Griffith v. Rhay

• Decision Date: 30 September 1959
• Docket Number: No. 1428.,1428.
• Citation: 177 F. Supp. 386
• Parties: Matter of the Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus of Henry M. GRIFFITH, Petitioner, v. B. J. RHAY, as Superintendent of Washington State Penitentiary at Walla Walla, Washington, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Washington

177 F. Supp. 386

Matter of the Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus of Henry M. GRIFFITH, Petitioner, v. B. J. RHAY, as Superintendent of Washington State Penitentiary at Walla Walla, Washington, Respondent.

No. 1428.

United States District Court E. D. Washington, S. D.

September 30, 1959.

R. Max Etter, Spokane, Wash., for petitioner.

John J. O'Connell, Atty. Gen., by Stephen C. Way, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Gordon Swyter, Pros. Atty. for Adams County, Ritzville, Wash., by Edward G. Cross, Deputy Pros. Atty., Ritzville, Wash., for respondent.

POWELL, Chief Judge.

Petition for a writ of habeas corpus has been filed by Henry M. Griffith, a prisoner under sentence of death, confined within this district in the Washington State Penitentiary at Walla Walla County, Washington. He was convicted of murder in the first degree in the County of Adams, State of Washington, by a jury verdict rendered on March 6, 1957.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, judgment of conviction was affirmed on August 7, 1958.¹ All of the judges sitting concurred in the opinion. A petition for rehearing was denied on October 7, 1958.

Thereafter, the petitioner here filed a petition with the Superior Court of the State of Washington for Adams County, requesting review and claiming that he had been denied due process of law. The petition was denied. Subsequent thereto, and on May 25, 1959, the petitioner here filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of the State of Washington. The petition was denied without hearing by the Supreme Court on the same date.

Petition for certiorari was filed in the United States Supreme Court. Certiorari was denied on June 1, 1959.²

Thereafter, and on July 16, 1959, the petitioner here filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of the State of Washington. The petition was denied on the same date.

Following the filing of the petition for writ of habeas corpus in this court, orders staying the execution of the petitioner were entered and the matter has now been submitted to this court for consideration upon the complete record of the trial, and the appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Washington.

Petitioner has been authorized to proceed here in forma pauperis.

The court appointed R. Max Etter, a capable attorney of the Spokane Bar and former assistant attorney general of the state, to present the petition and argument on behalf of the petitioner in this court.

Counsel for the respondent moved to dismiss the petition in part, claiming that the petitioner failed to exhaust his remedies in the state courts. An examination of the petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, and a comparison of that petition with the one filed in this court, disclose that all of the grounds for relief stated here were raised in the prior petition. Petitioner has therefore exhausted his remedies in the state courts as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and is entitled to maintain his petition here. The motion to dismiss is accordingly denied.

This court is required to determine the federal question presented here. The petition for writ of habeas corpus in this court is not a substitute for appeal.³

Petitioner contends that his constitutional rights were violated at the trial. The trial court admitted in evidence testimony concerning an oral statement, and also admitted an exhibit which was a statement signed by petitioner in which were admissions concerning his connection with the crime charged. He claims that the circumstances under which the statements were taken were such as to require their exclusion as being involuntary and coerced. He further contends that after the charge was filed against him he was not accorded rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution, in that he was not immediately taken before a magistrate and was not given the benefit of counsel appointed by the court.

While the determination of the state court is not binding here, it is not to be disregarded. It is for this court to determine whether the petitioner has been accorded due process, or whether he has been denied rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution.⁴ In the performance of that task there must be "an alert deference to the judgment of the state court * * *".⁵

The admitted facts are these: The petitioner was 19 years old when he was arrested. He had received little formal education. His childhood was unhappy and insecure. His stay in foster homes was necessary because his father abandoned the family and his mother suffered a nervous breakdown, requiring her hospitalization. He was in the army and went AWOL after boot training. He was sent to the state reformatory for forgery, and was on parole from that institution when he was arrested and charged with the crime of which he now stands convicted. The emotional instability of petitioner is shown by the testimony of his witnesses at the trial.

