Orient Ins Co of Hartford, Conn v. Daggs

• Decision Date: 16 January 1899
• Docket Number: No. 81,81
• Parties: ORIENT INS. CO. OF HARTFORD, CONN., v. DAGGS
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

172 U.S. 557

19 S.Ct. 281

43 L.Ed. 552

ORIENT INS. CO. OF HARTFORD, CONN.,

v DAGGS.

No. 81.

January 16, 1899.

This is an action at law upon a policy of insurance issued by the plaintiff in error, a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Connecticut. The policy was issued in June, 1893, insuring the defendant in error against loss or damage by fire to a certain barn situated in Scotland county, Mo., in a sum not to exceed $800. The barn was, within less than three months after the issuing of the policy, entirely consumed by fire, and an action was brought upon the contract to compel the payment of the entire sum of $800.

The petition filed in the case avers the delivery of the policy of insurance to the defendant in error, and says that the company, by virtue of said policy, promised to pay the plaintiff the sum of $800 in case said barn should be destroyed by fire, and attaches a copy of the policy to the petition as the basis of the action.

The answer filed by the company stated that the 'defendant is a corporation, organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the state of Connecticut, doing a general fire insurance business in the state of Missouri, and avers it has been doing such business continually since and prior to the 1st day of June, 1873, and that said defendant was and is fully authorized to do such business in the state of Missouri.' The answer admitted the delivery of the policy and the total destruction of the barn by fire; that the plaintiff was the owner thereof; and that proofs of loss had been made.

The defendant, further answering, stated that the contract of insurance sued on in the case was the contract between the parties, and that it provided that 'said insurance company shall not be liable beyond the actual cash value of the property at the time any loss or damage occurs, and that the loss or damage shall be ascertained or estimated according to the actual cash value of the property at the time of the fire, and shall in no case exceed what it will cost to replace the same, deducting therefrom a suitable amount for any depreciation of said property from age, use, or location, or otherwise.'

The answer further averred that at the time of the burning of the building in question it was not worth to exceed $100, which amount the plaintiff in error then offered to pay, with interest from the date of the fire, and to return the premium. The answer of the defendant further averred as follows:

'The defendant says that section 5897 of chapter 89, article 4, of the Revised Statutes of the State of Missouri, compiled in the year 1889, provides as follows: 'In all suits brought upon policies of insurance against loss or damage by fire, hereafter issued or renewed, the defendant shall not be permitted to deny that the property insured thereby was worth at the time of the issuing of the policy the full amount insured therein on said property; and in case of total loss of the property insured, the measure of damages shall be the amount for which the same was insured, less whatever depreciation in value below the amount for which the property is insured the property may have sustained, between the time of issuing the policy and the time of the loss, and the burden of proving such depreciation shall be upon the defendant.' * * * And that section 5898 of said chapter provides that no condition in any policy of insurance contrary to the provisions of this article, meaning thereby article 4, shall be legal or valid. The defendant says that said statute was enacted prior to the issuing of said policy, and has not been repealed.'

The defendant pleaded that said statute is contrary to the constitution of Missouri, and that the same is unconstitutiona , null, and void, and proceeded to aver as follows:

'The defendant, further answering, says that sections 5897 and 5898 of chapter 89, article 4, of the Statutes of Missouri, are contrary to, and in contravention of, the constitution of the United States, which provides that no state shall pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law, or laws impairing the obligation of contracts.

'Defendant, further answering, says that said sections, and each of them, are contrary to, and in contravention of, article 14 of the constitution of the United States, commonly called the 'Fourteenth Amendment,' and particularly of article 1 of said amendment, which is as follows:

"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any laws which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.'

'And that said sections 5897 and 5898 of chapter 89, article 4, of the Revised Statutes of Missouri, are unconstitutional and contrary to the constitution of the United States, and are null and void.

'That the defendant has the constitutional right to limit its liability by contract to actual damages caused by fire.'

To this answer the plaintiff and assured filed a demurrer, which demurrer the court sustained, and, the defendant electing to stand upon the ruling upon said demurrer, judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff, and in due course the cause was appealed to the supreme court of Missouri. At October term, 1896, the supreme court of Missouri rendered an opinion in said case, affirming the judgment of the court below. 136 Mo. 282, 38 S. W. 85. The case then came to this court in due course upon petition in error.

There are 23 assignments of error, which present the claim of plaintiff in error under the constitution of the United States, and the alleged error of the state court denying the claim.

A. H. McVey, for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Justice McKENNA, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the court.

The statute of Missouri is alleged to violate the fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States in the following particulars: (1) that it abridges the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; (2) denies to persons within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws; and (3) deprives persons of property without due process of law.

1. It is not clear that this ground is relied on. It is, however, not available to plaintiff in error. A corporation is not a citizen, within the meaning of the provision, and hence has not 'privileges and immunities' secured to 'citizens' against state legislation. This was decided in Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, against a corporation upon which were imposed conditions for doing business in the state of Virginia, and has been repeated in many cases since, including one at the present term. Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 19 Sup. Ct. 165.

2. It is not easy to make a succinct statement of the objections of plaintiff in error under this provision. Counsel says: 'The business of insurance includes insurance against damages on account of death, accident, personal injury, liability for acts of employees, damages to plate glass, damages by hail, lightning, high wind, tornadoes, and against damages to personal property on account of fire or casualty by other elements, as well as insurance against loss or damage to buildings on account of fire. * * * No other business is subject to the discrimination, in case such business is involved in litigation, of having the damages assessed without due process of law. The statute singles out persons engaged in fire insurance as against all other kinds of nsurance, and as against all other kinds of business, and imposes the onerous and unusual conditions provided in the statute against such persons.' And again: 'The statute thus discriminates as to the subject-matter, as to the parties, as to the mode of trial of actions at law and equity, and imposes upon this particular class of underwriters, as distingushed from all the rest of the world, conditions which abrogate its contracts, and compels it to pay damages never sustained, and prevents it from having an investigation upon the trial by due process of law.'

This mingles grounds of objection, and confounds the prohibitions of the provision we are considering with that of the next provision. Whether the statute of Missouri provides for 'due process' we shall consider hereafter, and upon that con- sideration determine how much of the complaint against it in that regard is true. Now we may confine ourselves to the more specific contention that it discriminates between fire insurance corporations or companies and those engaged in other kinds of insurance.

It is not necessary to state the reasoning upon which classification by legislation is based or justified. This court has had many occasions to do so, and only lately reviewed the subject in Magoun v. Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 18 Sup....