Jones v. Lafferty

Decision Date29 March 2016
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 5:15-51-KKC
Citation173 F.Supp.3d 493
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky
Parties Ronald L. Jones, Jr., Plaintiff, v. Todd Lafferty, Defendant.

Edward E. Dove, Lexington, KY, for Plaintiff.

Jane Lyle Hord, KY Department of Corrections-General Counsel, Frankfort, KY, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
KAREN K. CALDWELL
, CHIEF JUDGE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

This matter is before the Court upon the motion of defendant Todd Lafferty to dismiss the complaint. [R. 34] Plaintiff Ronald L. Jones, Jr., has filed a response in opposition to the motion [R. 41], to which Lafferty has replied. [R. 42] The motion is therefore ripe for decision.

I. Factual Background.

Proceeding without counsel, Jones filed this action on March 2, 2015. [R. 1] In his amended complaint, Jones indicated that on December 11, 2014, he was sitting on the sofa in his apartment when Probation and Parole Officer Todd Lafferty and several Lexington police officers used a key to open the door, and entered the premises without knocking, without announcing their presence, and without a warrant. [R. 17 at pp. 3-4] Lafferty arrested Jones at that time because “violations of supervision were present in the residence.” [R. 1-1 at p. 1] Jones alleges that Lafferty used unnecessary force during the arrest, and that as a result he had to be treated by medical staff at the Fayette County Jail. Jones contends that Officer Lafferty violated the Fourth Amendment by entering his apartment without a warrant, and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by using excessive force. [R. 17 at pp. 3-4, 7]

Upon initial screening of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)

, 1915A, the Court dismissed a number of claims against state and county officials, as well as the manager of the apartment complex and the property management company. The Court permitted Jones' claims against Officer Lafferty “regarding warrantless entry and unnecessary force” to proceed, and ordered that he be served with process. [R. 24]

In support of his motion for dismissal, Lafferty first contends that under Samson v. California , 547 U.S. 843, 126 S.Ct. 2193, 165 L.Ed.2d 250 (2006)

, the Fourth Amendment does not require either a warrant or reasonable suspicion to search Jones' apartment because he was on parole at the time, and therefore Jones' allegation that Lafferty lacked a warrant fails to state a claim. [R. 34-1 at pp. 3-5] Lafferty further contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity because as a parolee Jones had no clearly established right prohibiting the warrantless search of his home. [R. 34-1 at pp. 5-6] The motion to dismiss is unsupported by an affidavit from Lafferty or authenticated documentation.

In his response, Lafferty confirms that he was on parole on the date of the search and arrest. [R. 41 at p. 2] He contends, however, that because the “consent-to-search” language applicable to Kentucky parolees under Kentucky Department of Corrections (“KDOC”) Policy No. 27–16–01 II(D) (the “KDOC Policy”) is narrower than the California provision at issue in Samson

, the search of his apartment—supported by neither a warrant nor reasonable suspicion—was unreasonable in violation of the Fourth Amendment.1 [R. 41 at pp. 3-4] Lafferty therefore requests discovery to determine whether the search was supported by reasonable suspicion. [R. 41 at p. 5]

In reply, Lafferty counters that permitting discovery would undermine the purpose of qualified immunity, and that the Kentucky Supreme Court held in Bratcher v. Commonwealth , 424 S.W.3d 411 (Ky.2014)

that the particular language of the “consent to search” provision at issue is irrelevant for Fourth Amendment purposes. Lafferty separately alleges that the search was conducted by the Kentucky State Police, not Lexington police officers, thus rendering the KDOC Policy irrelevant, and that the KSP officers actually did have a warrant to search Jones' apartment. [R. 42 at p. 2, p. 4 n.2] However, Lafferty has failed to support either assertion by placing evidence into the record.

II. Discussion.

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

tests the sufficiency of the plaintiff's complaint. Gardner v. Quicken Loans, Inc. , 567 Fed.Appx. 362, 364 (6th Cir.2014). When addressing a motion to dismiss, the Court views the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accepts as true all ‘well-pleaded facts' in the complaint. D'Ambrosio v. Marino , 747 F.3d 378, 383 (6th Cir.2014). A complaint must contain allegations, either expressly stated or necessarily inferred, with respect to every material element necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co. v. Youth Alive, Inc. , 732 F.3d 645, 649 (6th Cir.2013). But the complaint must be dismissed if it undoubtedly fails to allege facts sufficient to state a facially-plausible claim. Republic Bank & Trust Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., Inc. , 683 F.3d 239, 247 (6th Cir.2012).

Ordinarily, the sufficiency of the complaint is tested with reference only to the face of the complaint itself. Burns v. United States , 542 Fed.Appx. 461, 466 (6th Cir.2013)

. This includes, of course, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. , 551 U.S. 308, 322, 127 S.Ct. 2499, 168 L.Ed.2d 179 (2007). The Court may also consider “other materials that are integral to the complaint, are public records, or are otherwise appropriate for the taking of judicial notice.” Ashland, Inc. v. Oppenheimer & Co. , 648 F.3d 461, 467 (6th Cir.2011).

