Chicago Ry Co v. Sturm

Decision Date22 May 1899
Docket NumberNo. 236,236
Citation43 L.Ed. 1144,174 U.S. 710,19 S.Ct. 797
PartiesCHICAGO, R. I. & P. RY. CO. v. STURM
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

The defendant in error brought an action against the plain- tiff in error in justice's court of Belleville, Republic county, Kan., for the sum of $140, for wages due. Judgment was rendered for him in the sum of $140, and interest and costs.

The plaintiff in error appealed from the judgment to the district court of th county, to which court all the papers were transmitted, and the case docketed for trial.

On the 10th of October, 1894, the case was called for trial, when plaintiff in error filed a motion for continuance, supported by an affidavit affirming: That on the 13th day of December, 1893, in the county of Pottawattamie and state of Iowa, one A. H. Willard commenced an action against E. H. Sturm, in justice's court, before Oride Vien, a justice of the peace for said county, to recover the sum of $78.63, with interest at the rate of 10 per cent. per annum, and at the same time sued out a writ of attachment and garnishment, and duly garnished the plaintiff in error, and at that time plaintiff in error was indebted to defendant in error in the sum of $77.17 for wages, being the same wages sought to be recovered in this action.

That plaintiff in error filed its answer, admitting such indebtedness.

That at the time of the commencement of said action in Pottawattamie county the defendant was a nonresident of the state of Iowa, and that service upon him was duly made by publication, and that afterwards judgment was rendered against him and plaintiff in error, as garnishee, for the sum of $76.16, and costs of suit, amounting to $19, and from such judgment appealed to the district court of said county, where, said action was then pending, undetermined.

That the moneys sought to be recovered in this action are the same moneys sought to be recovered in the garnishment proceedings, and that under the laws of Iowa its courts had jurisdiction thereof, and that the said moneys were not, at the time of the garnishment, exempt from attachment, execution, or garnishment. That the justice of the peace at all of the times of the proceedings was a duly qualified and acting justice, and that all the proceedings were commenced prior to the commencement of the present action. And that, if the case be continued until the next term of the court, the action in lowa will be determined, and the rights of plaintiff in error protected.

The motion was denied, and the plaintiff in error pleaded in answer the same matters alleged in the affidavit for continuance, and attached to the answer a certified copy of the proceedings in the Iowa courts. It also alleged that it was a corporation duly organized under the laws of the states of Illinois and Iowa, doing business in the state of Kansas.

The defendant in error replied to the answer, and alleged that the amount due from plaintiff in error was for wages due for services rendered within three months next prior to the commencement of the action; that he was a resident, head of a family, and that the wages were exempt under the laws of Kansas, and not subject to garnishment proceedings; that plaintiff in error knew these facts; and that the Iowa court had no jurisdiction of his property or person.

Evidence was introduced in support of the issues, including certain sections of the laws of Iowa relating to service by publication, and to attachment and garnishment, and judgment was rendered for the defendant in error in the amount sued for.

A new trial was moved, on the ground, among others, that the 'decision is contrary to, and in conflict with, section 1 of article 4 of the constitution of the United States.'

The motion was denied.

On error to the court of appeals, and from thence to the supreme court, the judgment was affirmed (51 Pac. 1100), and the case was then brought here.

The defendant in error was notified of the suit against him in Iowa, and of the proceedings in garnishment, in time to have protected his rights.

The errors assigned present, in various ways, the contention that the supreme court of Kansas refused to give full faith and credit to the records and judicial proceedings of the courts of the state of Iowa, in violation of section 1 of article 4 of the constitution of the United States, and of the act of congress entitled 'An act to prescribe the mode in which the public acts, records and judicial proceedings in each state shall be authenticated so as to take effect in every other state,' approved May 26, 1890.

W. F. Evans and M. A. Low, for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Justice McKENNA, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the court.

