Lathem v. Department of Children and Youth Services

Decision Date14 April 1999
Docket NumberNos. 97-9307,98-8223,s. 97-9307
Citation172 F.3d 786
Parties79 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1267, 12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 723 Rhonda Ann LATHEM, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH SERVICES, and its officers and agents, Defendant-Appellant. Rhonda Ann Lathem, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Department of Children and Youth Services, and its Officers and Agents, Donald Nix, Defendants-Appellants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Thurbert Baker, Atty. Gen., David C. Will, Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, GA, for Defendants-Appellants.

Karin L. Allen, William Q. Bird, William Q. Bird & Associates, P.C., Stephen Katz, Hewitt, Katz & Dumich, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

Before HATCHETT, Chief Judge, BIRCH, Circuit Judge, and KEITH *, Senior Circuit Judge.

HATCHETT, Chief Judge:

Appellee Rhonda Lathem successfully sued appellant Georgia Department of Juvenile Justice, f/k/a Department of Children & Youth Services (DCYS) for Title VII sex discrimination. DCYS appeals two of the district court's evidentiary rulings, the district court's denial of its motions for judgment as a matter of law and its grant of back pay and costs. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

DCYS hired Lathem as a secretary in August 1985. In July 1987, Lathem began working as a part-time intake officer for the juvenile court. In 1992, Lathem met Justin Cary, a juvenile client of DCYS's whom a court later emancipated. Lathem helped Cary secure housing, allowed him to stay at her house on Christmas Eve, provided him with meals and permitted him to use her car at least once. Cary and Hoyt Beavers, another juvenile DCYS client, stayed at Lathem's house on several occasions in January 1993. DCYS's policy prohibited its employees from becoming personally involved with DCYS clients. 1

In March 1993, Don Nix, the district director for DCYS, initiated an investigation of Lathem after Lathem's supervisor, Terry Waits, reported that Beavers's father had complained about his son and Cary spending too much time with Lathem. Nix arranged a meeting to discuss the complaint with Lathem and Waits. Lathem initially denied having a personal relationship with the boys and refused to answer some questions that Nix posed to her. Nix then referred the matter to Lew Brendle, a DCYS investigator. Lathem told Brendle that she had done nothing wrong and again refused to answer some of the questions asked of her. Brendle informed Lathem that, because of her failure to answer his questions, DCYS would require her to take a polygraph examination. The next day, during the preliminary interview with the polygraph examiner, Lathem admitted that she had lied to Nix when he questioned her about her relationship with Cary and Beavers. The examiner then called Brendle in to speak with Lathem. Lathem again admitted she let the boys stay at her house on several occasions. Brendle prepared an internal investigation report for Nix detailing his findings regarding Lathem's misconduct. In June 1993, apparently after Brendle issued his report, Nix nevertheless gave Lathem a favorable evaluation and recommended her for a merit increase. On October 29, 1993, however, Nix suspended Lathem with pay, citing Lathem's relationship with Cary and Beavers and her "failure to cooperate" with a DCYS investigation. DCYS terminated Lathem's employment on January 15, 1994.

Lathem filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and Georgia's Commission on Equal Opportunity (CEO), alleging that DCYS discriminated against her based on sex because DCYS had not terminated Larry Smith, a male employee whom she contended was similarly-situated and had committed more egregious violations of DCYS's anti-fraternization rule. Smith was a DCYS unit director and was Lathem's direct supervisor. In 1987, Shirley McGarity reported to Nix that Smith was having an inappropriate relationship with her daughter, Rhonda Jones, a DCYS client who was then fifteen years old. 2 McGarity saw Smith and Jones sitting in a car together, which was a violation of DCYS policy. Nix confronted Smith about these charges, and Smith denied the charges. 3 According to DCYS's version of the events, Nix then requested that McGarity give him names of people with whom he could speak regarding her allegations of Smith's misconduct. DCYS claimed that McGarity never contacted Nix with any follow-up information to counter Smith's denial of the allegations, and this was the reason that Nix did not initiate an official investigation of Smith. Lathem claims that McGarity did speak with Nix again after the initial allegation, but that DCYS did not begin any investigation regarding the relationship.

