176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961), 35872, Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.

Docket Nº:35872.
Citation:176 N.E.2d 761, 22 Ill.2d 432
Party Name:Phyllis GRAY, Appellant, v. AMERICAN RADIATOR & STANDARD SANITARY CORPORATION et al., Appellees.
Case Date:June 14, 1961
Court:Supreme Court of Illinois
 
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Page 761

176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961)

22 Ill.2d 432

Phyllis GRAY, Appellant,

v.

AMERICAN RADIATOR & STANDARD SANITARY CORPORATION et al., Appellees.

No. 35872.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 14, 1961.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 20, 1961.

Page 762

[22 Ill.2d 433] Victor N. Cardosi, Kankakee, and Leo S. Karlin and Daniel Karlin, Chicago (Leo S. Karlin, and Alan D. Katz, Chicago, of counsel), for appellant Phyllis Gray.

Baker, [22 Ill.2d 434] McKenzie & Hightower, Chicago (John C. McKenzie and Francis D. Morrissey, Chicago, of counsel), for appellant American Radiator Standard Corp.

Lord, Bissel & Brook, Chicago (Jay M. Smyser and William P. Butler, Chicago, of counsel), for appellees.

KLINGBIEL, Justice.

Phyllis Gray appeals from a judgment of the circuit court of Cook County dismissing her action for damages. The issues are concerned with the construction and validity of our statute providing for substituted service of process on nonresidents. Since a constitutional question is involved, the appeal is direct to this court.

The suit was brought against the Titan Valve Manufacturing Company and others, on the ground that a certain water heater had exploded and injured the plaintiff. The complaint charges, inter alia, that the Titan company, a foreign corporation, had negligently constructed the safety valve; and that the injuries were suffered as a proximate result thereof. Summons issued and was duly served on Titan's registered agent in Cleveland, Ohio. The corporation appeared specially, filing a motion to quash on the ground that it had not committed a tortious act in Illinois. Its affidavit stated that it does no business here; that it has no agent physically present in Illinois; and that it sells the completed valves to defendant, American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corporation, outside Illinois. The American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corporation (also made a defendant) filed an answer in which it set up a cross claim against Titan, alleging that Titan made certain warranties to American Radiator, and that if the latter is held liable to the plaintiff it should be indemnified and held harmless by Titan. The court granted Titan's motion, dismissing both the complaint and the cross claim.

[22 Ill.2d 435] Section 16 of the Civil Practice Act provides that summons may be personally served upon any party outside the State; and that as to nonresidents who have submitted to the jurisdiction of our courts, such service has the force and effect of personal service within Illinois. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1959, chap. 110, par. 16.) Under section 17(1)(b) a nonresident who, either in person or through an agent, commits a tortious act within this State submits to jurisdiction. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1959, chap. 110, par. 17.) The questions in this case are (1) whether a tortious act was committed here, within the meaning of the statute, despite the fact that the Titan corporation had no agent in Illinois; and (2) whether the statute, if so construed, violates due process of law.

The first aspect to which we must direct our attention is one of statutory construction. Under section 17(1)(b) jurisdiction is predicated on the committing of a tortious act in this State. It is not disputed, for the purpose of this appeal, that a tortious act was committed. The issue depends on whether it was committed in Illinois, so as to warrant the assertion of personal jurisdiction by service of summons in Ohio.

The wrong in the case at bar did not originate in the conduct of a servant physically present here, but arose instead from acts performed at the place of manufacture. Only the consequences occurred in Illinois. It is well established, however, that in law the place of a wrong is where the last event takes place which is necessary

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to render the actor liable. Restatement, Conflict of Laws, sec. 377. A second indication that the place of injury is the determining factor is found in rules governing the time within which an action must be brought. In applying statutes of limitation our court has computed the period from the time when the injury is done. Madison v. Wedron Silica Co., 352 Ill. 60, 184 N.E. 901; Leroy v. City of Springfield, 81 Ill. 114. We think it is clear that the alleged negligence in manufacturing the valve cannot be separated from the resulting injury; [22 Ill.2d 436] and that for present purposes, like those of liability and limitations, the tort was committed in Illinois.

Titan seeks to avoid this result by arguing that instead of using the word 'tort,' the legislature employed the term 'tortious act'; and that the latter refers only to the act or conduct, separate and apart from any consequences thereof. We cannot accept the argument. To be tortious an act must cause injury. The concept of injury is an inseparable part of the phrase. In determining legislative intention courts will read words in their ordinary and popularly understood sense. Illinois State Toll Highway Comm. v. Einfeldt, 12 Ill.2d 499, 147 N.E.2d 53; Farrand Coal Co. v. Halpin, 10 Ill.2d 507, 140 N.E.2d 698. We think the intent should be determined less from technicalities of definition than from considerations of general purpose and effect. To adopt the criteria urged by defendant would tend to promote litigation over extraneous issues concerning the elements of a tort and the territorial incidence of each, whereas the test should be concerned more with those substantial elements of convenience and justice presumably contemplated by the legislature. As we observed in Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill.2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673, the statute contemplates the exertion of jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the extent permitted by the due-process clause.

The Titan company contends that if the statute is applied so as to confer jurisdiction in this case it violates the requirement of due process of law. The precise constitutional question thus presented has not heretofore been considered by this court. In the Nelson case the validity of the statute was upheld in an action against a nonresident whose employee, while physically present in Illinois, allegedly caused the injury. The ratio decidendi was that Illinois has an interest in providing relief for injuries caused by persons having 'substantial contacts within the State.' A standard of fairness or reasonableness was announced, within the limitation that defendant be given a realistic opportunity to appear and be heard. The case at bar concerns the extent [22 Ill.2d 437] to which due process permits substituted service where defendant had no agent or employee in the State of the forum.

Under modern doctrine the power of a State court to enter a binding judgment against one not served with process within the State depends upon two questions: first, whether he has certain minimum contacts with the State (see International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 N.Ed. 95, 102), and second, whether there has been a reasonable method of notification. See International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95, 104-105; Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill.2d 378, 390, 143 N.E.2d 673. In the case at bar there is no contention that section 16 provides for inadequate notice or that its provisions were not followed. Defendant's argument on constitutionality is confined to the proposition that applying section 17(1)(b), where the injury is defendant's only contact with the State, would exceed the limits of due process.

A proper determination of the question presented requires analysis of those cases which have dealt with the quantum of contact sufficient to warrant jurisdiction. Since the decision in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed. 565, the power of a State to exert jurisdiction over nonresidents has been greatly expanded, particularly

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with respect to foreign corporations. See Annotations, 2 L.Ed.2d 1664; 94 L.Ed. 1167. International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95, was a proceeding to collect unpaid contributions to the unemployment compensation fund of the State of Washington. A statute purported to authorize such proceedings, where the employer was not found within the State, by sending notice by registered mail to its last known address. The defendant foreign corporation, a manufacturer of shoes, employed certain salesmen who resided in Washington and who solicited orders there. In holding that maintenance...

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