R. CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Worcester.

July 1, 1898

COUNSEL

W.S.B. Hopkins, H.W. King, and C.M. Rice, for plaintiff.

F.P Goulding and F.L. Dean, for defendant.

OPINION

ALLEN J.

This is an action of tort to recover for the loss of the plaintiff's buildings and other property by fire, under the following circumstances: The defendant owned and operated a branch railroad extending from its main line at South Spencer to the village of Spencer, and had at the Spencer terminus a passenger station, a freight house, and a freight yard, all adjoining a public street. On the side of the freight house, and extending beyond it about 75 feet, was a wooden platform about 8 feet wide and 4 feet high, placed upon posts set in the ground, the underside being left open and exposed. The main tracks ran along on the front side of this platform and freight house, and on the rear of the platform there was a freight track, so near as to be convenient to load and unload cars from and upon it. The plaintiff was engaged in the lumber business, buying at wholesale and selling at wholesale and retail, manufacturing boxes, etc. His place of business comprised several buildings, some of which were across the street from the defendant's buildings, and his principal buildings were about 75 feet from the point on the defendant's premises, beneath the platform, where the fire originated. The evidence tended to show that the platform was mostly used for the storing of oil which had been brought upon the railroad, until it was taken away by the consignees; and that the platform had become thoroughly saturated with oil, which had leaked from the barrels, and which not only saturated the platform, but dripped to the ground beneath. More or less rubbish accumulated from time to time under the platform, and was occasionally carried away. The evidence tended to show that this space below had been cleaned out two or three weeks before the fire. On the day of the fire, September 13, 1893, from 25 to 30 barrels of oil and oil barrels were upon the platform. Some were nearly or quite empty, some were partly full, but the most of them were probably full and nearly full. The only evidence to show how the fire originated tended to prove that one Casserly, a teamster, brought a load of boots to be shipped upon a car which was standing upon the track on the rear side of the platform; that he was smoking a pipe; that he stepped into the car, to wait for the defendant's foreman of the yard who was to help him unload the boots; that, in stepping in he stubbed his toe, and knocked some of the ashes and tobacco out of his pipe; that he relighted the pipe with a match, and threw the match down; that at this time he was standing in the door of the car, facing the platform. It must be assumed upon the evidence that the fire caught upon the ground underneath the platform from the match thrown down by Casserly. All efforts to extinguish the fire failed. It spread fast, and was almost immediately upon the top of the platform,--running up a post, according to one of the witnesses,--and very soon it reached the barrels of oil, which began to explode, and the fire communicated to the plaintiff's buildings, and they were burned. There was evidence tending to show that all of the oil had been upon the platform for a longer time than 48 hours. According to the testimony of the plaintiff, the platform was never, to his knowledge, empty of oil or oil barrels. It was completely saturated with oil, and that general condition of things, so far as the platform was concerned, had existed for eight years,--ever since he himself had been there. Upon the evidence introduced by the plaintiff, the court directed a verdict for the defendant.

The plaintiff, in substance, contends before us that the defendant was negligent in storing oil upon the platform, taking into consideration the condition of the platform, and of the ground and material under it, and the length of time during which the oil had been allowed to remain there; that, irrespectively of the question of negligence, the platform with the oil upon it constituted a public nuisance, especially in view of Pub.St. c. 102, § 74, providing that the oil composed wholly or in part of any of the products of petroleum shall not be allowed to remain on the grounds of a railroad corporation in a town for a longer time than 48 hours without a special permit from the selectmen; that the defendant is responsible for the damage resulting from the public nuisance, whether the act of starting the fire was due to a third person or not; and that the question should have been submitted to the jury whether the damage to the plaintiff's property was the natural and proximate consequence of the defendant's tort. Upon the evidence, the supposed tort of the defendant, whether it be called "negligence" or "nuisance," appears to have been limited to the keeping of oil too long upon the platform. Assuming this oil to have been a product of petroleum, and so within the statute cited, nevertheless the defendant, as a common carrier, was bound to transport it and deliver it to the consignees. The oil, as is well known, was an article of commerce, and in extensive use, and the defendant was bound to transport it, and keep it for a reasonable time, after its arrival in Spencer, in readiness for delivery. There was no evidence that the oil was liable to spontaneous ignition, or that the platform was an unsuitable place for its temporary storage till it could be removed, or that the defendant could have prevented the escape of oil upon the platform from leaky barrels. But we may assume without discussion that the defendant was in fault in keeping the oil there so long, and that, if the oil had been removed within 48 hours after its arrival, the fire would probably not have been attended with such disastrous consequences.

