Critten v. Chem. Nat. Bank

Decision Date13 May 1902
Citation171 N.Y. 219,63 N.E. 969
PartiesCRITTEN et al. v. CHEMICAL NAT. BANK.
CourtNew York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from supreme court, appellate division, First department.

Action by De Frees Critten and others against the Chemical National Bank. From a judgment of the appellate division (70 N. Y. Supp. 246) affirming a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals. Modified.

Vann and Martin, JJ., dissenting.George H. Yeaman and George C. Kobbé, for appellant.

Benjamin N. Cardozo and A. J. Simpson, for respondents.

CULLEN, J.

The plaintiffs kept a large and active account with the defendant, and this action is to recover an alleged balance of a deposit due to them from the bank. The plaintiffs had in their employ a clerk named Davis. It was the duty of Davis to fill up the checks which it might be necessary for the plaintiffs to give in the course of business, to make corresponding entries in the stubs of the check book, and present the checks so prepared to Mr. Critten, one of the plaintiffs, for signature, together with the bills in payment of which they were drawn. After signing a check Critten would place it and the bill in an envelope addressed to the proper party, seal the envelope, and put it in the mailing drawer. During the period from September, 1897, to October, 1899, in twenty-four separate instances Davis abstracted one of the envelopes from the mailing drawer, opened it, obliterated by acids the name of the payee and the amount specified in the check, then made the check payable to cash and raised its amount, in the majority of cases, by the sum of $100. He would draw the money on the check so altered from the defendant bank, pay the bill for which the check was drawn in cash, and appropriate the excess. On one occasion Davis did not collect the altered check from the defendant, but deposited it to his own credit in another bank. When a check was presented to Critten for signature the number of dollars for which it was drawn would be cut in the check by a punching instrument. When Davis altered a check he would punch a new figure in front of those already appearing in the check. The checks so altered by Davis were charged to the account of the plaintiffs, which was balanced every two months, and the vouchers returned to them from the bank. To Davis himself the plaintiffs, as a rule, intrusted the verification of the bank balance. This work having in the absence of Davis been committed to another person, the forgeries were discovered and Davis was arrested and punished. It is the amount of these forged checks, over and above the sums for which they were originally drawn, that this action is brought to recover. The defendant pleaded payment, and charged negligence on plaintiffs' part, both in the manner in which the checks were drawn and in the failure to discover the forgeries when the pass book was balanced and the vouchers surrendered. On the trial the alteration of the checks by Davis was established beyond contradiction, and the substantial issue litigated was that of the plaintiffs' negligence. The referee rendered a short decision in favor of the plaintiffs, in which he states as the ground of his decision that the plaintiffs were not negligent either in signing the checks as drawn by Davis or in failing to discover the forgeries at an earlier date than that at which they were made known to them.

The relation existing between a bank and a depositor being that of debtor and creditor, the bank can justify a payment on the depositor's account only upon the actual direction of the depositor. ‘The questions arising on such paper (checks) between drawee and drawer, however, always relate to what the one has authorized the other to do. They are not questions of negligence or of liability of parties upon commercial paper, but are those of authority solely. * * * The question of negligence cannot arise unless the depositor has in drawing his check left blanks unfilled, or by some affirmative act of negligence has facilitated the commission of a fraud by those into whose hands the check may come.’ Crawford v. Bank, 100 N. Y. 50, 2 N. E. 881,53 Am. Rep. 152. Therefore, when the fraudulent alteration of the checks was proved, the liability of the bank for their amount was made out, and it was incumbent upon the defendant to establish affirmatively negligence on the plaintiffs' part to relieve it from the consequences of its fault or misfortune in paying forged orders. Now, while the drawer of a check may be liable where he draws the instrument in such an incomplete state as to facilitate or invite fraudulent alterations, it is not the law that he is bound so to prepare the check that nobody else can successfully tamper with it. Societe Generale v. Metropolitan Bank, 27 Law T. (N. S.) 849; Belknap v. Bank, 100 Mass. 380, 97 am. Dec. 105. In the present case the fraudulent alteration of the checks was not merely in the perforation of the additional figure, but in the obliteration of the written name of the payee and the substitution therefor of the word ‘Cash.’ Against this latter change of the instrument the plaintiffs could not have been expected to guard, and without that alteration it would have no way profited the criminal to raise the amount. Apart, however, from that consideration, the question was clearly one of fact to be determined largely by an inspection of the checks themselves. They are not produced before us, and we cannot say that the finding of the referee, that the plaintiffs were guilty of no negligence in signing them in the condition in which they were presented for signature, was without sufficient evidence for its support.

