U.S. v. Maragh, 98-4562

Decision Date06 May 1999
Docket NumberNo. 98-4562,98-4562
Citation174 F.3d 1202
Parties12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 803 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Juliet MARAGH, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Eric Cohen, Miami, FL, for Defendant-Appellant.

Adalberto Jordan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Stephen Schlessinger, Kurt Stitcher, Dave M. Buckner, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before HATCHETT, Chief Judge, BARKETT, Circuit Judge, and RONEY, Senior Circuit Judge.

RONEY, Senior Circuit Judge:

Defendant Juliet Maragh appeals from a judgment finding her guilty of conspiring to import cocaine into the United States, in violation of 21 U.S.C. section 963. She properly argues that a magistrate judge may only conduct voir dire in a felony case with the consent of the defendant. She asserts that she is entitled to a new trial because the magistrate judge conducted the voir dire in this case. Since the record is not clear whether Maragh gave her knowing approval to this procedure, we remand for further proceedings so that the final decision as to whether the defendant is entitled to a new trial may be based on the actual facts of this case. At the same time, we announce a prospective rule that should eliminate any dispute over this kind of issue in future trials.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 7, 1997, agents of the United States Customs Service stopped Karlene Burton at the Miami International Airport in Miami, Florida, as she disembarked an Air Jamaica flight from Kingston, Jamaica. After briefly questioning Burton, a customs agent searched Burton's luggage, found several cosmetic bottles containing cocaine and immediately placed Burton under arrest. Upon further questioning, Burton stated that her two colleagues, Donna Francis and Maragh, had also smuggled cocaine into the country that same day on an earlier Air Jamaica flight. Burton also told the agents that Maragh had directed Burton and Francis to go to a Miami Travelodge hotel after landing and to contact a local purchaser for the smuggled cocaine. Customs agents set up surveillance equipment at the specified Travelodge, but neither Francis nor Maragh ever appeared at the hotel. Thereafter, a customs agent returned to Miami International Airport because Burton had indicated that Francis would fly back to Jamaica the following day, August 8, 1997. When Francis arrived at the airport for her return flight, customs agents arrested her.

Although Francis initially denied any involvement in drug trafficking, she later told the customs agents that she had spent the previous night with Maragh at a Holiday Inn hotel in Miami. Customs agents proceeded to the Holiday Inn that Francis had identified and arrested Maragh for drug smuggling. After initial questioning, the agents transported Maragh to the United States Attorney's Office in Miami, administered her Miranda rights (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)), and interrogated her about the drug smuggling operation. Maragh categorically denied any involvement in the drug smuggling operation.

Following their arrests, Burton and Francis revealed how Maragh coordinated their actions during the August 7 drug importation. According to Burton and Francis, Maragh provided the packaged cocaine to them and gave them instructions about where to stay (the Travelodge) and how to contact buyers once within the United States. Specifically, Maragh gave Burton and Francis telephone numbers for a cocaine buyer in the Miami area and a cocaine supplier in Jamaica. Maragh also gave Burton cash to purchase airline tickets for Burton and Francis, and promised them $1,500 each upon completion of the cocaine sales.

Burton and Francis further reported to the customs agents that on August 7, Francis and Maragh arrived in Miami before Burton, who had missed her flight. Maragh then sent Francis to the Travelodge while she remained at the airport, waiting for Burton's arrival. Upon arrival at the Travelodge, Francis arranged for the delivery of the cocaine. While Francis waited for the anticipated exchange, Maragh telephoned her from the airport and instructed her to leave the Travelodge immediately because "something [was] going down." Maragh arrived at the Travelodge shortly thereafter, and both traveled to the Holiday Inn. While at the Holiday Inn, Maragh arranged for and completed the drug transaction. The following day, the customs agents arrested Francis.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 3, 1997, a grand jury returned a one-count indictment charging Maragh with conspiracy to import cocaine into the United States in violation of 21 U.S.C. section 963. On December 3, 1997, Maragh appeared before a United States magistrate judge to select a jury.

The only things in the record concerning jury selection are (1) the entry that it had been conducted by the magistrate judge, and (2) the transcript of voir dire proceedings before the magistrate judge. We find no order of reference or any indication that the district judge ever addressed the point that a magistrate judge may only conduct voir dire in a felony case with the consent of the defendant.

The sole reference in the transcript of voir dire proceedings before the magistrate judge is the following colloquy:

THE COURT: This is USA versus Juliet Maragh. I am here to select a jury and everybody has agreed to me selecting the jury for Judge Graham. Is that correct?

MR. KALISCH (defendant's trial attorney): Correct.

MR. SENIOR (A.U.S.A.): Yes.

The magistrate judge then proceeded to conduct voir dire and to oversee the lawyers' questioning of the potential jurors. Neither Maragh nor her lawyer objected to the magistrate judge supervising jury selection before the commencement of trial. Following jury selection, Maragh proceeded to trial on December 4, 1997, before a district court judge.

At the end of a three-day trial, the jury found Maragh guilty as charged. On March 13, 1998, the district court sentenced Maragh to 78 months imprisonment, followed with four years of supervised release.

