174 P.2d 717 (Colo. 1946), 15682, Eaddy v. People
|Citation:||174 P.2d 717, 115 Colo. 488|
|Opinion Judge:||STONE, Justice.|
|Party Name:||EADDY v. PEOPLE.|
|Attorney:||[115 Colo. 489] Walter F. Scherer, and Morton M. David, both of Denver, for plaintiff in error. H. Lawrence Hinkley, Atty. Gen., Duke W. Dunbar, Deputy Atty. Gen., and James S. Henderson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendants in error.|
|Judge Panel:||ALTER, J., not having heard the argument, did not participate.|
|Case Date:||November 12, 1946|
|Court:||Supreme Court of Colorado|
Error to District Court, City and County of Denver; Joseph E. Cook, Judge.
Ernest Eaddy was convicted of first degree murder, and he brings error. On application for supersedeas.
Reversed and remanded.
Defendant was convicted of murder of the first degree, and sentenced to life imprisonment. He here seeks review praying that the matter be determined upon his application for supersedeas.
Defendant urges as error: (1) Overruling motion for mistrial because of the separation of the jury during the trial; (2) refusal of directed verdict for failure to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and (3) being compelled to stand trial, clothed in the garb of a convict. It is also urged as error that the verdict is contrary to law because based upon the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice, but this ground is not argued and has no merit.
First, as to permitting the jury to separate. The jury was composed in part of men and in part of women. When it became necessary for the jury to be held overnight, the women jurors were housed in the dormitory in the West Side Courthouse while the men were housed in one of the dormitories in the Municipal building. At all times each group of jurors was in the charge of a bailiff of the court and there is no suggestion that they were at any time subject to outside influences. Thus there was shown no separation of the jury in the sense that the jurors were at any time out of the custody of a bailiff [115 Colo. 490] or in position to communicate with outsiders in regard to the case, and there was no separation except under necessity created by the constitutional amendment making women eligible for jury service. Const. art. 2, § 23, see Laws 1945, c. 158. Consequently, the rule against separation was not violated. 'The rule that the jury must be kept together does not apply, even in capital cases, to
temporary separation of one or more jurors from the others in cases of necessity or convenience, where the separating jurors are in the charge or in sight of an officer and are not allowed to communicate with other persons.' 23 C.J.S., Criminal Law, pp. 1017, 1018, § 1356. Further, there is no showing of prejudice. Amis v. People, 83 Colo. 400, 265 P. 909.
Second, as to the sufficiency of the evidence. No purpose would be served by its review. That a mercenary, brutal and deliberate murder was committed clearly appears, and the evidence was...
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