Flint v. Dep't of Labor, 16–185

• Citation: 177 A.3d 1080
• Decision Date: 06 October 2017
• Docket Number: No. 16–185,16–185
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Vermont
• Parties: Paul FLINT v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

177 A.3d 1080

Paul FLINT

v.DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

No. 16–185

Supreme Court of Vermont.

October Term, 2016

October 6, 2017

Matthew M. Shagam and Richard T. Cassidy of Hoff Curtis, Burlington, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and Todd W. Daloz, Assistant Attorney General, Montpelier, for Defendant–Appellee.

PRESENT: Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Skoglund, Robinson and Eaton, JJ.

REIBER, C.J.

¶ 1. A former employee of the Vermont Department of Labor (Department) appeals from a judgment on the pleadings denying his suit against the Department seeking unpaid overtime pay. Employee first argues that he is entitled to overtime pay for hours worked in excess of forty hours per week because—through a 1994 revision to 21 V.S.A. § 384(b)(7) that refers to the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)—the Legislature intended to provide state employees not only with minimum wage-and-hour rights, but also with a statutory private right of action to enforce those rights. Employee next argues that state employees also have a private right of action to enforce those claimed rights through Article 4 of the Vermont Constitution. Vt. Const. ch. I, art. 4. We affirm.

¶ 2. Employee worked at the Department from 2010 to 2014, and he claims to have worked 704 hours of overtime during this period. After his termination, employee sued the Department on the basis that he had not been paid at the overtime rate of time-and-a-half for hours worked in excess of forty hours per week. Employee initially brought two claims—one under 21 V.S.A. § 384(b)(7) and another under FLSA—but withdrew the FLSA claim after the State filed a motion to dismiss in which it argued that sovereign immunity prevented the claim. The State later filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. See V.R.C.P. 12(c) ("After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings."). The court granted the motion on the basis that 21 V.S.A. § 384(b)(7)"does not extend a statutory right to the overtime rate that [employee] seeks," but rather "plainly exempts State employees." The court also concluded that Article 4 of the Vermont Constitution did not give state employees a private right of action to seek damages compensating them for unpaid overtime. Vt. Const. ch. I, art. 4.

¶ 3. Employee now appeals the court's judgment on the pleadings. In reviewing the judgment, "we accept as true all factual allegations contained in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those allegations." Sorge v. State, 171 Vt. 171, 174, 762 A.2d 816, 818 (2000). This is because when the court assesses a motion for judgment on the pleadings, "all well pleaded factual allegations in the nonmovant's pleadings and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are assumed to be true and all contravening assertions in the movant's pleadings are taken to be false." Bressler v. Keller, 139 Vt. 401, 403, 429 A.2d 1306, 1307 (1981). We therefore focus our analysis on the court's conclusions of law, which we review de novo. Anderson v. State, 2013 VT 73, ¶ 7, 194 Vt. 437, 82 A.3d 577 ("[W]e review the trial court's conclusions of law de novo."). Regarding these conclusions of law, employee argues that the court erred because (1) 21 V.S.A. § 384(b)(7) does provide state employees with both minimum wage-and-hour rights and a statutory private right of action to enforce those rights, and (2) state employees do have a private right of action to enforce those claimed rights through Article 4 of the Vermont Constitution. Vt. Const. ch. I, art. 4.

I.

¶ 4. We first address employee's argument that he is entitled to overtime pay because 21 V.S.A. § 384(b)(7) provides state employees with both minimum wage-and-hour rights and a statutory private right of action to enforce those rights. In relevant part, § 384(b)(7) reads:

(b) ... an employer shall not pay an employee less than one and one-half times the regular wage rate for any work done by the employee in excess of 40 hours during a workweek. However, this subsection shall not apply to:

...

(7) State employees who are covered by the federal Fair Labor Standards Act.

