Amos v. Maryland Dept. of Public Safety and Correctional Services

• Citation: 178 F.3d 212
• Decision Date: 04 December 1998
• Docket Number: No. 96-7091,96-7091
• Parties: , 9 A.D. Cases 769 Granville AMOS; Harvey W. Bloxom; Michael A. Holt; Teddy T. Jones; Charles Madison; Howard Megginson; Boris Prymerman; Gary Ralph; John Smith; Michael Hilman Smith; William Lewis Smith; Calvin J. Whiting; Dennis Brian Absher, Plaintiffs-Appellants, United States of America, Intervenor, and Winfried Lee Rhodes, Plaintiff, v. MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONAL SERVICES; Roxbury Correctional Institution, Hagerstown, Maryland; Richard Lanham, Sr., in his official capacity as Commissioner, Maryland Division of Correction; John P. Galley, in his official capacity as Warden, Roxbury Correctional Institution; Ronald Moats, Warden, Roxbury Correctional Institution; William Smith, Warden, Maryland House of Correction, Defendants-Appellees. National Advisory Group for Justice; The Association of State Correctional Administrators, Amici Curiae. . Argued:
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)

178 F.3d 212,

9 A.D. Cases 769

Granville AMOS; Harvey W. Bloxom; Michael A. Holt; Teddy T Jones; Charles Madison; Howard Megginson; Boris Prymerman Gary Ralph; John Smith; Michael Hilman Smith; William Lewis Smith; Calvin J. Whiting; Dennis Brian Absher, Plaintiffs-Appellants United States of America, Intervenor and Winfried Lee Rhodes, Plaintiff, v. MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONAL SERVICES; Roxbury Correctional Institution, Hagerstown, Maryland; Richard Lanham, Sr., in his official capacity as Commissioner, Maryland Division of Correction; John P. Galley, in his official capacity as Warden, Roxbury Correctional Institution; Ronald Moats, Warden, Roxbury Correctional Institution; William Smith, Warden, Maryland House of Correction, Defendants-Appellees. National Advisory Group for Justice; The Association of State Correctional Administrators, Amici Curiae.

No. 96-7091.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: Dec. 4, 1998.

Decided: June 24, 1999.

ARGUED: Marjorie Lynn Rifkin, National Prison Project, ACLU Foundation, Washington, D.C., for Appellants. Seth Michael Galanter, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Intervenor. Maureen Mullen Dove, Assistant Attorney General, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees. Marci A. Hamilton, Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, New York, New York, for Amicus Curiae ASCA. ON BRIEF: Margaret Winter, Elizabeth Alexander, Jerome W. Wesevich, National Prison Project, ACLU Foundation, Washington, D.C., for Appellants. Bill Lann Lee, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Jessica Dunsay Silver, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Intervenor. J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, Stephanie Lane-Weber, Assistant Attorney General, David P. Kennedy, Assistant Attorney General, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees. Barbara E. Ransom, Kirsten E. Keefe, the Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for Amicus Curiae Advisory Group.

Before MURNAGHAN and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and CLARKE, Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.

Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Senior Judge Clarke wrote the opinion. Judge Murnaghan wrote a concurring opinion. Judge Williams wrote a dissenting opinion.

OPINION

CLARKE, Senior District Judge.

Thirteen disabled Maryland state prisoners (collectively Appellants) incarcerated at Roxbury Correctional Institution (RCI) at Hagerstown, Maryland, brought suit against RCI, the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (MDPSCS), Richard Lanham, the Commissioner of the Maryland Division of Correction, and John P. Galley, the Warden of RCI (collectively Appellees), alleging that Appellees violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), see 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12131-12165 (West 1995 & Supp.1997); and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, see 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West Supp.1997). This case was originally before the Court on appeal from a grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellees. Based on our analysis of the statutes under the clear statement rule, and in light of our decision in Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340 (4th Cir.1995), we found that the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act do not apply to state prisons. We affirmed the judgment of the district court, see Amos v. Md. Dept. of Pub. Safety & Corr. Serv., 126 F.3d 589 (4th Cir.1997) (Amos I ), and Appellants petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for certiorari. On June 22, 1998, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated our opinion in Amos I, and remanded in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Pennsylvania Dept. of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 118 S.Ct. 1952, 141 L.Ed.2d 215 (1998). See Amos v. Md. Dept. of Pub. Safety & Corr. Serv., --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 2339, 141 L.Ed.2d 710 (1998). ¹

I.

