Shoshone Mining Company v. Royal Rutter
Citation | 20 S.Ct. 726,44 L.Ed. 864,177 U.S. 505 |
Decision Date | 30 April 1900 |
Docket Number | No. 208,208 |
Parties | SHOSHONE MINING COMPANY, Appt. , v. ROYAL J. RUTTER and F. W. Bradley |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Messrs. W. B. Heyburn and Lyttleton Price for appellant.
Mr. Curtis H. Lindley for appellees.
In Blackburn v. Portland Gold Min. Co. 175 U. S. 571, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 222, 44 L. ed.—, decided January 8, 1900, we held that a suit brought in support of an adverse claim under §§ 2325 and 2326 of the Revised Statutes was not a suit arising under the laws of the United States in such a sense as to confer jurisdiction on a Federal court regardless of the citizenship of the parties. In this case the same question is again presented, and has been elaborately argued by counsel against the opinion we then announced. Its importance, as well as the great ability with which it was argued by counsel for appellee, has induced a careful re-examination of the question. While it may be con- ceded that the matter is not free from doubt, nevertheless our re-examination has not led us to change our former views. We deem it unnecessary to restate all the reasons given in the opinion then delivered, and yet some matters may appropriately be noticed.
By the Constitution (art. 3, § 2) the judicial power of the United States extends 'to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States' and to controversies 'between citizens of different states.' By article 4, § 3, cl. 2, Congress is given 'power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States.' Under these clauses Congress might doubtless provide that any controversy of a judicial nature arising in or growing out of the disposal of the public lands should be litigated only in the courts of the United States. The question, therefore, is not one of the power of Congress, but of its intent. It has so constructed the judicial system of the United States that the great bulk of litigation respecting rights of property, although those rights may in their inception go back to some law of the United States, is in fact carried on in the courts of the several states. It has provided that the Federal courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction of admiralty and patent litigation, and jurisdiction concurrent with the state courts of suits arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States. U. S. Rev. Stat. 629; 25 Stat. at L. 433, chap. 866.
When in § 2326, Rev. Stat., Congress authorized that which is familiarly known in the mining regions as an 'adverse suit,' it simply declared that the adverse claimant should commence proceedings 'in a court of competent jurisdiction.' It did not in express language prescribe either a Federal or a state court, and did not provide for exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction. If it had intended that the jurisdiction should be vested only in the Federal courts, it would undoubtedly have said so. If it had intended that any new rule of demarcation between the jurisdiction of the Federal and state courts should apply, it would likewise undoubtedly have said so. Leaving the matter as it did, it unquestionably meant that the competency of the court should be determined by rules theretofore prescribed in respect to the jurisdiction of the Federal courts. In that view, if the adverse suit were between citizens of different states, and the value of the thing in controversy exceeded $2,000, then by virtue of the general provisions of the statutes the Federal courts might take jurisdiction, or, if the suit was one arising under the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and the amount in controversy was over $2,000, then also the Federal courts might take jurisdiction. Conversely, it would be true that if the amount in controversy was not in excess of $2,000, or if the parties were not citizens of different states, and the suit was not one arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, the Federal courts could not take jurisdiction.
In the present case diverse citizenship does not exist. Jurisdiction must, therefore depend upon the question whether the suit is one arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States.
We pointed out in the former opinion that it was well settled that a suit to enforce a right which takes its origin in the laws of the United States is not necessarily one arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, within the meaning of the jurisdiction clauses; for if it did, every action to establish title to real estate (at least in the newer states) would be such a one, as all titles in those states come from the United States or by virtue of its laws. As said by Mr. Chief Justice Waite, in Little York Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U. S. 199, 203, 24 L. ed. 656, 658.
.
The adverse suit, Rev. Stat. § 2326, is 'to determine the question of the right of possession.' That right may or may not involve the construction or effect of the Constitution or a law or treaty of the United States. By §§ 2319, 2324 and 2332, Revised Statutes, it is expressly provided that this right of possession may be determined by 'local customs of rules of miners in the several mining districts, so far as the same are applicable and not inconsistent with the laws of the United States;' or 'by the statute of limitations for mining claims of the state or territory where the same may be situated.' So that in a given case the right of possession may not involve any question under the Constitution or laws of the United States, but simply a determination of local rules and customs, or state statutes, or even only a mere matter of fact.
The recognition by Congress of local customs and statutory provisions as at times controlling the right of possession does not incorporate them into the body of Federal law. Section 2 of article I of the Constitution provides that the electors in each state of members of the House of Representatives 'shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature,' but this does not make the statutes and constitutional provisions of the various states in reference to the qualifications of electors parts of the Constitution or laws of the United States.
On August 8, 1890, Congress enacted (26 Stat. at L. 313, chap. 728) that intoxicating liquors transported into any state or territory 'shall upon arrival in such state or territory be subject to the operation and effect of the laws of such state or territory,' etc., and in Re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 561, sub nom. Wilkerson v. Rahrer, 35 L. ed. 572, 576, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 865, 869, this court said:
'Congress has not attempted to delegate the power to regulate commerce, or to exercise any power reserved to the states, or to grant a power not possessed by the states, or to adopt state laws.'
In Miller v. Swann, 150 U. S. 132, 136, 37 L. ed. 1028, 1029, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 52, 54, it appeared that the state of Alabama had passed an act containing this provision: 'The said Alabama & Chattanooga Railroad Company shall have the privilege and right of selling said lands or any part thereof in accordance with the acts of Congress granting the same;' and it was held:
Inasmuch, therefore, as the 'adverse suit' to determine the right of possession may not involve any question as to the construction or effect of the Constitution or laws of the United States, but may present simply a question of fact as to the time of the discovery of mineral,...
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