¶ 5. In interpreting a statute, our primary aim is always to determine the intent of the Legislature and implement that intent. See Miller v. Miller, 2005 VT 89, ¶ 14, 178 Vt. 273, 882 A.2d 1196 ("In construing a statute, our paramount goal is to discern and implement the intent of the Legislature."). In determining that intent, we begin by looking to the plain language of the statute. Tarrant v. Dep't of Taxes, 169 Vt. 189, 197, 733 A.2d 733, 739 (1999) ("[I]n our attempts to ascertain legislative intent we look for guidance in the plain meaning of the words used."). If the intent of the Legislature is apparent on the face of the statute because the plain language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we implement the statute according to that plain language. See Harris v. Sherman, 167 Vt. 613, 614, 708 A.2d 1348, 1349 (1998) (mem.) ("[W]here legislative intent can be ascertained on its face, the statute must be enforced according to its terms without resort to statutory construction."). As a corollary of this principle, we resort to other tools of statutory construction—such as legislative history—only if the plain language of the statute is unclear or ambiguous.

¶ 6. These well-established principles of statutory interpretation are particularly relevant in this case because employee specifically urges this Court to look beyond the plain language of § 384. In effect, he concedes that, on its face, the statute forecloses its application to state employees such as himself. However, he further argues that, in light of federal and state case law since the statute's revision, this plain language does not accurately represent the intent of the Legislature when it revised the statute. See In re S.B.L., 150 Vt. 294, 301, 553 A.2d 1078, 1083 (1988) ("[W]e must look not only at the letter of a statute but also its reason and spirit."); Lubinsky v. Fair Haven Zoning Bd., 148 Vt. 47, 49, 527 A.2d 227, 228 (1986) ("[T]he paramount function of the court is to give effect to the legislative intent."). Indeed, the overall thrust of his argument is that "[b]ecause the intent of the Vermont Legislature was to establish state employee wage-and-hour protections ... [employee] is not ‘covered’ under FLSA for the purposes of his due process employment rights under § 384(b)(7)." In other words, he argues that state employees should not be considered "covered by" FLSA because the only remedies available through FLSA to those employees are inconsistent with the intent of the Legislature when it passed § 384 in its present form.

¶ 7. Before directly addressing employee's argument, we first determine that the plain language of § 384 is clear and unambiguous. State employees generally are "covered by the federal Fair Labor Standards Act." 21 V.S.A. § 384(b)(7). The Code of Federal Regulations specifies that FLSA's 1974 amendments "extended coverage to virtually all of the remaining State and local government employees who were not [previously] covered." 29 C.F.R. § 553.3(a)(3) (emphasis added). Because FLSA explicitly extends employment protections to state employees, this provision of the Code of Federal Regulations answers the questions of (1) whether state employees are "covered by" FLSA and (2) whether § 384 is clear and unambiguous.

¶ 8. There are two primary exceptions for state employees who are not "subject to the civil service laws of the employing State or local agency," 29 C.F.R. § 553.10, but neither apply. One exception is for "elected officials and their appointees," 29 C.F.R. § 553.11, and the other is for "employees of legislative branches." 29 C.F.R. § 553.12. Here, employee does not qualify under either exception, nor does he argue that he does so.

¶ 9. It is therefore clear both that employee is included in the § 384(b)(7) exception for state employees and that this exception is a defining feature of § 384. Nevertheless, because employee's argument touches on the development of both FLSA and § 384(b)(7) and places the two in historical context, we must address employee's argument that state employees should not be considered "covered by" FLSA or included in the § 384(b)(7) exception for state employees. Moreover—although not necessary for our analysis—this historical context provides further support for our dual holdings that (1) state employees are generally "covered by" FLSA and (2) § 384(b)(7) does not provide employee with minimum wage-and-hour rights or a statutory private right of action to enforce those rights.

¶ 10. As originally passed by Congress in 1938, FLSA did not generally cover state government employees. But with an amendment in 1974, it did—with the two previously noted exceptions for "elected officials and their appointees" and "employees of legislative branches." 29 C.F.R. §§ 553.11, 553.12 ; see also Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 836, 96 S.Ct. 2465, 49 L.Ed.2d 245 (1976) ("The original Fair Labor Standards Act passed in 1938 specifically excluded the States and their political subdivisions from its coverage. In 1974, however, Congress enacted the most recent of a series of broadening amendments ... [that] extended the minimum wage and maximum hour provisions to almost all public employees employed by the States and by their various political subdivisions."), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 105 S.Ct. 1005, 83 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1985). Two years later, the U.S. Supreme Court narrowed the effect of this amendment on the basis that it unconstitutionally co-opted the authority of state governments to structure how they conduct their traditional functions. See Nat'l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852, 96 S.Ct. 2465 ("[I]nsofar as the challenged amendments operate to directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in...