Wylie v. Chesser, 102,015.

Citation173 P.3d 64,2007 OK 81
Decision Date23 October 2007
Docket NumberNo. 102,015.,102,015.
PartiesPete WYLIE, Wanda Evaige, Eddie Whitworth, Robert Meadors, and Jim Smith in their official capacity as the Trustees of the Employee Retirement System of Frederick, Oklahoma, Plaintiffs/Appellees, v. Margaret CHESSER, a/k/a Margaret Lavern Chesser, Defendant/Appellant.
CourtSupreme Court of Oklahoma

CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION IV, APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TILLMAN COUNTY, STATE OF OKLAHOMA; HONORABLE RICHARD B. DARBY, TRIAL JUDGE.

¶ 0 Charles Chesser, a former employee of the City of Frederick, died in 1999. After he died his surviving spouse, Defendant/Appellant, Margaret Chesser, a/k/a Margaret Lavern Chesser (Appellant), sought continuation of the monthly disability benefit he had been receiving since about late 1981 under the Employee Retirement System of Frederick, Oklahoma, a System Frederick adopted by ordinance in 1966. Plaintiffs/Appellees, Trustees of the System did not grant Appellant's request; instead, they brought a declaratory judgment action against her in district court seeking a ruling she was not entitled to continuation of the benefit. Appellant answered and counterclaimed asserting she was entitled to continuation of the monthly benefit. Each side moved for summary judgment. The trial court gave summary judgment to the Trustees. Appellant appealed and the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA), Division IV reversed and remanded with direction to the trial court to enter judgment for Appellant. The Trustees sought certiorari which we previously granted. We vacate the COCA's opinion and affirm the trial court judgment.

CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

Ty Johnson, Massad, Evans & Kent, Inc., Frederick, OK, for Plaintiffs/Appellees.

O. Christopher Meyers, Lawton, OK, for Defendant/Appellant.

PER CURIAM.

¶ 1 This case requires a decision as to whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Plaintiffs/Appellees, Trustees of the Employee Retirement System of Frederick, Oklahoma in the declaratory judgment action they brought against Defendant/Appellant, Margaret Chesser, a/k/a Margaret Lavern Chesser. In the action the Trustees sought a ruling Appellant was not entitled to continuation of the monthly disability benefit her deceased husband, a former City of Frederick employee, was receiving under the System's terms when he died. The Court of Civil Appeals (COCA), Division IV reversed and remanded with direction to the trial court to enter judgment for Appellant. We vacate the COCA's opinion and affirm the trial court judgment.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 2 Initially we note that each side to this litigation sought summary judgment in the trial court based on the written terms of the System plan which was adopted by the City of Frederick by municipal ordinance in 1966. The parties agreed there was no substantial controversy as to any material fact and that the matter was ripe for decision as a matter of law. Our review of the record shows there is no substantial controversy as to any material fact and the case may be determined as a matter of law. We also note that the interpretation or meaning of the System's terms are before us for review, a System that as noted was adopted by municipal ordinance.1

¶ 3 In reviewing a summary judgment grant an appellate court engages in a plenary, independent and non-deferential re-examination of the trial court's ruling, i.e., a de novo review. In re Estate of MacFarline, 2000 OK 87, ¶ 3, 14 P.3d 551, 554-555 (quoting Carmichael v. Beller, 1996 OK 48, 914 P.2d 1051, 1053 and citing Manley v. Brown, 1999 OK 79, ¶ 22 n. 30, 989 P.2d 448). Summary judgment is warranted only when "there is no substantial controversy as to the material facts and . . . one of the parties is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.]" 12 O.S.Supp.2006, Ch. 2, App., Rules for the District Courts of Oklahoma, Rule 13(e). For summary judgment for a party to be appropriate the evidentiary materials submitted must demonstrate undisputed facts on material issues supporting but a single inference in favor of that party. In the Matter of the Assessment of Real Property of Integris Realty Corp., 2002 OK 85, ¶ 5, 58 P.3d 200, 202-203.

¶ 4 The determination of legal questions involving statutory interpretation are also subject to de novo appellate review. Fulsom v. Fulsom, 2003 OK 96, ¶ 2, 81 P.3d 652, 654 (citing Samman v. Multiple Injury Trust Fund, 2001 OK 71, ¶ 8 and n. 5, 33 P.3d 302, 305 and n. 5). The basic rules as to the meaning of statutes are applicable to municipal ordinances. See Tinker Investment & Mortgage Corp. v. City of Midwest City, 1994 OK 41, 873 P.2d 1029, 1038 and Oklahoma Journal Publishing Co. v. City of Oklahoma City, 1979 OK CIV APP 42, 620 P.2d 452, 454.

