United States v. Mrs Gue Lim

Decision Date26 February 1900
Docket NumberNo. 123,123
Citation44 L.Ed. 544,176 U.S. 459,20 S.Ct. 415
PartiesUNITED STATES, Appt. , v. MRS. GUE LIM, Ah Tong, Yee Yuen, and Ah Quong
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Distinct appeals were taken direct to this court from the judgment of the district court of the United States for the district of Washington, northern division, in the case of the above defendant in error, Mrs. Gue Lim, and from the judgment of the western division of that court in the cases of Ah Tong, Yee Yuen, and Ah Quong, under the fifth clause of the 5th section of the act creating the circuit court of appeals (26 Stat. at L. 826, 828, chap. 517), because the cases involve, among other questions, the construction of the treaty between the United States and China, entered into in 1880 (22 Stat. at L. 826, article second, as affected by the third article of the treaty of December 8, 1894, 28 Stat. at L. 1210). The various appeals were heard here as one case.

The facts in regard to Mrs. Gue Lim were agreed upon in the court below, and it appears therefrom that she is the lawful wife of Fook Kee, a Chinese merchant engaged in buying and selling merchandise in the city of Seattle and state of Washington, under the firm name of Fook Kee & Company. He was not engaged in the performance of any manual labor, except such as was necessary in the conduct of his business as such merchant, for over one year next preceding the date of his last departure from the United States, which was in April, 1896, and was in all respects a Chinese merchant lawfully domiciled in the United States. He arrived at the port of Tacoma, Washington, from China, accompanied by his wife, this being her first arrival in the United States, and the collector of customs, acting under general instructions from the Secretary of the Treasury, allowed her to land on the—day of May, 1897, without the production of the certificate mentioned in § 6th of the act of July 5, 1884 (23 Stat. at L. 115, chap. 220). Complaint was subsequently made to the district court that she was a Chinese laborer, and was found unlawfully in the United States, in the county of King, in the district of Washington, on the 2d day of October, 1897, without having been registered as a Chinese laborer, and without having in her possession a certificate of registration as such laborer, and without having any other legal right or authority to be and remain in the United States.

A warrant was issued by the district court, upon which she was arrested, and after hearing evidence on behalf of the plaintiff and defendant the court decided (83 Fed. Rep. 136) that she was not a Chinese laborer, but the wife of a Chinese merchant lawfully domiciled and doing business as a merchant, and was not excluded by the laws of the United States from coming to or remaining in the United States, and she was therefore discharged from custody and the cause dismissed.

The other defendants in error had been admitted by the collector of customs at Port Townsend, and were thereafter adjudged by the United States commissioner, upon complaint made before him, to be Chinese laborers unlawfully in the United States, and the commissioner thereupon ordered them to be deported to China. They appealed from such decision, and the United States district court for the district of Washington, western division, after hearing the evidence, decided that the defendants were minor children of Chinese merchants, and that they were lawfully entitled to be and remain in the United States.

The facts were agreed upon in the court below, and they are stated in the record as follows:

(1.) The defendants were born in China of parents lawfully married, and had resided in that country up to the time they came to the United States to live with their respective fathers, and were still minors under the age of fifteen years.

(2.) The fathers of these boys were, and for a long time prior to the coming of the boys to this country, had been, bona fide Chinese merchants, lawfully residing and doing business in the city of Walla Walla, in the state of Washington, and had sent for their sons to come from China to live with them in Walla Walla, where they were residing with their fathers when arrested by a United States immigration officer.

(3.) The boys had never procured any certificate under § 6th of the act of July 5, 1884 (23 Stat. at L. 115, chap. 220, supra), but relied entirely upon the status of their fathers as merchants here to entitled them to come to this country, and upon that claim had been admitted by the collector of customs at Port Townsend.

A judgment discharging the defendants having been entered, the United States appealed to this court.

Assistant Attorney General Hoyt for appellant.

No counsel for appellees.

