Woods v. Malcolm-Dallyn Co.

• Decision Date: 12 December 1949
• Docket Number: No. 14008.,14008.
• Citation: 177 F.2d 414
• Parties: WOODS, Housing Expediter, v. MALCOLM-DALLYN CO. et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

177 F.2d 414 (1949)

WOODS, Housing Expediter, v. MALCOLM-DALLYN CO. et al.

No. 14008.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

November 3, 1949.

Rehearing Denied December 12, 1949.

Hugo V. Prucha, Assistant General Counsel, Office of Housing Expediter, Washington, D. C. (Ed Dupree, General Counsel, Office of Housing Expediter, and Louise F. McCarthy, Special Litigation Attorney, Office of the Housing Expediter, Washington, D. C., on the brief), for appellant.

Curtis Bush, Davenport, Iowa (A. G. Bush, Davenport, Iowa, on the brief), for appellees.

Before GARDNER, Chief Judge, and WOODBROUGH and COLLET, Circuit Judges.

GARDNER, Chief Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment of dismissal in an action brought by appellant against appellees pursuant to Section 206 (b) of the Housing and Rent Act of 1947 as amended, Public Law 31, 81st Congress, 1st Session, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 1881 et seq., for an injunction restraining appellees from violating the provisions of said Act, particularly Section 209(a) thereof, and the Controlled Housing Rent Regulation issued thereunder.

Appellee Malcolm-Dallyn Company owns seven housing accommodations known as the Breezy Point Apartments in Clinton, Iowa. Appellee O. D. Collis is the manager and president of the company. The housing accommodations involved are within the Savanna-Clinton Defense-Rental Area. In December, 1948, appellees served notice on their tenants to vacate the Breezy Point housing accommodations. The ground stated in the notice was the withdrawal of the accommodations from the rental market and the tenants were advised that the housing accommodations would be sold as a cooperative.

Appellant's complaint alleged the foregoing facts and alleged that none of the tenants desired to purchase the housing accommodations as a cooperative venture; that the appellees' actions were violative of Section 209(a) of the Housing and Rent Act of 1947 as amended, for the reason that the defendants were not in good faith seeking to withdraw the accommodations from the rental market within the meaning and intent of the Act. The complaint, as has been observed, asked for a preliminary and final injunction enjoining the defendants therein named from evicting the tenants. A temporary injunction was granted.

The parties stipulated as to most of the facts. In this stipulation it is recited that, "By his paragraph 15 of his complaint as amended, the plaintiff did not mean that as a matter of fact the defendants were not in good faith seeking to withdraw the housing accommodations from the rental market."

The matter was submitted to the court for final determination and the court in its opinion stated that, "The proceeding here is to determine whether plaintiff is entitled to his permanent injunction, or, the case be dismissed on its merits."

The gist of plaintiff's contention was that the defendants were not entitled to evict their tenants unless a certificate permitting such eviction were issued by the Housing Expediter. The court expressed the view that the Act as amended did not authorize the making of any order or regulation preventing a landlord from evicting tenants when he is acting in good faith and under the provisions of Section 209 of the Act of 1947 as amended by the Act of 1948. The court accordingly found that the action of the defendants in serving notice of eviction on the ground that they intended to withdraw the property from rental accommodations was in good faith and concluded that defendants were entitled to proceed with their actions to evict. Judgment was thereupon entered dismissing plaintiff's complaint on the merits.

Following the entry of judgment and on June 20, 1949, notice of appeal was filed and a motion for stay pending appeal was presented to the trial court but denied. On ...