Of particular relevance here, if a plaintiff refers to a document in the complaint and it is central to her claim, the document will be considered part of the pleadings even if the plaintiff did not attach it to her complaint if the defendant attaches it to the motion to dismiss. Campbell v. Nationstar Mtg. , 611 Fed.Appx. 288 (6th Cir.2015)

(citing Weiner v. Klais & Co. , 108 F.3d 86, 89 (6th Cir.1997) ). See also Rondigo, L.L.C. v. Twp. of Richmond , 641 F.3d 673, 681 (6th Cir.2011).

Lafferty's motion to dismiss Jones' complaint must be first denied, at least in part, because he does not reference, address, or challenge the sufficiency of Jones' excessive force claim.2 Lafferty's assertion that the Court only “allowed Jones' Fourth Amendment claim against Officer Lafferty in his individual capacity to proceed” [R. 34-1 at p. 2] is incorrect. [R. 24 at p. 5 (“Jones's allegations regarding warrantless entry and unnecessary force against Officer Lafferty in his individual capacity do not clearly fail to state a claim, and the Court will therefore order the complaint to be served upon Officer Lafferty for response.”) (emphasis added) ] Having failed to make any effort to argue against the viability of half of the claims in the complaint, Lafferty lays no plausible claim to the dismissal of all of it.

Instead, Lafferty's motion challenges only the sufficiency of Jones' claim that the warrantless search of his apartment violated the Fourth Amendment. It is entirely unclear why Lafferty chose not to rely upon the warrant that he contends was issued to permit the search of Jones' apartment [R. 42 at p. 4 n.2], potentially a much simpler path to the dismissal he seeks, whether by attaching it to his motion to dismiss or by filing a motion for summary judgment. Further, if the search led to evidence which resulted in Jones' subsequent conviction (as opposed to a mere revocation of his parole) his claim may be barred by Heck v. Humphr e y , 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994)

. Cf. Boyer v. Mohring , 994 F.Supp.2d 649, 654 (E.D.Pa.2014) (holding that parolee's Fourth Amendment claim against parole officer barred by Heck where search led to evidence resulting in plaintiff's criminal conviction). This is important because Lafferty's argument that the search was consistent with the Fourth Amendment, even though it was supported by neither a warrant nor reasonable suspicion, fails to provide a basis to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. Nor can the Court conclude that Lafferty is entitled to qualified immunity on this claim, at least upon the record before it. The Court must therefore deny his motion to dismiss Jones' Fourth Amendment claim at this juncture.

Lafferty's motion to dismiss is not premised upon the usual or necessary grounds for dismissal—the absence of one or more necessary factual allegations in Jones' complaint. Instead, Lafferty flatly contends that Jones has no rights whatsoever under the Fourth Amendment to prevent even an unreasonable search simply because he was on parole. [R. 34-1 at p. 1] Lafferty's argument is that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there is no set of facts that Jones could allege that would ever entitle him to relief.

Procedurally, a motion for summary judgment, not a motion to dismiss, is the proper vehicle for Lafferty's argument.3 Substantively, Lafferty relies upon the Kentucky Supreme Court's statement that “the Fourth Amendment presents no impediment against a warrantless and suspicionless search of a person on parole.” Bratcher , 424 S.W.3d at 415

. With due respect to our sister court, that conclusion misapprehends the holdings and the reasoning of the Supreme Court precedent upon which it relies. To reach a fuller understanding of why this is so, a brief discussion of the evolution of the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in this area provides some helpful historical context.

The Fourth Amendment protects the right of citizens to be free from unreasonable government intrusions into areas where they have a legitimate expectation of privacy. Kyllo v. United States , 533 U.S. 27, 33–34, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001)

. In determining whether a particular search is permissible under the Fourth Amendment, “the touchstone ... is reasonableness.” United States v. Lifshitz , 369 F.3d...

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3 cases
  • Davis v. Commonwealth
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Kentucky
    • May 24, 2019
    ...motion was proper. Finally, we address whether Bratcher should be overturned. As Davis notes, a federal judge in Jones v. Lafferty, 173 F.Supp.3d 493 (E.D. Ky. 2016), disagreed with Bratcher, stating:Lafferty relies upon the Kentucky Supreme Court's statement that "the Fourth Amendment pres......
  • Stigall v. Commonwealth
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Kentucky
    • September 22, 2017
    ...but recognizing "federal courts are generally bound by the Kentucky Supreme Court's interpretation of Kentucky law." Jones v. Lafferty, 173 F.Supp.3d 493, 500 (E.D.Ky. 2016) (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 3169, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 ...
  • Jones v. Commonwealth
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Kentucky
    • February 25, 2022
    ...sister court, that conclusion misapprehends the holdings and the reasoning of the Supreme Court precedent upon which it relies. Jones, 173 F.Supp.3d at 496-97.[2] "[a]s an intermediate appellate court, this Court is bound by published decisions of the Kentucky Supreme Court. SCR [Supreme Co......
1 books & journal articles
  • Part two: case summaries by major topics.
    • United States
    • Detention and Corrections Caselaw Quarterly No. 69, June 2017
    • June 1, 2017
    ...(Suffolk County Community Protection Act, Suffolk County Police Dept., N.Y.) U.S. District Court SEARCHES PAROLE Jones v. Lafferty, 173 F.Supp.3d 493 (E.D. Ky. 2016). A parolee, proceeding pro se, brought an action against a police officer, alleging violations of the Fourth Amendment in the......

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