Mr. Justice Peckham, after stating the facts, delivered the opinion of the court:

The question here arising in regard to the correctness of the decision of the district court in the case of the married woman depends for its solution upon the construction to be given to the 6th section of the act of Congress of 1884 (23 Stat. at L. 115, chap. 220), which is set forth in the margin. That section must be construed in connection with the treaty concluded between this country and China in November, 1880. 22 Stat. at L. 826.

It is contended on the part of counsel for the government that by the subsequent treaty of March, 1894 (28 Stat. at L. 1210), the two governments have agreed that the requirements of a certificate as provided for in the 6th section of the act of Congress shall apply to all permitted Chinese subjects who must, without exception, produce such certificates. Article two of the treaty of 1880 and article three of the treaty of 1894 are set out in the margin.

We do not think the treaty of 1894 alters the result flowing from the treaty of 1880 and the act of 1884. The question is, whether under the act of 1884, construed in connection with the treaty of 1880, the wife of a Chinese merchant, domiciled in this country, may enter the United States without a certificate, because she is the wife of such merchant.

Although the third article of the treaty of 1894 does speak of certificates for Chinese subjects therein described, who already enjoy the right to enter the country, the question recurs whether the certificate of the husband who himself enjoys the right is not enough for the wife, the fact being proved or admitted that she is such wife. Possibly the result of the treaty of 1894 may be held to be, instead of simply prohibiting the entrance of Chinese laborers, to restrict the right of entry to those classes who are specially named in the third article of the treaty. But the question would still remain whether the wives of the members of the classes privileged to enter were not entitled themselves to enter by reason of the right of the husband and without the certificate mentioned in the act of 1884.

There has been some difference of opinion among the lower courts as to the true construction to be given to the treaty and the act of Congress. The judges in some cases have taken the view that the wife and minor children of a Chinese merchant, who is himself entitled, under the second article of the treaty of 1880 and § 6th of the act of 1884, to come within and dwell in the United States, were entitled to come into the country with him or after him as such wife and children without the certificate prescribed in that section. Other judges have held that they were not entitled to enter the country without the production of the certificate mentioned in the act.

Those cases holding the right of the wife to enter without a certificate are Re Chung Toy Ho, 42 Fed. Rep. 398, 9 L. R. A. 204, in the circuit court, district of Oregon, May 1890, in which case the opinion was delivered by Judge Deady; Re Lee Yee Sing, 85 Fed. Rep. 635, decided in 1898 in the district court for the state of Washington; also in this case, United States v. Gue Lim, 83 Fed. Rep. 136, district court of Washington, 1897.

Those adverse to the doctrine are Re Ah Quan, 21 Fed. Rep. 182, 186, decided in 1884 in the circuit court, district of California; Re Ah Moy, 21 Fed. Rep. 785, in the same court, September, 1884; Re Wo Tai Li, 48 Fed. Rep. 668, in the district court, northern district of California, August, 1888; Re Lum Lin Ying, 59 Fed. Rep. 682, district court of Oregon, February, 1894; Re Li Foon, 80 Fed. Rep. 881, circuit court, southern district of New York, 1897.

Some of the latter cases do not involve the exact point now before the court, but they are in the direction stated.

It is not necessary to review these cases in detail. It is sufficient to say that we agree with the reasoning contained in the opinion delivered by Judge Deady. Re Chung Toy Ho, 42 Fed. Rep. 398, 9 L. R. A. 204. In our judgment the wife in this case was entitled to come into the country without the certificate mentioned in the act of 1884.

The act of 1882, of which that of 1884 was an amendment, was passed, as is stated in its title, 'to execute certain treaty stipulations relating to Chinese,' and therefore we must assume that the body of the act has that purpose.

This court has already sustained the power of Congress to provide for excluding or expelling Chinese, even in contravention of a treaty; also the power to intrust the final determination of the facts upon which the individual is to be expelled, to an executive officer. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 37 L. ed. 905, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1016; Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228, 41 L. ed. 140, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 977. But it is not the power of Congress over the subject with which we are now dealing. The question is, What did Congress mean by the act of 1884? Some light upon that question can be derived from the treaty of 1880, which must be read in connection with it. By article two of the treaty, Chinese subjects proceeding to the United States, either as teachers, students, merchants, or...

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