FACTS, PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND OVERVIEW

¶ 5 In 1966 the City of Frederick passed Ordinance No. 364 which adopted the System plan at issue in this case.2 Charles Chesser was employed by Frederick for about twenty-one (21) years until his retirement for disability in late 1981. At such time, pursuant to the System's provisions, he began receiving disability benefits of two hundred sixty-eight dollars and seventy-six cents ($268.76) per month. He received this monthly benefit until his death in April 1999, when the payments ceased. It is undisputed Appellant is Charles' widow/surviving spouse, having married him in 1972, and that she has not remarried. It is also undisputed that Charles contributed a portion of his monthly pay to the Employee Retirement System of Frederick as required by the System plan.3

¶ 6 At some point after Charles died Appellant applied to Frederick for a continuation of the monthly disability benefit she claimed entitlement to as his surviving spouse.4 The Trustees refused to grant her claim. Instead, they brought a declaratory judgment action against her in the district court, in effect, arguing the System's terms did not intend for continuation of the benefit. Appellant answered and counterclaimed, in essence, arguing the System's terms did allow for continuation of the benefit to her as Charles' surviving spouse.

¶ 7 Both sides moved for summary judgment, agreeing there was no material fact in substantial controversy and that the case was subject to decision as a matter of law based on the interpretation and meaning of the System's terms. To support her claim to entitlement to continuation of the monthly disability benefit Appellant places primary reliance on subsection 6.1(B)(2) of the System plan, a part of Article VI.5 Article VI provides in pertinent part:

6.1 Spouse's Pensions

A. Eligibility Requirements:

1. In-Service Death: The surviving spouse of deceased Employee shall be eligible for a Spouse's Pension with payments commencing on the first day of the month coinciding with or next following the Employee's date of death and payable for the spouse's lifetime, or until the spouse's remarriage, provided that the Employee, as of the date of his or her death, (a) was continuing in the active service of the Employer, (b) had completed 10 or more years of service, (c) had not retired, and (d) was not legally separated from the surviving spouse.

B. Amount of Spouse's Pension:

1. In-Service Death: A surviving spouse who meets the eligibility requirements under Paragraph 1 of Subsection 6.1A above shall receive a monthly amount of Spouse's Pension equal to 75 percent of the amount determined in Article V for a Pension considering the Employee's Compensation and Service with the Employer to the date of his death.

2. Post-Disability Retirement Death: A surviving spouse who meets the eligibility requirements under Paragraph 2 of Subsection 6.1A above shall receive a monthly amount of Spouse's Pension equal to the monthly amount of the Disability Pension which the retired Employee was receiving or was entitled to receive under this System on the date of his death.6

The problem with application of subsection 6.1(B)(2) is that there is no "Paragraph 2 of Subsection 6.1A" setting forth and spelling out the eligibility requirements necessary for a surviving spouse to receive continuation of the benefit.

¶ 8 In their motion for summary judgment the Trustees set forth three possible scenarios as to the reference to the non-existent paragraph 2 of subsection 6.1(A), each of which they basically argued would result in a conclusion that Appellant was not entitled to continuation of the disability benefit.

¶ 9 One, the Trustees in effect posited that the most logical interpretation was that the intent of the authors of the System plan was an intentional deletion of subsection 6.1(A)(2) from an earlier draft of the plan, but through oversight the authors neglected or forgot to also delete subsection 6.1(B)(2). In other words, that the System plan's authors only intended for surviving spouse benefits in the situation of an in-service death covered by subsections 6.1(A)(1) and 6.1(B)(1).

¶ 10 Two, that the reference to 6.1(A)(2) was a typographical error and was meant to refer to subsection 6.1(A)(1), i.e., to the in-service death eligibility requirements. The Trustees asserted that such an interpretation would be nonsensical because for a surviving spouse to be eligible for continuation of the decedent's benefit under 6.1(A)(1) the decedent must have been continuing in the active service of the City at the time of death and the employee must not have retired, i.e., requirements found in subsections 6.1(A)(1)(a) and (c), respectively; requirements that a surviving spouse like Appellant could not meet because Charles at the time of his death was not an active City employee, but had retired with a disability benefit under section 4.3 of the System plan.7 The nonsensical nature of such an interpretation, according to the Trustees, is that it would be unreasonable to believe the plan's authors would create...

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