We are now brought to the consideration of the finding of the referee that the plaintiffs were not guilty of negligence in failing to discover the forgeries after the return of the checks and the balancing of the account in the pass book. Preliminarily we must determine what duty the depositor owes to his bank by way of examination and verification of his checks and account, for the learned counsel for the respondents asserts that no such duty in reality exists. This contention is principally based on the authority of Weisser's Adm'rs v. Denison, 10 N. Y. 68, 61 Am. Dec. 731. In that case a depositor sued his bank for the amount of certain checks to which his signature was forged by his clerk. His pass book was balanced and vouchers returned at intervals as in the present case. At the trial he recovered a verdict for the full amount of the forgeries. On appeal the general term of the superior court ordered a reversal of the judgment unless the plaintiff would reduce his recovery to the amount paid on the forged checks prior to the time when the bank book was first balanced and vouchers returned. To this reduction the plaintiff assented, and, on the defendant's appeal, the judgment as modified was affirmed by this court. In the opinions delivered by two distinguished judges the doctrine is asserted that the depositor owes no duty to the bank to examine his pass book or vouchers with the view to the detection of forgeries, but the decision itself is not authority for more than the proposition that the bank was not relieved from liability for forged checks which it had paid before the account was balanced by the failure of the depositor to subsequently discover the forgeries. As was said by Judge Johnson as to these checks, ‘Whatever loss the bank has sustained, it has suffered from its own negligence or want of skill in a matter as to which, in the first instance, it and it only was bound to exercise skill and diligence. To this loss no act of Weisser has contributed.’ The question again came before this court in the case of Frank v. Bank, 84 N. Y. 209, 38 Am. Rep. 501. That action also was brought to recover cover the amount of a series of checks forged by the depositor's clerk. A recovery by the plaintiffs was upheld, though not on the principle that the depositor owed no duty to his bank, but on the ground that he had discharged that duty. In the opinion there delivered Judge Andrews said: ‘It does not seem to be unreasonable, in view of the course of business and the custom of banks to surrender its vouchers on the periodical writing up of the accounts of depositors, to exact from the latter some attention to the account when it is made up or to hold that the negligent omission of all examination may, when injury has resulted to the bank which it would not have suffered if such examination had been made and the bank had received timely notice of objections, preclude the depositor from afterwards questioning its correctness. But where forged checks have been paid and charged in the account and returned to the depositor, he is under no duty to the bank so to conduct the examination that it will necessarily lead to the discovery of the fraud. If he examines the vouchers personally and is himself deceived by the skillful character of the forgery, his omission to discover it will not shift upon him the loss which in the first instance is the loss of the bank.’ In that case the depositor compared the returned checks with the stubs in the check book, but was deceived by the fact that the forger had abstracted the forged checks from the package. In the supreme court of the United States and in several of our sister states the rule is settled that the depositor owes his bank the duty of a reasonable verification of the returned checks. In Bank v. Morgan, 117 U. S. 96, 6 Sup. Ct. 657, 29 L. Ed. 811, it was held that a depositor is bound personally or by his agent, and with due diligence, to examine the pass book and vouchers, and to report to the bank without unreasonable delay any errors which may have been discovered therein, and that, if he fails to do so and the bank is thereby misled to its prejudice, he cannot afterwards dispute the correctness of the balance shown in the pass book. In Dana v. Bank, 132 Mass. 156, the supreme court of...

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