Nevertheless, the question remains--and, in our view, this becomes the important and decisive question of the case--whether, assuming that the defendant was thus in fault, the plaintiff introduced any evidence which would warrant any finding by the jury that the damage to his property was a consequence for which the defendant is responsible; or, in other words, whether the act of Casserly in starting the fire was such a consequence of the defendant's original wrong in allowing the oil to remain upon the platform that the defendant is responsible to the plaintiff for it. In approaching this question, it must be borne in mind that Casserly was in no sense a servant, agent, or guest of the defendant. He brought a load of goods to the defendant's station, to be carried upon the defendant's railroad. The defendant was bound by law to accept and carry them. It could not lawfully exclude Casserly from its ground. By Pub.St. c. 112, § 188, it was bound to give all persons reasonable and equal terms, facilities, and accommodations for the transportation of merchandise upon its railroad, and for the use of its depot and other buildings and ground. Casserly came there in his own right, and the defendant is not responsible for him in the same way that perhaps it might be responsible for a servant, agent, or (according to some statements of the law) guest. Lothrop v. Thayer, 138 Mass. 466. It is also to be borne in mind that this was not a case of spontaneous ignition of a substance liable to ignite spontaneously, as was the case in Vaughan v. Menlove, 3 Bing.N.C. 468. Nor did the defendant owe to the plaintiff the duties of a carrier of passengers or freight towards its customers, or any othed duties growing out of a contract with the plaintiff. There was no contract of any kind between the plaintiff and the defendant.

The rule is very often stated that, in law, the proximate, and not the remote, cause is to be regarded; and, in applying this rule, it is sometimes said that the law will not look back from the injurious consequence beyond the last sufficient cause, and especially that, where an intelligent and responsible human being has intervened between the original cause and the resulting damage, the law will not look back beyond him. This ground of exonerating an original wrongdoer may be found discussed or suggested in the following decisions and text-books, among others: Clifford v. Cotton Mills, 146 Mass. 47, 15 N.E. 84; Elmer v. Fessenden, 151 Mass. 359, 24 N.E. 208; Hayes v. Inhabitants of Hyde Park, 153 Mass. 514, 27 N.E. 522; Freeman v. Accident Ass'n, 156 Mass. 351, 30 N.E. 1013; Lynn Gas & Electric Co. v. Meriden Fire Ins. Co., 158 Mass. 570, 33 N.E. 690; Insurance Co. v. Tweed, 7 Wall. 44; Railroad Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469; Railroad Co. v. Hickey, 166 U.S. 521, 17 Sup.Ct. 661; Reiper v. Nichols, 31 Hun, 491; Read v. Nichols, 118 N.Y. 224, 23 N.E. 468; Mars v. President, etc., 54 Hun, 625, 8 N.Y.Supp. 107; Leavitt v. Railroad Co. (Me.) 36 A. 998; Cuff v. Railroad Co., 35 N.J.Law, 17; Curtin v. Somerset, 140 Pa.St. 70, 21 A. 244; Railroad Co. v. Salmon, 39 N.J.Law, 299; Pennsylvania Co. v. Whitlock, 99 Ind. 16; Goodlander Mill Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 11 C.C.A. 253, 63 F. 400, 405; Shear. & R.Neg. §§ 38, 666; Whart.Neg. § 134 et seq. It cannot, however, be considered that in all cases the intervention even of a responsible and intelligent human being will absolutely exonerate a preceding wrongdoer. Many instances to the contrary have occurred, and these are usually cases where it has been found that it was the duty of the original wrongdoer to anticipate and provide against such intervention, because such intervention was a thing likely to happen in the ordinary course of events. Such was the case of Lane v. Atlantic Works, 111 Mass. 136, where it was found by the jury that the...