On October 6, 1956, at 11:30 p. m., petitioner was lying on a street in Spokane, Washington, suffering from a serious, self-inflicted, abdominal, gunshot wound. Police had orders to pick him up for questioning about the death of an oil dealer near Lind, Washington. The deputy sheriffs who found him proceeded to question him there and in the ambulance enroute to the hospital. Emergency surgery was performed. Repeated blood transfusions were given. From the record it appears the petitioner received medical and hospital care that left nothing wanting. His hospitalization extended from October 6, to December 31, 1956, during which time several major operations were performed on him.

During that period the petitioner was on two occasions questioned by officers. On October 7, 1956, a recorded interview was taken. A typed transcript of that interview was offered in evidence and rejected. On October 11, 1956, the prosecuting attorney of Adams County, in company with a stenographer and two detectives, interviewed the petitioner in his hospital room. He at that time had been charged with murder by an information filed in the Superior Court of Adams County. He was not represented by an attorney. He did not ask for an attorney. He had not been taken before a committing magistrate.

At 2:25 p. m. on October 11, the nurse had administered to petitioner an injection of 75mgs. of demerol to relieve pain. Questioning of the petitioner began at 2:30 p. m. That interview was recorded and later typed and taken to the hospital by a notary on October 15, 1956. She found the petitioner in bed in a partially elevated position, smoking and reading. Petitioner was handed the statement to read and thereafter, under oath, signed it. The statement was received in evidence as the state's Exhibit 19. This statement, petitioner contends, should have, under all the circumstances, been rejected on the ground that it was coerced.

During the times referred to, the petitioner was a bed patient in the Sacred Heart Hospital in Spokane, Washington. He was not held incommunicado, although he was guarded. He had nurses in attendance frequently. His doctor saw him twice a day. He received visitors.

At the trial petitioner testified briefly, in the absence of the jury, concerning the questioning that resulted in his oral statement. He stated he had no recollection of it. He did not testify about the statements made on October 7 and 11, 1956, and did not take the stand in his own defense.

Petitioner was arraigned on January 4, 1957, before the Superior Court of Adams County, Washington, on the information filed against him there. No proceedings were conducted in court until an attorney had been appointed to represent him. Thereafter, he entered a plea of not guilty, and a special plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.

At the trial, evidence of the officers was received concerning the taking of the statements of petitioner. The record shows the State's evidence was introduced in the presence of the jury. No objection was made to this procedure by petitioner's trial counsel. The court instructed the jury on the weight to be given statements of petitioner.⁵

The petitioner's arraignment was delayed until his discharge from the hospital. Under the Washington statutes the appointment of counsel is to be made at the time of arraignment.⁶

Counsel for petitioner argues that the failure to arraign petitioner and to provide counsel for him, at an early date, has deprived him of his constitutional rights. Counsel must be provided to conduct the trial.⁷ There is no such general requirement as to investigative stages.

An application for writ of habeas corpus following a state court conviction is to be treated differently from that following a federal court conviction. The delay in arraignment and in appointment of counsel in a state court case are relevant only as they bear on petitioner's contention that he has been deprived of a fair trial, through the use of a coerced confession or otherwise.⁸

In Crooker v. State of California, 357 U.S. 433, 78 S.Ct. 1287, 2 L.Ed.2d 1448, the defendant repeatedly asked for, and was refused the right to, counsel. The defendant Crooker was educated and was well aware of his constitutional rights. After repeated questioning he finally confessed, and later claimed his confession was coerced. In rejecting his claim, the majority of the Court in that case said (357 U.S. at pages 437-438, 78 S.Ct. at page 1290):

"The bare fact of police `detention and police examination in private of one in official state custody' does not render involuntary a confession by the one so detained. Brown v. Allen, 1953, 344 U.S. 443, 476, 73 S.Ct. 397, 417, 97 L.Ed. 469. Neither does an admonition by the police to tell the truth, Sparf v. United States, 1895, 156 U.S. 51, 55-56, 15 S.Ct. 273, 275, 39 L.Ed. 343, nor the failure of state authorities to comply with local statutes requiring that an accused promptly be brought

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