In Yeskey, a state prisoner had been denied admission to a Motivational Boot Camp Program because of his medical history of hypertension. The Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit's opinion that the ADA does apply to state prisons, stating explicitly that Congress drafted the ADA in unambiguous terms. Based on the unambiguous text of the statute, the Court held that Congress clearly intended to include state prisons within the scope of the ADA. See Yeskey, 118 S.Ct. at 1953-54. Although the Court ruled that Congress intended for the ADA and Rehabilitation Act to apply to state prisons, the Court expressly declined to rule on the issue of whether application of the ADA to state prisons is a constitutional exercise of Congress' legislative power, either under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Commerce Clause. Id. at 1956.

By Order of July 10, 1998, after this Court regained jurisdiction over Amos I on remand, we directed both parties to file supplemental briefs addressing the issue of the constitutionality of the application of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act to state prisons. Both Appellants and Appellees, as well as the United States as intervenor and several amicus curiae, filed briefs addressing the issue. ² Being bound to reject our panel's previous opinion in Amos I, and to follow instead the direction of the Supreme Court, ³ we must now base our analysis of the statutes' constitutionality on the premise that Congress did intend for the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act to apply to state prisons. Under such analysis, we hold that Congress did in fact act constitutionally when it enacted the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act pursuant to its enforcement powers under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment with the intent that the statutes apply to state prisons.

Before we go further, however, we note that with our holding today, we continue to have our reservations, stated in Torcasio and Amos I, about the far-reaching and serious implications for the management of state prisons that will result from application of these Acts to those institutions. We agree with the Seventh Circuit that

[i]t might seem absurd to apply the Americans with Disabilities Act to prisoners. Prisoners are not a favored group in society; the propensity of some of them to sue at the drop of a hat is well known; prison systems are strapped for funds; the practical effect of granting disabled prisoners rights of access that might require costly modifications of prison facilities might be the curtailment of educational, recreational, and rehabilitative programs for prisoners, in which event everyone might be worse off ....

Crawford v. Indiana Dept. of Corrections, 115 F.3d 481, 486 (7th Cir.1997). Our job today, however, is simply to decide whether Congress, in pursuing its clear objective, exceeded its constitutional authority. Since we hold that Congress acted constitutionally under its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers, our opinion as to the prudence of Congress' choice to make the statutes applicable to state prisons is irrelevant. ⁴

II.

When Congress enacted the ADA, it "invoke[d] the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment ... in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities." 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(b)(4) (West 1995). Thus, we begin our analysis with the Equal Protection Clause and § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, noting, as we did in Amos I, that "because Congress has directed that Title II of the ADA be interpreted in a manner consistent with § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, see 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12134(b), 12201(a) (West 1995), we combine the analysis of the prisoners' ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims." Amos I, 126 F.3d at 593, n. 2 (citing Shafer v. Preston Mem'l Hosp., 107 F.3d 274, 276, n. 3 (4th Cir.1997); Doe v. University of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1264, n. 9 (4th Cir.1995); Tyndall v. National Educ. Ctrs., Inc., 31 F.3d 209, 213, n. 1 (4th Cir.1994)). We also note that although § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act does not state explicitly that it was enacted pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court has stated in dicta that "[t]he Rehabilitation Act was passed pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 472, n. 2, 107 S.Ct. 2941, 97 L.Ed.2d 389 (1987) (citing Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 244-45, n. 4, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 87 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985)).

A.

Congress has the power to protect classes of persons from arbitrary discrimination by the States. This power is rooted in the Equal Protection Clause of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution which guarantees that no State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The Supreme Court has stated that the Equal Protection Clause "is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). The Supreme Court has specifically found that the Equal Protection Clause protects the physically and mentally disabled from arbitrary discrimination by the States, even though the disabled do not themselves constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class of persons. Id. at 446, 105 S.Ct. 3249.

Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment grants to Congress the power to enforce the mandates of the Equal Protection Clause through legislation that is aimed at remedying or preventing violations of the Amendment. This remedial power has traditionally been quite broad, not only in the context of racial discrimination and voting rights, but in other areas of discrimination as well. See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 100 S.Ct. 1548, 64 L.Ed.2d 119, reh'g denied, 447 U.S. 916, 100 S.Ct. 3003, 64 L.Ed.2d 865 (1980); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 91 S.Ct. 260, 27...