Fridella v. Coughlin

• Decision Date: 27 November 1991
• Citation: 177 A.D.2d 872,577 N.Y.S.2d 151
• Parties: In the Matter of Lenny J. FRIDELLA, Appellant-Respondent, v. Thomas A. COUGHLIN III, as Commissioner of the Department of Correctional Services, et al., Respondents-Appellants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 151

577 N.Y.S.2d 151

177 A.D.2d 872

In the Matter of Lenny J. FRIDELLA, Appellant-Respondent, v. Thomas A. COUGHLIN III, as Commissioner of the Department of Correctional Services, et al., Respondents-Appellants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Third Department.

Nov. 27, 1991.

Lenny J. Fridella, in pro per.

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen. (Martin A. Hotvet, of counsel), Albany, for respondents-appellants.

Before MAHONEY, P.J., and WEISS, YESAWICH, LEVINE and MERCURE, JJ.

YESAWICH, Justice.

Cross appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Connor, J.), entered October 16, 1990 in Ulster County, which partially granted petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to annul a determination of respondent Commissioner of Correctional Services finding petitioner guilty of violating a prison disciplinary rule.

Following a tier III disciplinary hearing petitioner, a prisoner at Wallkill Correctional Facility, a medium security facility in Ulster County, was found guilty of violating inmate rule 113.12 prohibiting the use of controlled substances. He was thereafter transferred to a maximum security facility where he apparently served the confinement aspects of the penalty imposed, 60 days in special housing unit. Following a transfer to Ogdensburg, a medium security facility, he was then transferred to Oneida Correctional Facility in Oneida County, yet another medium security facility, where he is currently located.

Petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging the tier III determination which had been affirmed on administrative appeal. Supreme Court concluded that a proper foundation had not been laid for introducing into evidence what was purported to be petitioner's urine specimen. Because the specimen was destroyed and a remittal for a new hearing was therefore not possible, the court ordered petitioner restored to the "status he enjoyed prior to the subject * * * Hearing" and expunction from petitioner's institutional records of all references to the hearing and the underlying misbehavior report. The meaning of the court's order, insofar as it directs restoration of petitioner to his prior status, prompts petitioner's appeal and respondents' cross appeal.

Petitioner, appearing pro se, maintains that he is entitled to be returned to Wallkill and to be afforded the same housing and programming he previously enjoyed there; he was both a music tutor and a college music student at the time. Parenthetically, we note that monetary damages which are also sought by petitioner are not recoverable in this proceeding (see, Matter of Sabo v. Racette, 124 A.D.2d 920, 921, 508 N.Y.S.2d 666). It is respondents' contention that petitioner has no right to be confined to a particular facility and, hence, the order should be modified by deleting the provision directing restoration to prior status.

Inasmuch as respondent Commissioner of Correctional Services has virtually "unbridled authority to transfer inmates from one facility to another within the system" (Matter of Johnson v. Ward...