III. ISSUES

The issues Maragh raises on appeal are: (1) whether there was error in the magistrate judge being allowed to supervise and conduct voir dire and jury selection; and (2) whether the district court abused its discretion in allowing the government to use inadmissible evidence to rebut cross-examination of a government witness.

IV. DISCUSSION

Because Maragh made no objection to the magistrate judge's conducting of voir dire, we review the district court's delegation of jury selection to the magistrate judge only for plain error. See United States v. Zapata, 139 F.3d 1355, 1357 (11th Cir.1998). We review a district court's ruling on admission of evidence under the abuse of discretion standard. See United States v. Trujillo, 146 F.3d 838, 843 (11th Cir.1998).

A. Voir Dire

United States Supreme Court precedent and Eleventh Circuit case law are explicit regarding the delegation of voir dire to a magistrate judge. The validity of the magistrate judge's criminal jurisdiction hinges on the construction of 28 U.S.C. section 636, known as the Federal Magistrates Act. Historically, the decision of a district court to delegate certain of its functions, including the conducting of voir dire, to a magistrate judge has been evaluated under the section 636(b)(3) catchall provision that states: "A magistrate may be assigned such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States." 28 U.S.C. section 636(b)(3) (1993). The Supreme Court's interpretation of section 636(b)(3) establishes the presence or absence of consent as the crucial factor in determining what duties the section encompasses. See Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 934-36, 111 S.Ct. 2661, 115 L.Ed.2d 808 (1991); see also NLRB v. A-Plus Roofing, Inc., 39 F.3d 1410, 1415 (9th Cir.1994).

In 1989, the Supreme Court concluded that a magistrate judge did not have jurisdiction to conduct jury voir dire in a felony trial. See Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 871-76, 109 S.Ct. 2237, 104 L.Ed.2d 923 (1989). Two years later, the Supreme Court amended its Gomez conclusion, holding that as long as a defendant consented, a magistrate judge rather than an Article III judge could conduct voir dire in a felony case under section 636(b)(3). See Peretz, 501 U.S. at 935-36, 111 S.Ct. 2661. "In sum, the structure and purpose of the Federal Magistrates Act convince us that supervision of voir dire in a felony proceeding is an additional duty that may be delegated to a magistrate under 28 U.S.C. section 636(b)(3) [28 U.S.C. section 636(b)(3) ] if the litigants consent." Peretz, 501 U.S. at 935, 111 S.Ct. 2661. The Supreme Court continued, "[i]f a defendant perceives any threat of injury from the absence of an Article III judge in the jury selection process, he need only decline to consent to the magistrate's supervision to ensure that a judge conduct the voir dire." Peretz, 501 U.S. at 935, 111 S.Ct. 2661. As is clear in Peretz, consent is of paramount importance in the construction of a district court's authority to delegate to a magistrate judge its duty to conduct voir dire under section 636(b)(3).

If the term "everybody" was understood by both counsel and the magistrate judge to include the clients as well as the attorneys when addressing the question, "[E]verybody has agreed to me selecting the jury for Judge Graham. Is that correct?," then this record reveals almost as much as the record in Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 111 S.Ct. 2661, 115 L.Ed.2d 808 (1991), which affirmed a conviction where a magistrate judge conducted the jury selection.

At a pretrial conference in Peretz, "[T]he district judge asked if there was '[a]ny objection to picking the jury before a magistrate?' App.2. Petitioner's counsel responded: 'I would love the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
11 cases
  • Flores v. Keane
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
    • June 13, 2001
    ...of the questions he submitted did not violate defendant's Sixth Amendment right to be tried by an impartial jury); United States v. Maragh, 174 F.3d 1202, 1206 (11th Cir.1999) (court must obtain explicit consent from all parties before referring voir dire to a magistrate). Cardinal v. Gorcz......
  • U.S. v. Gamba
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • April 11, 2007
    ...knowing, informed, and personal consent to a magistrate judge's jurisdiction. Dissent at 950; see also United States v. Maragh, 174 F.3d 1202, 1206 (11th Cir. 1999) (remanding the case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on whether the defendant personally consented to a magist......
  • Gonzalez v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • May 12, 2008
    ...by petitioner's counsel. 483 F.3d 390, 394 (2007). The Courts of Appeals differ on this issue. Compare ibid. with United States v. Maragh, 174 F.3d 1202, 1206 (C.A.11 1999) (requiring personal and explicit consent from the defendant); see also United States v. Desir, 273 F.3d 39, 44 (C.A.1 ......
  • U.S. v. Gonzalez
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • March 30, 2007
    ...States v. Rivera-Sola, 713 F.2d 866, 874 (1st Cir.1983); United States v. Jones, 938 F.2d 737, 744 (7th Cir.1991); United States v. Maragh, 174 F.3d 1202, 1204 (11th Cir.), opinion supplemented on reh'g, 189 F.3d 1315, 1316 (11th Cir.1999). Under the plain error standard, Gonzalez must demo......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT