People v. Jackson

Decision Date30 November 1961
Docket NumberNo. 35687,35687
Citation23 Ill.2d 263,178 N.E.2d 310
PartiesPEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. LeRoy JACKSON, Plaintiff in Error.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Thomas M. Hills, Chicago, for appellant.

William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., Daniel P. Ward, State's Atty., Chicago, for appellee.

DAILY, Justice.

At a jury trial conducted in the criminal court of Cook County, the defendant, LeRoy Jackson, was convicted of murdering one Louise Jackson, and was sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of 199 years. Upon writ of error to review that judgment he contends the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence, and in instructing the jury.

Since the facts are fully set forth in People v. Jackson, 9 Ill.2d 484, 138 N.E.2d 528, it is necessary at this time to repeat only the essential circumstances involved in the charge against defendant. At about 4:00 A.M. on the morning of April 9, 1954, Louise Jackson, who was not related to defendant, was fatally stabbed in her bedroom at 3547 Cottage Grove Avenue, Chicago. The weapon used was a paring knife which had been stolen in the burglary of a nearby home approximately an hour earlier. Defendant was arrested on May 24, 1954, and, the following day, signed a 23-page confession stating in detail how he had acquired the knife in the earlier burglary and then killed Louise Jackson when she resisted his attempt to rob her. A gun found in his possession was likewise identified as one stolen at the same time the knife was taken. At a preliminary hearing on June 2, 1954, without being represented by counsel or advised of his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, defendant, in answer to questions propounded both by the court and an assistant State's Attorney, admitted under oath that he had stabbed the victim during the course of a robbery.

When the cause was tried a transcript of the proceedings at the preliminary hearing was admitted into evidence against defendant, and it is his initial contention that this was reversible error in that his constitutional right against self-incrimination was violated. Specifically, the record discloses that defendant was called and sworn at the preliminary hearing at the request of an assistant State's Attorney, aftet which the following interrogation occurred:

'Q. LeRoy, you know my name is Irving Lang. A. Yes.

'Q. And you know you are in the courtroom of Judge Schiller, is that correct, at this time? And this is the Judge before you is that correct? A. Yes.

'Q. LeRoy, at this time, I want to ask you, did you stab Louise Jackson on April 9, 1954? A. I did.

'Q. That is the girl, lady, on 3800, 3857 Cottage, is that correct, approximately? A. Yes.

'Q. This, you tell us now of your own free will in front of this Judge, is that correct? A. Yes.

'The Court: Why did you do this?

'Q. Why did you stab Louise Jackson? A. She was resisting robbery.

'The Court: She was resisting robbery? A. Yes.

'Q. Where was this robbery; on the street or in the house? A. In her home.

'Q. It was a burglary? A. You might call it that.

'Q. How did you get in? A. Through a window.'

At the outset it should be noted that we are here concerned, not with an extrajudicial confession, but with an admission of guilt elicited in the course of a judicial proceeding. When the former is involved it has been held that the constitutional provision concerning self-incrimination does not apply and that the fact that an accused was not warned the confession might be used against him does not render the confession inadmissible (People v. Fox, 319 Ill. 606, 611, 150 N.E. 347; People v. Kelly, 404 Ill. 281, 286, 89 N.E.2d 27), but it does not necessarily follow that the same precepts apply where a confession is made in the course of a judicial proceeding. By reason of their very nature, such proceedings are cloaked with the solemnity and authority inherent in courts, and there exists the highest duty to see that an accused is fairly and properly treated and his rights observed.

Although we do not find that the precise question concerning the admissibility of a judicial confession made at a preliminary hearing has ever been presented to this court before, the cases clearly differentiate between judicial and extrajudicial confessions. In People v. Cochran, 313 Ill. 508, 145 N.E. 207, we held that statements made by the accused before a grand jury were inadmissible upon trial even though he had been informed prior to his appearance before the grand jury that he was not required to testify and that his testimony might be used for any purpose. In Lyons v. People, 137 Ill. 602, 616, 27 N.E. 677, 681, certain admissions made by defendant before a coroner's jury were used against him upon trial. While the court was of the opinion that his rights had not been violated in that particular instance, the following observation was made: 'It has been held that if a party testifying before a coroner or committing magistrate is actually under arrest, though it may be without a warrant, his testimony is indamissible. But this rule applies where the accused party is put on his oath and sworn and examined, not on his own motion, but on the motion of the prosecution. Statements made under such circumstances may not only be unreliable, but inquisitorial, in their character. Where a man arrested by an officer, without a warrant, upon suspicion of having committed murder, is compelled to answer under oath as a witness at a coroner's inquest, statements which he thus makes are not admissible against him on his trial for the murder.'

Similarly in Gardner v. People, 106 Ill. 76, 83, the reliance upon evidence obtained by interrogating the accused at time of arraignment was condemned in the following terms: 'The calling on one to plead to an indictment can not be made the occasion for extracting from him criminating evidence against himself. * * * Under no circumstances ought the court, in such case, to proceed to examine the accused, as seems to have been done here, with a view of determining whether the killing was murder or some other offense. This was, in effect, trying the prisoner by the court, which, of course, is wholly incompatible with the safeguards which the law has thrown around one charged with a capital offense.'

To uphold the admissibility of the judicial admission of guilt in this instance, the People rely upon People v. Farrell, 349 Ill. 129, 181 N.E. 703; Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 16 S.Ct. 895, 40 L.Ed. 1090, and Powers v. United States, 223 U.S. 303, 32 S.Ct. 281, 56 L.Ed. 448. But none of these...

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  • State v. McKenzie
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • April 18, 1973
    ...of his right not to testify,' 79 A.L.R.2d 643; People v. Kramer, 227 Cal.App.2d 199, 38 Cal.Rptr. 487 (1964); People v. Jackson, 23 Ill.2d 263, 178 N.E.2d 310 (1961). Fundamental fairness demands that the uncounseled defendant be informed of the ramifications of his taking the stand and of ......
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    ...25 Ill.2d 568, 573, 185 N.E.2d 676; People v. Jackson (1956), 9 Ill.2d 484, 490-91, 138 N.E.2d 528, Appeal after remand (1966), 23 Ill.2d 263, 178 N.E.2d 310; People v. Jenko (1951), 410 Ill. 478, 482, 102 N.E.2d Almost three decades ago, in Jenko, the court set forth the rule which it has ......
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    ...criminal proceeding, despite lack of counsel, so long as certain requirements are met. These requirements, set forth in People v. Jackson, 23 Ill.2d 263, 178 N.E.2d 310, call for affirmative proof showing that the accused was advised of his right to refuse to testify; that he was advised th......
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    • March 7, 1969
    ...(1963). In support of its position that defendant Musil was adequately advised of his rights, the state refers us to People v. Jackson, 23 Ill.2d 263, 178 N.E.2d 310 (1961). In that case the defendant was arrested on a murder charge. The day after his arrest he signed a lengthy confession d......
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