How proceedings in garnishment may be availed of in defense, whether in abatement or bar of the suit on the debt attached, or for a continuance of it or suspension of execution,—the practice of the states of the Union is not uniform. But it is obvious and necessary justice that such proceedings should be allowed as a defense in some way.

In the pending suit plaintiff in error moved for a continuance, and, not securing it, pleaded the proceedings in garnishment in answer. Judgment, however, was rendered agairst it, and sustained by the supreme court, on the authority of Railway Co. v. Sharitt, 43 Kan. 375, 23 Pac. 430, and 'for the reasons stated by Mr. Justice Valentine in that case.'

The facts of that case were as follows: The Missouri Pacific Railway Company was indebted to Sharitt for services performed in Kansas. Sharitt was indebted to one J. P. Stewart, a resident of Missouri. Stewart sued him in Missouri, and attached his wages in the hands of the railway company; and the latter answered in the suit in accordance with the order of garnishment on the 28th of July, 1887, admitting indebtedness, and on the 29th of September was ordered to pay its amount into court. On the 27th of July, Sharitt brought an action in Kansas against the railway company to recover for his services, and the company, in defense, pleaded the garnishment and order of the Missouri court. The amount due Sharitt, having been for wages, was exempt from attachment in Kansas. It was held that the garnishment was not a defense. The facts were similar, therefore, to those of the case at bar.

The ground of the opinion of Mr. Justice Valentine was that the Missouri court had no jurisdiction, because the situs of the debt was in Kansas. In order words, and to quote the language of the learned justice, 'the situs of a debt is either with the owner thereof, or at his domicile, or where the debt is to be paid; and it cannot be subjected to a proceeding in garnishment anywhere else. * * * It is not the debtor who can carry or transfer or transport the property in a debt from one state or jurisdiction into another. The situs of the property in a debt can be changed only by the change of location of the creditor who is the owner thereof, or with his consent.'

The primary proposition is that the situs of a debt is at the domicile of a creditor, or, to state it negatively, it is not at the domicile of the debtor.

The proposition is supported by some cases. It is opposed by others. Its error proceeds, as we conceive, from confounding debt and credit, rights and remedies. The right of a creditor and the obligation of a debtor are correlative, but different, things; and the law, in adapting its remedies for or against either, must regard that difference. Of this there are many illustrations, and a proper and accurate attention to it avoids misunderstanding. This court said, by Mr. Justice Gray, in Wyman v. Halstead, 109 U. S. 656, 3 Sup. Ct. 418, 'The general rule of law is well settled, that, for the purpose of founding administration, all simple-contract debts are assets at the domicile of the debtor.' And this is not because of defective title in the creditor or in his administrator, but a bacause the policy of the state of the debtor requires it to protect home creditors. Wilkins v. Ellett, 9 Wall. 740; Id., 108 U. S. 256, 2 Sup. Ct. 641. Debts cannot be assets at the domicile of the debtor, if their locality is flxed at the domicile of the creditor; and, if the policy of the state of the debtor can protect home creditors through administration proceedings, the same policy can protect home creditors through attachment proceedings.

For illustrations in matters of taxation, see Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. 491; Pullman Palace-Car C . v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18, 11 Sup. Ct. 876; Savings & Loan Soc. v. Multnomah Co., 169 U. S. 421, 18 Sup. Ct. 392.

Our attachment laws had their origin in the custom of London. Drake, § 1. Under it a debt was regarded as being where the debtor was, and questions of jurisdiction were settled on that regard. In Andrews v. Clerke, 1 Carth. 25, Lord Chief Justice Holt summarily decided such a question, and stated the practice under the custom of London. The report of the case is brief, and is as follows:

'Andrews levied a plaint in the sheriff's courts in London, and, upon the usual suggestion that one T. S. (the garnishee) was debtor to the defendant, a foreign attachment was awarded to attach that debt in the hands of T. S., which was accordingly done; and then a diletur was entered, which is in the nature of an imparlance in that court.

'Afterwards T. S. (the...

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