Pitchler v. Reese

• Decision Date: 27 June 1902
• Citation: 64 N.E. 441,171 N.Y. 577
• Parties: PITCHLER v. REESE, Sheriff.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

171 N.Y. 577

64 N.E. 441

PITCHLER

v.REESE, Sheriff.

Court of Appeals of New York.

June 27, 1902.

Appeal from supreme court, appellate division; Fourth department.

Action by Joseph Pitchler, executor of Mary Simon, against William H. Reese, sheriff of Oneida county. From a judgment of the appellate division (63 N. Y. Supp. 1116) affirming a judgment for plaintiff and an order denying a new trial, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

P. C. J. De Angelis, for appellant.

D. F. Searle, for respondent.

GRAY, J.

The action was brought to recover damages for the conversion by the defendant of a quantity of harvested hops. The defendant, as sheriff, had levied upon and sold the hops under an execution issued upon a judgment recovered against Joseph Pitchler. The farm upon which the hops had been raised belonged to plaintiff's testatrix, and the controversywas over the ownership of the farm product. In behalf of the plaintiff, the evidence showed, or tended to show, that, after she had acquired title to the farm, she made an agreement with Joseph Pitchler, her brother, by which he was to work for her and care for the place, accounting to her for any surplus over expenses. She lived in New York, and she agreed to pay him, and to furnish moneys whenever needed in running the farm. In behalf of the defendant, there was evidence tending to contradict the plaintiff's statements about her relations with Pitchler, and to show that the arrangement was really one which vested the title to the crops in the latter. The evidence upon the subject was conflicting, but, from either point of view, it was not inconsistent with the fact that Pitchler was working the farm for, and as the servant of, its owner. The decision of the controversy was clearly one for the jury to reach, and the verdict for the plaintiff should not be disturbed unless there was some error in the course of the trial which necessitates a reversal of the judgment upon the verdict. The appellant argues that such an error was committed in permitting the plaintiff's testatrix to testify, against his objection, that the hops were hers, because their ownership was the matter in controversy, and it was the province of the jury to draw the conclusion from the facts and circumstances. Doubtless, if the question objected to called for an opinion or for a legal conclusion upon the facts appearing in the case, it would be objectionable. But witnesses may testify to facts which are within their knowledge, even though the facts are such as the jury is eventually to determine. There is a distinction between asking a witness to testify to a fact, the existence of which depends upon an inference from a collection of facts, or upon the...