Coulter v. State

• Decision Date: 30 November 2007
• Docket Number: No. 27025.,27025.
• Citation: 172 P.3d 493,116 Haw. 181
• Parties: Michael Edward COULTER, Petitioner/Petitioner-Appellant v. STATE of Hawai`i, Respondent/Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

172 P.3d 493

116 Haw. 181

Michael Edward COULTER, Petitioner/Petitioner-Appellant v. STATE of Hawai`i, Respondent/Respondent-Appellee.

No. 27025.

Supreme Court of Hawai`i.

November 30, 2007.

Phyllis J. Hironaka, Deputy Public Defender, (Sat K. Freedman, Deputy Public Defender, with her on the brief), for petitioner/petitioner-appellant.

Lisa M. Itomura, Deputy Attorney General, (Bryan C. Yee and Diane K. Taira, Deputy Attorneys General, with her on the briefs), for respondent/respondent-appellee.

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, and DUFFY, JJ.

Opinion of the Court by DUFFY, J.

Petitioner Michael Edward Coulter seeks review of the Intermediate Court of Appeals' (ICA) January 22, 2007 judgment, which affirmed the circuit court of the first circuit's November 29, 2004 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Denying Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.¹ We accepted Coulter's application for a writ of certiorari and vacate the judgment of the ICA.

Coulter asserts that the ICA gravely erred in affirming the circuit court order which denied his Hawai`i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 40 Petition for post-conviction relief. Coulter argues that the manner in which the Hawai`i Paroling Authority (HPA) set his minimum terms of imprisonment was in violation of his constitutional rights, the applicable statute, and the HPA's own guidelines.

Because we agree that the HPA violated its guidelines in setting Coulter's minimum term, we reverse the judgment of the ICA, vacate the circuit court's order, and remand to the circuit court with instructions to order the HPA to provide Coulter with a new minimum-term hearing under Hawai`i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 706-669.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Coulter's Minimum Term Hearing and Rule 40 Petition

In July 2002, Coulter pleaded guilty to one count of Negligent Homicide in the First Degree, in violation of HRS § 707-702.5 (1993), and one count of Accidents Involving Death or Serious Bodily Injury, in violation of HRS § 291C-12 (1993). The circuit court, in September 2002, sentenced Coulter to ten years of imprisonment for each count, to run concurrently.

Subsequently, in November 2002, Coulter received a notice informing him that the HPA would hold a hearing to fix his minimum term of imprisonment and explaining his rights in such a hearing. A later notice set the minimum term hearing date of January 6, 2003, which was continued until March 11, 2003 at Coulter's request. On January 7, 2003, Coulter's counsel sent copies of support letters, Coulter's autobiography, and two transcripts to the HPA for review by the HPA Board prior to the minimum term hearing.

Coulter appeared with counsel at the minimum term hearing that was held on March 11, 2003.

On March 15, 2003, the HPA issued a notice and order ("Order") setting Coulter's minimum terms of imprisonment at seven years for each count. The Order did not specify Coulter's level of punishment and the significant criteria upon which his minimum decision was based, as required by Section III of the HPA's 1989 Guidelines for Establishing Minimum Terms of Imprisonment.

Section III of the Guidelines, entitled "Issuance of Decision," states:

The Order Establishing Minimum Terms of Imprisonment (DOC # 10029) will include the specific minimum terms(s) [sic] established in years and/or months, the level of punishment (Level I, II, or III) under which the inmate falls, and the significant criteria upon which the decision was based.

HPA's Guidelines for Establishing Minimum Terms of Imprisonment (1989), available at http://hawaii.gov/psd/documents/hpa/ Minimum_Guidelines.pdf [hereinafter, "HPA Guidelines"].

Coulter, acting pro se, filed a Rule 40 Petition challenging his minimum term order on August 21, 2003. In the petition, Coulter made six allegations, including claims that the HPA hearing did not comply with the statutorily-required procedural requirements, that the HPA violated his statutory right to be considered for parole, and that the minimum term established by the HPA violated his constitutional equal protection rights. Relevant to the present action, Coulter also challenged the Order itself, asserting (1) that he was placed into the wrong level of punishment, and (2) that the HPA failed to follow its guidelines when it set his minimum terms without stating in the Order Coulter's level of punishment or providing any written criteria upon which the HPA based its decision.

The State filed an answer to Coulter's petition on September 19, 2003 and a supplemental answer on December 4, 2003. Coulter filed replies to both answers.