Several months later, DCYS investigated Smith when several DCYS staff members accused him of additional serious misconduct, including having a sexual relationship with juvenile clients, possessing pornographic material, wiretapping, engaging in arson for hire, smuggling drugs and failure to perform his job duties. Brendle headed the investigation and ultimately uncovered evidence of Smith's misconduct. Although DCYS initially suspended Smith with pay while the investigation was underway, DCYS later reinstated him and transferred him to the Rome, Georgia DCYS office. A short time later, Smith voluntarily resigned. DCYS contends that Smith resigned while the investigation was still underway, and that if Smith had not resigned, DCYS would have taken disciplinary action against him, perhaps terminating his employment. Lathem, on the other hand, asserts that after DCYS transferred Smith to the Rome office, Nix informed her and other employees that the investigation of Smith was over.

The EEOC and the CEO both investigated Lathem's complaint. 4 The CEO report concluded that reasonable cause did not exist to believe that DCYS violated the Fair Employment Practices Act of 1978. See Ga.Code Ann. § 45-19-29. The EEOC also rendered a no-cause determination and issued Lathem a right-to-sue letter on January 19, 1995.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 18, 1995, Lathem filed a Title VII action alleging that DCYS engaged in sex discrimination through disparate discipline, and also alleging various state law claims. On November 1, 1996, the district court denied DCYS's motion for summary judgment as to the Title VII claim, but dismissed Lathem's pendent state law claims. The district court also denied DCYS's motion for reconsideration of the summary judgment ruling. A jury trial commenced. During trial, the district court denied DCYS's motion for judgment as a matter of law, and also denied DCYS's motion to introduce Lathem's no-cause determinations into evidence.

During trial, Lathem testified regarding DCYS's discipline of another male employee, Mark Reed, whom she alleged engaged in conduct similar to Lathem's. The pretrial order contained Lathem's allegation that in 1990 or 1991 Reed had a personal relationship with a DCYS client, but that DCYS did not terminate or even discipline Reed. At trial, DCYS presented evidence that the juvenile who stayed with Reed was not a DCYS client in 1991 and part of 1990. Lathem testified on rebuttal that the relationship also occurred in 1989. The juvenile that Reed had the relationship with was a DCYS client in 1989. Lathem also testified regarding Smith's inappropriate conduct toward her and DCYS clients. Lathem testified that Smith met with female clients behind closed doors in violation of DCYS policy, made inappropriate comments to her and showed her pornographic pictures.

The jury returned a verdict for Lathem on the Title VII claim for $400,000. The district court reduced the award to $300,000 (the statutory limit) and denied DCYS's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, or in the alternative, for a new trial. In a subsequent hearing, the district court awarded Lathem back pay and costs.

III. ISSUES

The issues are whether the district court erred in: (1) refusing to admit the EEOC's and CEO's no-cause determinations into evidence; (2) denying DCYS's requests for judgment as a matter of law, or in the alternative, a new trial; (3) admitting Lathem's testimony regarding discriminatory acts that DCYS alleges occurred outside the statute of limitations for a Title VII action; (4) admitting Lathem's testimony that allegedly contradicted the pretrial order and her pleadings; (5) awarding Lathem back pay; and (6) granting Lathem costs.

IV. DISCUSSION
A. Evidentiary determinations

DCYS first argues that the district court abused its discretion in refusing its request to admit the EEOC's and the CEO's no-cause determinations. Although trial courts admit EEOC determinations in bench trials, this liberal admissibility rule does not apply to jury trials. 5 See Walker v. NationsBank of Florida, 53 F.3d 1548, 1554 (11th Cir.1995). Instead, the district court must make the admissibility determination on an individual basis, considering the evidence's probative value and the danger of unfair prejudice. See Barfield v. Orange County, 911 F.2d 644, 650 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 954, 111 S.Ct. 2263, 114 L.Ed.2d 715 (1991). In its request to have the reports admitted, DCYS argued that failure to admit the reports would prejudice it because in both reports Lathem alleged that Smith, rather than Smith and Reed, had engaged in similar misconduct but received disparate discipline. Lathem, however, argued that the district court should not admit the reports because the EEOC and CEO failed to interview certain witnesses and review certain documents during its investigation. District courts have broad discretion with respect to the admissibility of evidence. See Hines v. Brandon Steel Decks, Inc., 886 F.2d 299, 302 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 971, 112 S.Ct. 1587, 118 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992). Because Lathem offered a legitimate reason why the reports may have...

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