On December 31, 2003, the HPA, sua sponte and without holding a hearing, issued an amended Notice and Order of Fixing Minimum Term(s) of Imprisonment ("Amended Order"). In the Amended Order the HPA set Coulter's minimum terms at seven years for each count, the level of punishment at Level III, and identified the significant factors used in determining Coulter's level of punishment as the nature of the offense and the degree of injury/loss to person.²

The circuit court held a hearing on Coulter's Rule 40 Petition on August 24, 2004. On November 29, 2004, the circuit court issued findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order denying Coulter's petition.

B. HPA Board Composition

The HPA is composed of three members, one of which serves as chairperson, and each of which is appointed for four-year terms. HRS § 353-61 (1993).

The March 15, 2003 order setting Coulter's minimum term of imprisonment was signed by the Acting Chair Mary Juanita Tiwanak. The letterhead at the top of the March Order also listed Lani Rae Garcia as an HPA member and Tommy Johnson as administrator.

The December Amended Order, on the other hand, was signed by Chairman Albert Tufono. The letterhead of that order indicates that the HPA at that time was composed of two other members, Dane K. Oda and Edward M. Slavish, as well as administrator Tommy Johnson. Therefore, none of the individuals who were HPA members at the time that the March Order was issued continued to be HPA members by December 2003, when the Amended Order was released.

C. The ICA's Decision

Before the ICA, Coulter argued that the circuit court erred in denying his Rule 40 Petition because it wrongly concluded that (1) Coulter's constitutional rights to due process and equal protection were not violated and (2) the HPA properly followed its guidelines in identifying Coulter as a Level III offender. The ICA rejected these arguments, stating:

Upon careful review of the record and the briefs submitted by the parties and having given due consideration to the arguments advanced and the issues raised by the parties, we conclude that Coulter's contentions are without merit. The circuit court did not err in concluding that Coulter failed to prove facts sufficient to justify relief on any of his claims. Furthermore, the HPA did not abuse its discretion nor violate the constitutional rights of Coulter, in setting Coulter's minimum terms of imprisonment. Williamson v. Hawaii Paroling Authority, 97 Hawai`i 183, 195, 35 P.3d 210, 222 (2001).

ICA's SDO at 6.

We heard oral argument in this case on August 22, 2007.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

An HRPP Rule 40 petition is an appropriate means to challenge a minimum term of imprisonment set by the HPA. Williamson v. Hawai`i Paroling Auth., 97 Hawai`i 156, 34 P.3d 1055 (App.2000), rev'd on other grounds, 97 Hawai`i 183, 35 P.3d 210 (2001).

"The disposition of an HRPP Rule 40 petition is based on FOF [findings of fact] and COL [conclusions of law]." Raines v. State, 79 Hawai`i 219, 222, 900 P.2d 1286, 1289 (1995). Accordingly, we review the circuit court's conclusions of law de novo and findings of fact for clear error. See id. (citing Dan v. State, 76 Hawai`i 423, 428, 879 P.2d 528, 533 (1994)).

With respect to HPA decisions establishing a minimum term, this court has stated that "judicial intervention is appropriate where the HPA has failed to exercise any discretion at all, acted arbitrarily and capriciously so as to give rise to a due process violation, or otherwise violated the prisoner's constitutional rights." Williamson, 97 Hawai`i at 195, 35 P.3d at 222.

With respect to claims of procedural violations, the court will assess whether the HPA conformed with the procedural protections of HRS § 706-669 and complied with its own guidelines, which the HPA was required to establish by statute. HRS § 706-669(8) (1993).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Coulter's Due Process Claim

In his Application, Coulter separately challenges the March 2003 and December 2003 actions of the HPA, alleging that both were in violation of his due process rights. The challenges he mounts are based on three grounds: constitutional due process protections; violation of the HPA's own guidelines; and violations of the statutory procedural requirements.

Although Coulter raises separate challenges to each of the two HPA actions, they are factually linked. Coulter asserts that the first violation was committed by the HPA board as composed on March 11, 2003, which issued the March 15, 2003 minimum-term order that failed to specify either the level of punishment or the significant criteria upon which the decision was based, both of which must be specified according to Section III of HPA's 1989 Guidelines. This failure, Coulter maintains, violated his due process rights.

The second violation was allegedly committed by the HPA board as composed on December 31, 2003, when it issued the Amended Order—maintaining the term decision but providing the level of punishment and significant criteria information—without providing the normal procedures set out in HRS § 706-669, such as notice and a hearing. Although the amended decision could be considered a "cure" of the conclusory March Order, Coulter contends that because the membership of the HPA completely changed in the interim, the decision was in reality a "new" decision for which he was entitled to...